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Abstract 
This thesis examines the extent to which landlords of property portfolios are permitted by law 
to take account of the interests of other properties in their portfolio when exercising control 
over individual properties.  It also examines what rights individual tenants have in the 
management of of their landlord's portfolio, and what effect competition law might have on 
portfolio landlords' control.  The courts' approach to the reasonableness of a landlord's 
withholding of consent is considered in detail, with particular attention paid to how it may 
affect the ability of portfolio landlords to protect the rest of their properties from harm 
through the withholding of consent.  Attention is also given to the legislative interference in 
the law of landlord and tenant, and the areas where Parliament considered the impact of law 
on portfolio landlords, such as fines provisions in the Landlord and Tenant Act 1927, and in 
the rejection of proposals for mandatory full qualification of user covenants.  The need for 
competition law in the land sector in response to the market power of portfolio landlords is 
also discussed.  Finaly, a number of ways for tenants to have some say in the management of 
the portfolio are examined.  These include contractual provisions intended to empower the 
tenant, the doctrine of non-derogation from grant, the use of letting schemes, the use of 
competition law to escape restrictive covenants, cooperation between landlords and tenants 
and the use of alternative dispute resolution to maintain amicable landlord-tenant 
relationships. 
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1. Introduction 
Many commercial properties in the UK are let from landlords who control not just isolated 
properties, but broad portfolios.  As shopping centres continue to gain in popularity over the 
high street, the benefits which can be realised through centralised control of property 
portfolios are apparent. 
This thesis first examines these potential benefits, achievable through the common ownership 
and control of property portfolios.  It then sets out the constraints that the law places on 
landlords, and considers whether the law inhibits the capturing of these potential benefits.  
This leads to further questions, such as what role the law may have in facilitating portfolio 
landlords in taking account of their whole estate when managing a property within it; whether 
there are any potential drawbacks to the centralisation of control in a property portfolio and 
how the law might address them; and what solutions exist for the problems of co-ordinating 
ongoing landlord-tenant relationships in the context of a portfolio.  These questions are also 
addressed. 
Throughout this thesis, it is sought to relate legal analysis back to commercial practice and, 
through the lens of law and economics, to analyse the effect that the law has on the incentives 
facing landlords and tenants.  This is intended to provide insight into the workings of the law, 
and to identify areas for potential reform.  It is also used to assess the extent to which judges 
and regulators take account of commercial practice in shaping the law. 
Comparisons are made throughout the thesis between the commercial practice, case law and 
legislative environment in England and Wales with that in other countries.  Such comparisons 
are not intended to be thorough comparative reviews of the systems in question, but rather as 
illustrations of particular points of interest.  Differences in commercial practice may arise as a 
result of structural factors or regulation, and may dictate the need for regulatory interventions 
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specific to a particular jurisdiction.  The approach adopted by courts in other common law 
jurisdictions may provide guidance in novel factual situations, or act as persuasive authority 
in evolving areas of the law. 
Although this thesis concerns property portfolios in general, many of the relevant commercial 
differences between portfolio and standalone lettings relate to "agglomeration effects" and the 
interaction between nearby properties.  These effects are most noticeable in the retail sector 
and a significant body of work has examined the issue of tenant mix.  Therefore, much of this 
thesis will examine concerns which are only likely to apply to retail portfolio properties. 
Thesis overview 
Chapter 2 - Commercial management of real property - examines the commercial factors 
underlying the relationship of landlord and tenant and the motivations driving each party. 
Drawing from commercial literature, the importance for landlords, of being able to control 
certain aspects of leasehold property is explained.  Following on from this, the nature of the 
property portfolio is explored.  The significance of multiple properties being managed 
together in a portfolio is considered, with a particular focus on the interaction of properties 
employed for different retail uses within a portfolio.  The issue of tenant mix is discussed 
from the perspectives of the commercial property management literature and economic 
theory.  This chapter also lays the groundwork for an analysis of the law from the perspective 
of law and economics. 
Chapter 3 - The law governing the management of commercial lettings - follows on from the 
discussion in Chapter 2 on the importance to a landlord of being able to control certain 
aspects of their property, outlining how the law in England and Wales governs the exercise of 
such control.  In particular, the chapter addresses how the law governs the control which a 
landlord may exercise over dealings by a tenant with their interest in the property; how the 
-3- 
tenant uses the property; and any alterations they may make to the physical structure of the 
property. 
Chapter 4 - The reasonable landlord and the portfolio - builds on the description of the law 
outlined in Chapter 3.  Many controls retained by landlords consist of a requirement in a lease 
for the tenant to seek consent from the landlord; and these are often qualified by a provision 
that such consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.  The interpretation given by the courts 
to reasonableness will be crucial, as it defines the level of control reserved to landlords by 
such covenants.  This is examined in detail through case law.  Finally, reasonableness is 
examined specifically in the context of portfolio properties, to determine whether any special 
treatment is given to portfolio landlords, and whether the approach taken by the courts allows 
portfolio landlords sufficient control over individual tenants to realise the benefits achievable 
through common ownership. 
Chapter 5 - Portfolio landlords and legislative policy - examines how Parliament has taken 
account of portfolio landlords in how it legislated to change the landlord-tenant relationship, 
and how legislation might constrain or facilitate the unified management of a property 
portfolio.  Given the potential benefits available to society through the co-ordination of 
property portfolios by landlords, it is in the public interest to allow portfolio landlords 
sufficient scope to realise these benefits.  The effect of legislation on landlords is analysed 
from a law and economics perspective, to determine whether Parliament has been successful 
in facilitating portfolio landlords, or whether too wide a berth has been taken by legislators for 
fear of obstructing portfolio landlords.  Chapter 5 also introduces the concept of competition 
law.  The power exercisable by portfolio landlords may be used to harm the public interest by 
restricting competition.  In 2011, an exemption to competition law for land agreements was 
-4- 
withdrawn.  This chapter examines the reasons for this, and the protections under competition 
law for portfolio landlords exercising control in line with the public interest. 
Chapter 6 - The ongoing relationship of landlord and tenant - looks at landlords' management 
of portfolios from a different perspective.  Chapters 3, 4, and 5 address how and when a 
landlord may be entitled to take the interests of his portfolio as a whole into account in 
making decisions relating to a single property.  In contrast, Chapter 6 asks when a landlord 
will - and when he may be required to - take the interests of a single property into account in 
his management of the portfolio as a whole, or of individual other properties in the portfolio.  
It also examines when tenants may be able to enforce rights directly against neighbouring 
tenants, and when they may be able to rely on competition law to escape the landlord's 
control.  In addition to legal rights tenants may have in the management of a portfolio, this 
chapter examines how the relationship of the parties works, and how co-operation can be 
promoted.  It also examines the potential for the use of alternative dispute resolution in the 
context of an ongoing landlord-tenant relationship. 
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2. Commercial management of real property  
 
In order to understand how the law takes account of a landlord’s interests beyond 
those relating to a property which is the subject of proceedings, it is first necessary to 
examine the commercial underpinnings of a landlord’s actions.  In this chapter, the 
context within which landlords make their decisions and the economic motivations 
driving them are examined. 
This thesis concerns the management of commercial property portfolios.  "Portfolio" 
is used to denote a number of properties let separately, whether they form part of the 
same building or development, or not, although the focus will be on neighbouring 
properties.  While different types of commercial property will be considered, property 
in use for retail purposes will be examined in most detail, as the conduct of 
neighbouring retail tenants can have a very pronounced effect on one another, and 
there is ample literature examining the management of shopping centres.  
Nevertheless, many of the principles will apply to non-retail commercial property 
portfolios. 
2.1 The landlord 
At this juncture, I should briefly explain what is meant by “landlord”.   The variety of 
investment structures through which property is owned and managed is ever growing, 
and much financial literature is dedicated to identifying the correct structure for a 
particular investor’s needs.1  These structures often end up separating the management 
and ownership functions, potentially leading to confusion. 
                                                 
1
 E.g. Nigel Dubben, Property Portfolio Management: An Introduction (London ; New York: 
Routledge, 1991); Su Han Chan, John Erickson & Ko Wang, Real Estate Investment Trusts: Structure, 
Performance, and Investment Opportunities (Oxford University Press, 2003); Gaylon E Greer & 
Phillip T Kolbe, Investment Analysis for Real Estate Decisions (Dearborn Real Estate, 2003). 
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In a legal sense, "landlord" generally denotes the owner of the reversion to a lease.2  
Certainly the owner of a reversion enjoys the legal rights associated with the 
management functions, but often these are in fact delegated.  It may even be the case 
that different elements of the management functions are delegated to different agents.3  
The financial literature on the subject places a great emphasis on the owner – the 
beneficial owner in that it is the person or entity entitled to the profits – whether in 
terms of setting up and organising a portfolio of investments or appointing 
management agents.4 
For the purposes of this thesis, “landlord” will be used to refer to the combined 
ownership and management functions, whether or not they are in fact vested in the 
same entity. 
2.2 The scope of property management 
The task of managing property is often referred to by the term “estate management”.5 
This can often be a confusing term. In its commercial sense, there are a number of 
understandings of it, reflecting the various interests that different parties have in the 
process. 
                                                 
2
 See, for example Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954, s 44. 
3
 Michael Pitt & Zairul N Musa, “Towards defining shopping centres and their management systems” 
(2009) 8:1 J Retail Leisure Property 39 at 47; Malcolm H Kirkup & Mohammed Rafiq, “Marketing 
shopping centres: challenges in the UK context” (1999) 5:5 Journal of Marketing Practice: Applied 
Marketing Science 119. 
4
 Tony Feng & David Geltner, “Property-Level Performance Attribution: Investment Management 
Diagnostics and the Investment Importance of Property Management” (2011) 37:5 Journal of Portfolio 
Management 110; Jacques Gordon, “The Real Estate Portfolio Manager: DIPs, SIPs and REITs” 
(1998) 4:2 Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management 169; Stephen A Pyhrr et al, “Project and 
Portfolio Management Decisions: A Framework and Body of Knowledge Model for Cycle Research” 
(2003) 9:1 Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management 1. 
5
 Banfield notes current market practice is to refer to it as “real estate management”: Anthony Banfield, 
Stapleton’s Real Estate Management Practice (Taylor & Francis, 2005) at xi., although I retain the 
older term as it continues to be used in legal settings. 
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Arnison defines estate management as “all aspects of long-term property ownership 
and control, including development and investment.”6  A 1974 Royal Institution of 
Chartered Surveyors (RICS) policy review defined Estate Management (for Chartered 
Surveyors) as:7 
All facets of the use, development and management of urban land, including 
the sale, purchase and letting of residential, commercial and industrial 
property and the management of urban estates; and advice to clients on 
planning. 
Thorncroft, concerned with the “estate” in its abstract, legal sense, defined the term 
as:8 
The direction and supervision of ‘an interest’ in landed property with the aim 
of securing the optimum return; this return need not always be financial but 
may be in terms of social benefit, status, prestige, political power or some 
other goal or group of goals. 
The first two definitions cast a wide net, portraying estate management as both a 
strategic-level activity and day-to-day concern.  It encompasses everything done in 
the management of property.  One aspect of it which is only mentioned expressly by 
Arnison, but which can be seen throughout the literature on the subject is that it is 
concerned with long-term performance. This distinguishes it from speculative 
activities, which distinction may be relevant from a public policy perspective. 
Thorncroft’s definition is useful for a number of reasons.  First, it recognises that 
there are many different types of interests which may be managed, not merely 
ownership of a fee simple.  Estate management is just as relevant to the management 
of leasehold interests for example.  The important factor is that the interest gives the 
                                                 
6
 CJ Arnison, “Masters and Tenants: Leasehold Tenure as a Mechanism for Moral Governance” in 
David Chiddick & Alan Millington, eds, Land Management: New Directions: An Edited Publication of 
the Proceedings of the Land Management Research Conference Held at Leicester Polytechnic from 15-
17 September 1983 (London: Spon, 1984) 136 at 136. 
7
 Cited in: Banfield, supra note 5 at 19. 
8
 Michael Thorncroft, Principles of estate management (Estates Gazette, Ltd., 1965). 
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landlord some degree of control, so that he has some ongoing involvement with the 
property, beyond mere ownership rights.  Secondly, Thorncroft recognises non-
financial goals for estate management. The literature as a whole demonstrates a bias 
towards financial motivations alone for the holding of property, but this definition 
recognises other possible motivations.9 
Financial returns can be sought through capital growth (i.e. growth in the value of the 
reversion), rental income or a mixture of the two.10  The strategy a landlord chooses 
will depend on a large number of factors, including the qualities of the property in 
question, the flexibility of existing leases, his risk profile, and wider market 
conditions. 
2.2.1 Estate management and property management 
Some literature in the business sphere seeks to distinguish between estate 
management (in the sense of the Thorncroft definition) and property management – 
the commercial management of a property.11  This terminology reflects a less 
legalistic (and perhaps more practical) view of real property than classic estate 
management.  This may be accounted for by its focus on the owner-occupier rather 
than the landlord, the former being less concerned with the intricacies of the legal 
interests in his premises. 
Hines defines property management as:  
the art or science of operating, dealing with, or otherwise handling land or the 
improvements which are held for rent or for the production of income in a 
manner as to produce for the owners, within the limits of the law and 
                                                 
9
 See also: Dubben, supra note 1 at 9. 
10
 Ibid at 4. 
11
 Mark Deakin, Property Management: Corporate Strategies, Financial Instruments and the Urban 
Environment (Aldershot ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004) at 10. 
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responsibility to the community, a maximum of economic return over the 
period of management.12 
In short, this definition asserts that property management is an exercise in profit 
maximisation.  To accomplish this, Hines sets out the following functions of property 
managers in the context of a shopping centre:13 
merchandising the space to obtain a maximum gross income; 
reducing operating and maintenance costs to attain maximum net income; 
reducing the finance costs to the owner; and 
adapting the center to environmental and market changes over time. 
This understanding of property management is perhaps more focused on the day-to-
day operation of a property than the longer-term view expressed by the estate 
management definitions above, but is certainly addressing the same areas of concern.  
For example, in a legal context. the management of tenant mix in a shopping centre 
has been held to be good estate management,14 although it would likely also fall 
within the definition of property management. 
As such, there is no meaningful distinction between estate and property management 
for the purposes of this thesis, and no distinction will be made between the two. 
2.2.2 Corporate real estate management 
Put simply, corporate real estate management (CREM), is the management of 
property as a factor of production.15  The term was first used by Zeckhauser and 
Silverman, to draw attention to the fact that for many companies not in the real estate 
                                                 
12
 Mary Alice Hines, Shopping Center Development and Investment, 2nd ed ed, Real estate for 
professional practitioners (New York ; Chichester: Wiley, 1988) at 171. 
13
 Ibid at 172.. 
14
 Moss Bros Group plc v CSC Properties Ltd, [1999] EGCS 47. 
15
 Banfield, supra note 5 at 297. 
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business, a significant portion of their balance sheets is taken up by property.16  The 
cost (or opportunity cost17) of the capital tied up in that property should be taken 
account of for a business to operate as efficiently as possible. 
As organisations have tried to streamline their operations, much underperforming 
legacy property has been disposed of, but in some cases it is necessary for a company 
to retain property which it is not occupying itself, perhaps to permit flexibility, or to 
retain control over property interlinked with the property that is occupied. 
One of the main points to note about property managed in this fashion is that it is 
sought to be managed in the best interests of the company’s primary business, and in 
accordance with its broader business strategies.18  This has been a factor in much case 
law19 and may be relevant in assessing a landlord’s interests. 
2.2.3 Estate management and facilities management 
Facilities management refers to the management of a property from the perspective of 
the “end user” or occupier.20  This involves optimising the property for the use to 
which it is put.  Zeckhauser and Silverman have criticised this discipline for failing to 
have regard to the property itself, and the opportunity costs involved with its 
occupation,21 although it in more recent times it has embraced the financial control 
aspects of managing property.22  It combines many of the other specialities discussed 
                                                 
16
 S Zeckhauser & R Silverman, “Corporate real estate asset management in the United States” (1981) 
Harvard Real Estate, Inc [I have not been able to see this paper, have only read papers referring to it]; 
Sally Zeckhauser & Robert Silverman, “Rediscover your company’s real estate” (1983) 61:1 Harvard 
Business Review 111. 
17
 Opportunity cost is the cost of opportunities forgone in order to pursue a particular course of action. 
18
 Ranko Bon, “Ten Principles of Corporate Real Estate Management” (1994) 12:5 Facilities 9. 
19
 E.g. Stakelum v Ryan, [1980] 114 ILTR 42; Sportoffer Ltd v Erewash BC, [1999] L & TR 433; 
Sargeant v Macepark (Whittlebury) Ltd, [2004] 4 All ER 662; Whiteminster Estates v Hodges 
Menswear, (1974) 232 EG 715 (Ch). 
20
 Dubben, supra note 1 at 26.  
21
 Zeckhauser & Silverman, supra note 16 at 115. 
22
 Brian Atkin & Adrian Brooks, Total Facilities Management, 3rd ed (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2009) at 4.  
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above,23 and has taken on a number of functions traditionally associated with estate or 
property management.24 
Although it is primarily conducted by the occupier (and so not so much a concern for 
the landlord) it may become important insofar as the landlord seeks to manage a let 
property as part of its facilities management strategy for property it occupies itself, or 
where a landlord seeks to actively manage his portfolio in order to maximise rental 
income.  It may also play a part in explaining tenants’ attitudes towards maintenance 
and alterations of their properties. 
2.2.4 Legal term of art 
Despite the shifting commercial terminology surrounding the management of real 
property, in legal contexts, the phrase “good estate management” has come to denote 
a motive for action by a landlord based on best practices.25  This has been applied 
with respect to a wide range of property management functions. It has been widely 
used as a legal term of art, featuring in textbooks,26 legislation,27 and drafting 
practice.28 
Woodfall, in a passage which has attracted some negative comment from the 
judiciary,29 describes good estate management as relating to the landlord’s property 
interests beyond the property in question.30 
                                                 
23
 ibid. 
24
 ibid, 31-34. 
25
 See 6.2.1, below. 
26
 William Woodfall, Woodfall landlord and tenant (Sweet & Maxwell); Susan Bright, Landlord and 
tenant law in context (Oxford: Hart, 2007). 
27
 Landlord and Tenant (Amendment) Act, 1980, ss.17, 33 (Ireland). 
28
 eg Bright, supra note 25 at 306.  See also 6.2.1, below. 
29
 Bromley Park Garden Estates Ltd v Moss, [1982] 1 WLR 1019 at 1023. – the most recent edition has 
been modified to reflect the criticisms made of it in Bromley Park. 
30
 Woodfall, supra note 25, para 11.150. 
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Bright considered that “estate management” relates to the landlord’s core 
responsibilities towards a single property, and has used the term “leasehold estate 
management” to describe the additional functions entailed in looking after a larger 
development.31 
2.3 Approaches to management 
There are a number of different ways in which landlords may go about managing their 
properties.  In reality, a landlord’s strategy will not fit neatly into any one category 
and different elements of his management might be considered to reflect different 
approaches.  I shall examine a number of axes of comparison of different management 
styles.  The two most common are the distinctions between active and passive 
management, and between hands-on and hands-off management. 
Howard contrasts property- and business-  (or consumer-) led approaches to property 
management.32  Property-led approaches see property as a financial asset to be 
managed for best return, and to maximise value.  This may centre on ensuring 
occupancy by a tenant of good financial standing and avoiding liability for expenses 
such as maintenance.  Business-led approaches seek to maximise profitability through 
the success of the businesses occupying the landlord's property.  This distinction is 
less specific than the approaches discussed below but is useful in characterising the 
broad style of management adopted by a landlord. 
2.3.1 Active and passive management 
One of the key differences between property and other types of investment is the 
degree of management required to maintain it.  Active and passive management styles 
                                                 
31
 Bright, supra note 25 at 299. 
32
 Elizabeth Howard, “The management of shopping centres: conflict or collaboration?” (1997) 7:3 The 
International Review of Retail, Distribution and Consumer Research 263. 
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represent two alternative approaches to dealing with this need.  Prendergast et al 
suggest that the best landlords from a tenant's perspective are "more than simply 
landlords."33 
Active management involves proactively seeking out ways to maximise the 
performance of both individual properties and whole portfolios.  This requires the 
formulation of strategic plans to guide the management of the property, as well as 
periodic review of property and portfolio performance, which should feed back into 
the update of the plan. On a portfolio-wide scale, active management may involve 
selling off under-performing properties.34 
There is a strong emphasis on strategic planning in the area: “Pro-active management 
means not only being ready for the present day but also looking to the future and 
informing owners of where they stand, what should be done, and what the income and 
expense ramifications are if things don’t get done”35  Active management is also 
important in the short run.  Howard notes that the importance in management beyond 
merely maintaining and protecting property has grown in response to competition, and 
in search of improved short-run performance.36 
Refurbishments might be made to adapt to the changing marketplace, in order to 
maximise rental potential and potential rental income.  This entrepreneurial strategy 
                                                 
33
 Gerard Prendergast, Norman Marr & Brent Jarratt, “An exploratory study of tenant-manager 
relationships in New Zealand’s managed shopping centres” (1996) 24:9 International Journal of Retail 
& Distribution Management 19 at 21. 
34
 Gordon, supra note 4. 
35
 Ray Perkins, quoted in Jan Yager, “It’s about time” (2002) 67:5 Journal of Property Management 36. 
36
 Howard, supra note 31 at 266. 
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entails relatively high expenditure for the landlord’s part, increasing risk, but 
promises high returns.37 
Hutcheson identified a number of tasks that a building manager must undertake to 
ensure that the property under his charge obtains the maximum attainable returns.38  
These fall broadly into the categories of tenant relations, building maintenance and 
repair, and development.  Howard cited "innovation, competition, organization 
internal space planning, growth [and] profit" as the focus of ongoing shopping centre 
management.39  
There is an increasing focus on the collection and analysis of property data to inform 
management.  Analysis on a property-by-property basis can identify opportunities and 
causes for concern very early on, giving managers a powerful tool to make and justify 
decisions.40  Bon et al have emphasised the importance of a short feedback loop 
between changes in market conditions and management decisions, which can be 
facilitated by computerised data analysis.41  Howard notes the value of information 
sharing between landlord and tenant in helping to maximise the performance of 
both.42 
Greer and Kolbe point to the responsibility to make decisions regarding “selecting on-
site managerial personnel, negotiating maintenance contracts, making rental rate 
decisions, approving leases, and so forth” as denoting “active investment”.43  There is 
                                                 
37
 Marc E Rosendorf & Jill Reynolds Seidman, “Restrictive Covenants - The Life Cycle of a Shopping 
Center” (1998) 12 Prob & Prop 33. 
38
 John M Hutcheson, “The Life Cycle Economics of Buildings” (1994) 12:5 Facilities 11. 
39
 Howard, supra note 31 at 265. 
40
 This may be important in a legal setting given the requirements to evidence business plans used to 
base management decisions discussed in Moss Bros Group plc v CSC Properties Ltd, supra note 14. 
41
 Ranko Bon, Jay F McMahan & Paul Carder, “Property Performance Measurement: From Theory to 
Management Practice” (1994) 12:12 Facilities 18. 
42
 Howard, supra note 31. 
43
 Greer & Kolbe, supra note 1 at 4. 
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evidence to suggest that active approaches to property management are increasing in 
popularity.44 
By contrast, from the perspective of the passive manager, a property shares many 
characteristics with a long-term bond, in line with Howard's description of property-
led management.45  Managed passively, property offers a stable long-term income 
supply with some opportunities for capital growth and relatively low operating costs. 
Greer and Kolbe note that passive investment can be identified by the disconnect 
between the manager and operations.46 
Passive strategies aim to minimise risk for the landlord by devolving responsibilities 
in respect of a property to the tenant.  This style of management may be attractive to 
institutional investors due to the reduced risk, but will reduce the potential yield of the 
property, as the tenant will require a discount in order to assume the additional risk.  
This style of management may also risk depreciating both capital value and future 
rental income, as the tenant will not prioritise those factors in managing the property, 
as a landlord-manager would.  This management style is typified by a preference for 
long leases to tenants with good covenant strength, on a full repairing and insuring 
(FRI) basis, with an upward only rent review clause.47  These arrangements, which are 
known as institutional leases, were popularised in the 1980s, and allow for 
commoditisation of property interests, securities deriving from which could be traded. 
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 C M Lizieri, “Occupier Requirements in Commercial Real Estate Markets” (2003) 40:5-6 Urban 
Stud 1151. 
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2.3.2 Hands-on/-off Management 
The hands-on/ hands-off distinction relates to the amount of day-to-day involvement 
the landlord has with a property.  While it may initially appear to be strongly related 
to the active/passive distinction, it does not line up cleanly with those categories. A 
landlord who actively manages the tenant mix of a property may not take any 
responsibility for security or maintenance.  Likewise, a landlord who remains very 
involved in the day-to-day running of a property may not actively look out for 
development opportunities. 
What matters is the duties under the lease – whether it is the landlord or his direct 
employees, or a service provider contracted by the landlord who actually carries out 
the activities, so long as the landlord is responsible for having them carried out, it is 
“hands-on” management.   
As with the active/passive distinction, that between hands-on and hands-off 
management is a matter of degree.  Prendergast et al have linked the quality of a 
relationship and degree of information passing between landlords and tenants to the 
level of contact between them, 48 so hands-on management may be more successful 
for a landlord adopting a business-led approach. 
2.4 The tenant 
Another basic management function is tenant selection; both at the start of a lease and 
in deciding whether or not to consent to a disposition during the continuance of the 
lease.  Banfield points out that in truth it is the tenant of a property – rather than the 
property itself – that is the source of the landlord’s income.49  It doesn’t matter how 
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 Prendergast, Marr & Jarratt, supra note 32. 
49
 Banfield, supra note 5 at 32. 
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well a property is managed otherwise, ultimately the income is dependent on the 
tenant paying his rent. 
The covenant strength of the tenant is therefore of paramount importance to the 
landlord, both in terms of the ability of the tenant to pay rent and the ability to meet 
other obligations – such as repairing obligations.  The covenant strength of a tenant 
will be reflected strongly in the value of the reversion.50  Because of the tenant’s 
central importance to a landlord’s operations, tenant selection is key to the success of 
property management.  This is relevant both at the time of initial letting and when 
deciding on whether to consent to a disposition by a sitting tenant.51  Thus a landlord 
will want to maximise his control over the process. 
The covenant strength may not be not the only relevant consideration for a landlord.  
If a landlord owns nearby property, the issue of tenant mix will become very 
important.  This is discussed below at 2.6.2. 
2.4.1 Ongoing landlord-tenant relations 
As a result of this renewed interest in the importance of the tenant, much has been 
written about the need for landlord-tenant relations to remain cordial.52  If a landlord 
has a management role, it will be crucial for both parties that they work together.  In 
such a case, not only is the success of a landlord dependant on the success of his 
tenants, but the reverse is also true.  In order to realise the benefits of working 
                                                 
50
 John Armatys, Principles of Valuation (London: Estates Gazette, 2009) at 20. 
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 Especially in light of the changes made by the Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act, 1995 to 
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together, it is important that the parties share information and engage constructively 
rather than adversarially.53 
 
2.5 The property 
2.5.1 Repairs and maintenance 
Repairs and maintenance are of crucial importance to a tenant, as it is the tenant who 
will ultimately have to live with any defects in the property.  Similarly, a landlord will 
have a strong interest in ensuring they are carried out to maintain rental value of the 
property and prevent premature obsolescence.  However, for a number of reasons 
their interests may not align perfectly.  First, a landlord and tenant will have different 
timescales in mind when determining their interests: while a landlord will want to 
maximise rental income (and capital value) in the long term, a tenant will only be 
concerned with the duration of his lease, which may be relatively short.  Second, a 
tenant will only be concerned with defects which are likely to adversely affect his 
business, whereas a landlord will want to prevent or fix defects which could make the 
property less useful to other potential occupiers, thereby damaging the rental and 
capital values.  Additionally, landlords will be very mindful of the impact of the state 
of one property on the performance of neighbouring premises within his portfolio. 
Normally, the responsibility for repairs and maintenance will be apportioned by the 
lease.  This responsibility may fall on the landlord or the tenant.  In either case, the 
tenant will want to minimise the cost to him, while ensuring that the premises are kept 
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 Howard, supra note 31; Gary Warnaby & Kit Man Yip, “Promotional planning in UK regional 
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in adequate repair for his business, while the landlord will have the more long-term 
interests of his reversion in mind. 
2.5.2 Service charges 
It has become standard practice for landlords with responsibility for repairs and 
maintenance to recoup the costs of maintaining the property by way of a service 
charge, provided for in the lease.54  A good service charge clause will set out 
unambiguously what services the charge is to pay for and how the tenant’s liability is 
to be calculated.  Some future expenses will be difficult to predict, so it is prudent to 
allow for the scope of allowable service charges to change over time.  This may, of 
course, be done by agreement at a later date but this could be complicated where 
maintenance and repair costs are split between a large number of tenants, each of 
which might have different concerns and different priorities.  It may also be difficult 
to determine how increases in service charges should be split between tenants of 
varying sizes.  For these reasons, open-ended clauses, which set out such details, are 
often used. 
Some methods for calculating service charges are described by Adamshick, who notes 
the differing degrees of year-to-year uncertainty for both landlord and tenant 
depending on the method used.55  Banfield also lists a number of different bases for 
apportionment of service charges.56 
2.5.3 Refurbishment and renewals 
The lifecycle of a commercial property goes through a number of phases, from new 
build to obsolescence. Obsolescence will hurt the rental value of property as well as 
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its capital value.57  In order to maintain the rental and capital values of a property in 
the long run, a landlord will have to carry out periodic refurbishments and renewals.  
These will be informed by the nature of the market58 and by the evolving strategic 
management plan of the landlord. 
2.5.4 Development 
Property development goes beyond mere refurbishments or renewals.  It may become 
necessary where the property concerned has become functionally obsolete and cannot 
be adapted to meet another purpose, where market changes have reduced or 
eliminated the demand for a that kind of property in the property’s location, or where 
a premises has become structurally obsolete. 
The concept of “marriage value” – that some properties are more valuable when 
managed together – may be another reason for property development.59  Often, it is 
the case that a particular development cannot take place at all unless it can be in a 
particular place, of a minimum size, have access to particular amenities, or a 
combination of those prerequisites.  Otherwise, it may be the case that there is an 
opportunity for economies of scale, making a particular property much more valuable 
within a development than it would be outside it. 
2.6 The activities on a property 
2.6.1 User 
The ability of a property to generate returns for the landlord will be closely related to 
the use to which it is put by the tenant (or more correctly, the use to which it would be 
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put by a hypothetical replacement tenant).60  The more options a tenant has in relation 
to his occupation of a property, the higher the rent will be.  Landlords will be mindful, 
however, that some uses may disrupt the landlord’s other properties, lowering the rent 
achievable from those.  Therefore, landlords who manage a number of nearby 
properties often place relatively strict restrictions on the use to which a tenant may put 
a property.  This will have the potential to depress rental values (at least at rent 
review) but may benefit the landlord overall.61 
In addition to restricting what is done in a property generally, a user clause may place 
temporal restrictions on certain activities.  Thus, deliveries may not be permitted 
during normal office hours or an anchor tenant may be required to keep open for a 
minimum amount of hours. 
2.6.2 Tenant Mix 
The occupier of one property can have both positive and negative effects on the 
occupiers of nearby properties.62  In shopping centres especially, this has led landlords 
to consider very carefully the issue of tenant mix. 
"Tenant mix" is the “combination of business establishments occupying space in a 
shopping centre to form an assemblage that produces optimum sales, rents, service to 
the community and financiability of the shopping centre venture”63  It is a key factor 
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in the success or failure of any shopping centre.64  The principles are, of course of 
broader application, and will be helpful in analysing any group of properties in close 
proximity under the same management. 
An "ideal tenant mix" may include a broad mix of users, creating a specific image for 
the centre and allowing it to generate maximal customer flow and sales; it will create 
synergies between tenants and create a pleasant destination for shoppers while 
maximising the return on the landlord's investment.65 Because the rent achievable by a 
landlord for a property will depend on the benefit a tenant derives from it, it will often 
be the case that a landlord will be incentivised to maximise tenant profitability (this is, 
of course, tied in with the simple fact that a tenant who is not profitable will not be 
paying rent to the landlord for very long). If the incentives of landlords and tenants 
were perfectly aligned, a landlord would be incentivised to maximise total 
profitability across his portfolio, even if this means incurring an opportunity cost in 
relation to some parts of the portfolio which could be let at a higher rent but only at an 
overall disadvantage to the portfolio performance.66 
There are a number of different types of tenant mix strategies, which may be tailored 
to fit the demographics of a particular shopping centre’s location and commercial 
environment.  Some categories which are often used to describe shops are 
“comparison” shops, “destination” shops and “convenience” shops. 
The theory behind comparison shops is that when buying certain types of things (e.g. 
clothing) customers prefer to compare many different products before making a 
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purchasing decision.67  Thus, where a number of comparison shops are located 
together, it can lead to higher sales for all. 
Destination shops are destinations in their own right and so draw in large volumes of 
customers.  They may be referred to as “anchor” tenants, and are crucial to the 
success of many shopping centres.  They often pay a much lower rent per unit area 
than other tenants because of the benefits they bring to other tenants (and, thereby, to 
the landlord).68  The character of the anchor tenant may have a significant impact on 
the performance of the centre, as the type of customer attracted to the tenant will 
dictate which types of stores benefit most from the externalities.69 
Convenience shops are unlikely to draw any customers to a centre but may provide 
services to them while they are there, prolonging their stay.  Some new categories 
have emerged recently.  A shopping centre may grant a lease at very low rent to a 
tenant who will improve the performance of the centre, by keeping shoppers present 
longer, possibly targeting demographics likely to become bored and bring other 
shoppers away with them as well.70 
It is important to note that due to changes in the broader market, the ideal tenant mix 
for a particular retail agglomeration will change over time.71  The uses to which 
tenants may wish to put their property may also evolve over time.72  The landlord 
should keep the tenant mix policy under constant review in order to ensure that it is 
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suited to present market conditions.73  The ability for a landlord to control tenant mix 
in response to such changes will be vital to ensuring the long term prosperity of a 
portfolio, and of the tenants within the portfolio.  The landlord may steer the tenant 
mix on an ongoing basis through the exercise of legal controls,74 subsequent 
negotiations to buy back leases and the letting of units which become vacant. 
2.7 Managing a portfolio 
Although the bulk of the literature on portfolio management is more concerned with 
financial instruments, performance ratios and profit margins in the abstract, properties 
are not abstract financial instruments and ultimately it is the ground-level 
management which will determine their profitability.  This thesis will not address the 
gains achievable to landlords through the management of property assets in a financial 
portfolio.  Rather, it focuses on the practical management of portfolios of property. 
As noted by Bon in the context of CREM,75 “[j]ust as a fleet of ships requires overall 
strategy and co-ordination among individual vessels, so too does a ‘fleet’ of buildings. 
Although each vessel in a fleet may have a separate mission, the fleet as a whole is 
informed by a mission common to all.”76  In the context of closely located properties, 
or a network of properties, in order to obtain the greatest overall performance, it may 
sometimes be necessary to follow a strategy for one part of an estate which would be 
sub-optimal – or even loss-making – for that part on its own.77 
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2.7.1 Agglomeration effects 
The point of creating a shopping centre must be to create more overall value 
than the individual businesses within it could create for themselves. The whole 
must be greater than the sum of the parts.78 
"Agglomeration effects" describe a range of factors which lead to synergies between 
co-located retailers.  Teller and Schnedlitz have identified four broad sources of such 
effects: location-related; tenant-related; marketing-related; and management-related.79  
Location-related factors are mostly linked to the accessibility of the agglomeration via 
transport infrastructure.  Tenant-related factors are related to tenant mix, as retail 
agglomerations allow consumers to carry out different tasks in one trip.  Marketing-
related factors refer to the improved ability of retailers to market their stores when 
acting together.  Management-related factors refer to the gains made possible through 
the common management of a group of retailers as if they were one. 
Shopping centres and town centre management provide good examples of where 
property managers should be on the lookout for such opportunities. 
Agglomeration effects and Externalities 
Externalities are consequences of actions not felt directly by the actor, or the 
“spillover” costs (or benefits, as the case may be) of an action.80  These can be 
positive or negative.  A shop that draws in customers who go on to visit neighbouring 
shops can be said to be creating positive externalities for those other shops.  On the 
other hand, a shop which causes a nuisance and puts shoppers off visiting 
neighbouring shops creates negative externalities.81  These spillover costs and benefits 
mean that the benefit or nuisance creating behaviour will be produced sub optimally 
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by the creator of the externalities, meaning that resources are allocated inefficiently.  
If the creator of the externalities were to experience the negative spillover of his 
actions, he would reduce the nuisance-causing activity.  Conversely, if he experienced 
the benefits of positive externalities, he would devote more resources to activities 
which create those benefits. 
Because these effects tend to under-produce benefits and over-produce nuisances, 
their existence within a property portfolio can lead to reduced overall profitability, 
which may have a negative effect on the rent achievable by the landlord.  Landlords 
will be keen, therefore, to prevent this from happening (or to stop it from continuing), 
and will seek to prevent tenants from causing negative externalities within a portfolio  
2.7.2 Realising the potential of agglomeration effects 
Yuo et al have suggested that the question "is how to internalise or manage these 
inter-store externalities."82  "Internalising" an externality involves causing it to be 
"priced into" decisions, meaning that the interests of a decision maker are aligned 
with those who experience the effects of their actions and efficiency is promoted.  The 
three methods of achieving this are through property rights (the Coase Theorem), the 
use of a Pigouvian tax or subsidy, and regulation.83 
The Coase theorem 
Efficiency is generally defined by reference to the Pareto condition: Set of affairs A is 
more efficient than set of affairs B if at least one person is better off under A than B, 
and no one is worse off under A than under B.84  Where enforceable property rights 
are present, the Coase theorem asserts that in the absence of transaction costs, market 
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participants will arrive at a Pareto efficient allocation of resources through voluntary 
transactions, regardless of the original allocation.85  Thus, tenants would be able to 
negotiate between themselves for an optimal mix of uses.86 
Transaction costs are the costs entailed in using the price mechanism in the market.87  
These costs will increase the more parties are involved in negotiations and the more 
complex the negotiations.  Baum has identified difficulties in assessing the correct 
price for flexible leases,88 while Murdoch suggests that the valuation of unusual terms 
can be based on "intuition" rather than on any objective basis.89  The work of 
Brueckner in relation to determining the ideal initial mix of tenants in a shopping 
centre90 and of Grenadier in determining how the mix should be managed 
dynamically as external market factors change91 demonstrates the degree of 
complexity involved in arriving at an efficient mix.  Empirically, it has been found 
that centrally controlled shopping centres perform better than organically evolved 
retail agglomerations92 and that central management is key to the differential 
performance of the two types of agglomeration.93  It appears, therefore that due to 
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transaction costs, tenants will not generally be able to internalise externalities by 
voluntary agreement. 
Where significant transaction costs are present, market participants organise their 
operations through means other than the pricing mechanism.94  This may involve the 
imposing of Pigouvian taxes or subsidies or more direct control through the 
imposition of regulations. 
Pigouvian taxes and subsidies 
Pigouvian taxes and subsidies internalise externalities by levying a charge on or 
subsidising activities which generate externalities, calculated to cause the creators of 
externalities to factor the effects of the externalities on other parties into their 
decisions.95  The use of Pigouvian taxes or subsidies is not as precise as voluntary 
transactions, as the tax or subsidy may not accurately reflect the actual benefit or 
disbenefit experienced by the other party, but are less costly than a market system to 
implement. 
Empirical evidence suggests that anchor tenants and other tenants capable of 
producing positive externalities receive a substantial rent reduction in shopping 
centres.96  Thus, the tenants benefitting from the extra footfall brought in are 
subsidising the tenants that create these benefits.  This incentivises the creation of 
positive externalities within centrally managed centres.  In the absence of central 
management, such subsidies may not be possible, as the benefits arising could not be 
withheld from retailers who refused to pay towards a subsidy.  This may be described 
as a "freerider" problem. 
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Regulation 
If Pigouvian taxes are not appropriate, regulation may be the only way to ensure that 
an agglomeration runs efficiently.  Portfolio landlords commonly retain rule making 
powers over common areas and the uses to which property is put.  This permits a 
portfolio landlord to prevent tenants from using their premises for purposes which 
might harm the interests of neighbouring tenants or the landlord.  This central rule 
making authority replaces the pricing mechanism as the means of control in respect of 
some areas of business.97  In the presence of transaction costs, it may be the only way 
of effectively achieving the benefits of retail agglomeration.98 
2.7.3 Aligning the interests of landlord and tenant 
If the landlord is to retain significant powers to control his portfolio, tenants may wish 
to ensure that their interests are aligned with his, so that the property is managed for 
their benefit.  Miceli and Sirmans have found that the key to maximising the benefits 
achievable as a result of agglomeration is to design leases that allow stores to 
internalise externalities existing between them, and to ensure that the landlord 
provides an appropriate level of marketing for all stores.99 
Wheaton has argued that percentage rents are used in order to align the interests of 
landlord and tenant, so that the landlord is not incentivised to profit in the short run by 
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doing something which might be detrimental to sitting tenants.100  Such percentage 
leases have not, however, been favoured traditionally in the UK.101  The fixed rent, 
with an upward only review provision, which was for a long time the norm in the 
UK,102 provides little incentive for landlords to work to improve their tenants' 
businesses, as rent review clauses are typically not intended to reflect the productivity 
of the tenant's business, but rather the market value.103 
2.8 Conclusion 
It is clear that portfolio landlords have the potential to create value through prudent 
management of a portfolio, not only in a financial sense as the management of a group 
of assets, but by managing the properties as a business, to promote the success of all 
the tenants in a portfolio.  The workings of the ongoing relationship of portfolio 
landlord and commercial tenant are discussed in Chapter 6.  If the incentives exist for 
a landlord to realise this potential, it will benefit not only the landlord, but his tenants' 
businesses, and broader society through the efficient allocation of resources.  The 
extent to which Parliament has taken account of the role of portfolio landlords in 
creating such benefits for society is discussed in Chapter 5. 
A portfolio landlord whose interests are aligned with those of his tenants is ideally 
positioned to overcome the problems of coordinating the activities of an 
agglomeration of properties, which can be a very complicated task, but such 
coordination requires not only the alignment of interests, but centralisation of control. 
In particular, landlords will need the ability to manage the portfolio flexibly in 
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response to changes in market conditions in order for a portfolio to be successful in 
the long run.  In Chapter 3, the ability of a landlord to reserve control over 
dispositions, user and alterations is examined, and the Courts' approach to the 
reasonableness of the control exercised by landlords over these aspects of his portfolio 
is reviewed in Chapter 4. 
 -32- 
3. The law governing the management of commercial 
lettings 
In the previous chapter, three broad areas of concern for the landlord of a commercial 
property were identified: Who uses the property; what they use it for; and the physical 
state of the property.  By the inclusion of restrictions in individual leases, the landlord 
may exercise some control over properties in certain respects; namely dealings by a 
tenant with his interest, changes in the use to which leasehold property is put (user), 
and alterations and improvements to the premises by a tenant.  This chapter lays out 
the law governing the powers landlords commonly have to exercise such control over 
tenants. 
In most leases in the UK, landlords do not have the power to eject a tenant who is not 
in breach of their lease.  Therefore, a landlord wishing to exercise legal control over 
the tenant mix in a portfolio must rely on the control retained over changes to user or 
assignment initiated by a tenant. Of course a landlord may also negotiate the purchase 
of a surrender of a sitting tenant's lease, and may choose new tenants for any vacant 
properties, however they become vacant.1 
3.1 Dealings involving leasehold interests 
Broadly speaking, leasehold interests may be dealt with by a tenant in three ways: 
they may be assigned, sublet or used as security (referred to generally as “dealings”).  
Each of these dealings involves a transfer of some interest in the property and each 
has the potential to affect the landlord’s interests to some degree.  The law in all three 
areas is similar and is addressed together, differentiating between different types of 
dealing where the law treats them differently. 
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3.1.1 The Common Law Position 
At common law, the default position is that a proprietary interest in land is freely 
alienable, and this principle extends to leasehold interests.2  Such alienation may be 
effected by assignment, sublease or charge.  This position is of benefit to a lessee, as 
it allows him absolute freedom to deal with the property as his needs change.3  It is, 
however, subject to modification by covenant and there are several reasons why other 
stakeholders might wish to restrict this right.  The lessor would not want to have 
foisted upon him a tenant who is seen to pose a risk of not complying with one or 
more of the leasehold covenants;4 or who might not draw as many customers (or the 
right kind of customers) into a shopping area.5  Furthermore, tenants of neighbouring 
properties may not want the property to be occupied by their competitors,6 or by a 
business which might change the character of the area.7  In a residential setting, a 
landlord might be keen to dictate what types of tenant live in a development – a “no 
student” policy, for example.8 
For these reasons, some landlords have for a long time9 insisted upon the inclusion in 
leases of covenants restricting the tenant’s ability to deal with the lease and this has 
become common commercial practice.10  These covenants take a number of forms, 
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namely “absolute” covenants; (merely) “qualified” covenants; and “fully qualified” 
covenants. 
Absolute covenants, as their name suggests, limit the ability of a tenant to deal with 
his interest in the property, without any procedure in place to allow for dealings with 
the property.  The landlord may, at his sole discretion, permit a particular transaction, 
but is not bound to come to this decision reasonably.11   
“Qualified” covenants bar the tenant from dealing with the land in a specified way, 
without the consent of the landlord.  In the case of covenants that are merely 
qualified, the landlord was traditionally allowed to be as unreasonable as he wanted in 
refusing to grant permission to assign, or otherwise deal with, the property.12  It has 
been noted that merely qualified covenants may mislead tenants in giving the 
impression that a landlord will consent to a reasonable request for permission to deal 
with the property, when in fact the landlord has no such intention.13  For this reason 
such covenants have been the subject of statutory intervention in a number of 
jurisdictions.14  In England and Wales, merely qualified disposition covenants are 
treated as fully qualified by operation of s19(1)(a) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 
1927. 
“Fully qualified” covenants prohibit the tenant from dealing with the property in a 
particular way, except with the consent of the landlord, but are qualified by a 
statement to the effect that the consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. This 
provides a level of reassurance to the tenant at the time of entering into the lease, 
                                                 
11
 FW Woolworth and Co Ltd v Lambert, [1937] Ch 37. 
12
 Subject to the Equality Act, 2010. See Brian Doyle, Equality and discrimination: the new law, New 
law series (Bristol: Jordans, 2010), chap 5. 
13
 Letitia Crabb, “Restrictions on Assignment of Commercial Leases: A Comparative Perspective” 
(2006) 35:2 CLWR 93. 
14
 ibid. 
 -35- 
protecting him from the landlord’s future whims. Such covenants do not, however, 
create a positive duty on the landlord not to unreasonably withhold consent unless 
stated specifically in the lease.15  Rather, they release a tenant who is unreasonably 
refused consent from his obligations under the covenant, allowing him to proceed 
with the transaction in the absence of consent and to fall back on the landlord’s 
unreasonable withholding of consent as a defence to any future action brought by the 
landlord in respect of the transaction.16  A tenant in this position does not normally 
have a remedy in damages against the landlord at common law, however he could 
bring proceedings seeking declaratory relief (that the landlord should have consented 
to the transaction and that the tenant would not be in breach of covenant in dealing 
with the property in the manner proposed). Although this is not strictly necessary 
some parties may be reluctant to take on a property interest from a tenant in the 
absence of consent.17  Additionally, since the coming into force of the Land 
Registration (Amendment) (No 2) Rules 2005, an assignment of a registered lease 
with a disposition covenant may not be registered, and so cannot take effect in law, 
unless the necessary consent has been received by the Land Registry, and so the 
transaction could not proceed without an application to court.18 
It is primarily the final category, that of fully qualified covenants, which is relevant to 
this thesis. 
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3.1.2 The Law of Property Act 1925 
The Law of Property Act 1925 (the 1925 Act) makes slight changes to the law 
relating to consents for mortgages. A landlord may not unreasonably refuse consent to 
a subdemise by way of mortgage where it is required,19 nor to an assignment by the 
mortgagee upon a power of sale arising.20  Presumably, by analogy with provisions in 
the Landlord and Tenant Act 1927 relating to consent to alterations, the section only 
affects the operation of merely qualified covenants restricting the creation of 
mortgages, and not absolute prohibitions.21 
The 1925 Act also prohibits the levying of a fine for consent to assignment.22  It does 
not, however, prohibit landlords from requiring their tenants to pay legal costs 
associated with the granting of consent nor any premium provided for in the lease.23 
3.1.3 The Landlord and Tenant Act 1927 
The Landlord and Tenant Act 1927 (the 1927 Act) made a number of changes to the 
common law position on dealings by tenants with leasehold interests. Most 
significantly, section 19 sets out as follows: 
(1) In all leases whether made before or after the commencement of this Act 
containing a covenant condition or agreement against assigning, underletting, 
charging or parting with the possession of demised premises or any part 
thereof without licence or consent, such covenant condition or agreement 
shall, notwithstanding any express provision to the contrary, be deemed to be 
subject— 
(a) to a proviso to the effect that such licence or consent is not to be 
unreasonably withheld, but this proviso does not preclude the right of the 
landlord to require payment of a reasonable sum in respect of any legal or 
other expenses incurred in connection with such licence or consent; […] 
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This has the effect of limiting the types of alienation covenant to absolute and fully 
qualified ones, with all merely qualified covenants becoming fully qualified by 
operation of the Act.  In FW Woolworth and Co Ltd v Lambert,24 a case concerned 
with an improvements covenant, it was argued that section 19(2), which is very 
similar to the above provision, should apply to an absolute covenant prohibiting 
alterations on grounds that that such covenants in fact allow for an alteration to be 
made with the consent or licence of the landlord.  Romer LJ dismissed this argument, 
referring to absolute covenants against assignment, and pointing out that there has 
been a historic difference between absolute and merely qualified covenants and that if 
there was not a practical difference, the words in the 1927 Act relating to consent 
would be “otiose and useless” if the section were intended to apply to both qualified 
and absolute alienation covenants.25 
3.1.4 The Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 
The Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 (the 1954 Act) does not make any changes to the 
substantive law in this area but there is one procedural provision which should be 
noted.  Under section 53 of the Act, the County Court has jurisdiction to determine 
whether consent has been unreasonably withheld by the landlord. 
3.1.5 The Landlord and Tenant Act 198826 
Although the changes made by the Landlord and Tenant Act 1988 (the 1988 Act) are 
largely procedural in nature, they amount to a significant transformation in both the 
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duties of landlord and tenant in giving and seeking consent respectively, and in the 
consequences for a landlord who unreasonably withholds consent to a dealing.   
A number of new duties were imposed on landlords by this Act: to give consent 
unless it would be reasonable not to;27 to notify the tenant of the decision within a 
reasonable time period,28 setting out any conditions attaching to the consent and 
giving reasons for any refusal of consent.29  It is also for the landlord to prove that all 
the procedural steps were complied with, and that any refusal of consent or any 
conditions imposed as part of the consent were reasonable.30 
By necessary implication of these duties, a landlord can no longer rely on reasons for 
withholding consent that were not communicated to the tenant.31 
Where a landlord fails in his duties under any of the above headings, the tenant will, 
in addition to any action that may lie at common law, have a claim in tort for breach 
of a statutory duty.32  It should be noted that as the landlord’s wrong is a tortious one, 
and not contractual, a tenant will not be entitled to repudiate the lease, no matter how 
unreasonable the landlord’s conduct, although exemplary damages may be awarded 
where the landlord’s conduct has been particularly egregious.33 
There had been some debate on the question of whether section 1(6) of the 1988 Act 
had as its effect the reversal of the common law burden of proof on the question of 
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contractual reasonableness - as opposed merely to reasonableness in the context of the 
statutory duty.34  It was argued that as a matter of construction, had the legislature 
intended to alter the common law burden of proof they would have done so 
explicitly.35  The curious result of this situation would be that it would be for the 
landlord to prove that any refusal of consent was reasonable to avoid having to pay 
damages for breach of statutory duty, but for the tenant to prove that the refusal was 
unreasonable in order to proceed with the assignment.  Following on from this 
position, it is difficult to see how a tenant who had established statutory 
unreasonableness but not unreasonableness under the lease could show the necessary 
causation for the award of statutory damages, as the tenant would not be able to 
proceed with the transaction in any event.36  Taken to its logical conclusion, such an 
analysis would therefore frustrate the purpose of the legislation.  This question 
appears to have been authoritatively settled in the case of Footwear Corp v Amplight 
Properties.37  The burden of proof is on the landlord not only in regard to the statutory 
duty, but also in relation to the substantive question of the reasonableness of a refusal 
under the lease. 
3.1.6 The Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995 
The Landlord and Tenants (Covenants) Act 1995 (the 1995 Act) makes a number of 
important changes to the law in this area, for leases made on or after the 1st of 
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January, 1996, or so-called “new tenancies”.38  The most significant change made by 
the Act was the disapplication of the rule of privity of contract to new tenancies.  
Thus covenants in new leases are directly enforceable by and against the landlord and 
his successors in title, by and against the tenant and his successors in title.39 
To prevent the change from having an adverse effect on the property market, section 
16 of the 1995 Act allows for the creation of Authorised Guarantee Agreements 
(AGAs).40   These agreements are to guarantee the performance of the covenants by 
the proposed assignee.  This guarantee may only last until the term of the original 
lease lapses or the assignee assigns the lease, so it will not apply to a subsequent lease 
(or lease extension) entered into between the assignee and the landlord, or if the 
assignee subsequently assigns it to a third party.41  The landlord may insist on the 
existing tenant entering into an AGA where there is a prohibition of assignment 
(whether absolute or fully qualified), and it is reasonable for the landlord to insist on 
the AGA as a condition to consenting to the assignment.42 
Section 22 of the 1995 Act inserts new subsections 19 (1A) to (1E) of the 1927 Act, 
allowing for the inclusion into a lease, or a later agreement43 of a clause setting out 
circumstances in which the landlord will be entitled to withhold consent, and 
conditions which a landlord may attach to any such consent.  Where a landlord 
refuses consent based on one of the reasons set out in a clause made under section 22, 
or attaches conditions to the assignment which were prescribed by such a clause, his 
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refusal or attachment of conditions will not be unreasonable.44  One condition which 
is commonly imposed is that any consent to assign will be subject to the tenant 
entering into an AGA, guaranteeing the proposed assignee’s performance of the 
covenants under the lease.  Landlords have to be careful in drafting these covenants to 
include any reasons they might seek to rely on subsequently, but not to make the 
assignment process so restrictive as to depress the rent achievable under the lease.45 
3.1.7 What kinds of dealings are governed by the covenant? 
This question is a matter of construction of the lease and is best answered by 
reference to the relevant covenant in any given case.  The limitation may be on 
assignment, subletting, charging, or otherwise dealing with the property or a part 
thereof.  In some cases, the covenant may prohibit one type of dealing – subletting a 
part only of the premises for example – but not another – subletting the whole of the 
premises. 
There are numerous examples of different covenants that have been interpreted by the 
courts, which it is not proposed to examine in detail here.46  Arising out of the 
principle that interests in land should be freely alienable, the courts have interpreted 
covenants seeking to restrict that right strictly against the landlord.47 
Involuntary conveyances do not generally come within the scope of such covenants 
but may in certain circumstances, for example where they are expressly included.48  In 
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Crescent Leaseholds Ltd v Gerard Horn Investments Ltd,49 the Court of Queen’s 
Bench for Saskatchewan distinguished a change of ownership arising out of a 
voluntary company merger which created a new company in which all assets of its 
predecessor companies would be vested.  The alienation covenant in the lease 
expressly applied to assignment by operation of law, but the trial judge distinguished 
this from other cases on the ground of voluntariness. 
It is worth noting that dealings with unregistered leases in breach of covenant do take 
effect in law, subject to the landlord’s rights in respect of the lease.50  Thus the 
landlord may forfeit the lease and recover damages from the tenant in default, and 
may in some circumstances be entitled to a mandatory injunction ordering a new 
subtenant to surrender the lease to the original tenant.51  This should be noted where a 
tenant seeks to proceed with a transaction in the absence of consent on grounds that 
he believes it to have been unreasonably withheld. 
3.1.8 Reasonableness 
When the court comes to assess the reasonableness of a landlord's withholding of 
consent, it will consider the reasons from the landlord's perspective52 but based upon 
what a reasonable person might do in his place.  It is not a question of whether the 
landlord made the right decision, but of whether the decision made by the landlord 
was within the range of permissible decisions in the circumstances.53   
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The landlord must actually have based its decision on the reasons given in court.54  In 
Berenyi v Watford Borough Council, it was clear from the minutes of the Council's 
meeting that they had not considered the reason later relied on in court.55  In Bromley 
Park Garden Estates v Moss, one of the reasons given had not materialised until after 
consent was rejected.56  As a result of the 1988 Act, only reasons given to the tenant 
within a reasonable time of the application for consent being made may be relied upon 
in court,57 although these may be expanded upon.58  Where good reasons are given as 
well as bad reasons, the court may uphold the landlord's refusal of consent, so long as 
the good reasons are not corrupted by the bad reasons.59 
In extreme cases, the landlord may have to take the effect of a refusal of consent upon 
the tenant into account,60 although this will not normally be the case.61   
Under the s1(6) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1988, the burden of showing that a 
refusal to consent was reasonable rests on the landlord.  It was confirmed in Footwear 
Corp v Amplight that this applies equally to the question of reasonableness for the 
purposes of landlord and tenant law as it does for the purposes of a claim for damages 
under section 4 of the 1988 Act.62 
As discussed at  3.1.6 above, the Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995 (the 1995 
Act) allows for the incorporation of circumstances into the lease, in which the 
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landlord will be justified in withholding consent. Where a landlord relies on one of 
these reasons, his refusal of consent will be reasonable. 
A landlord cannot insist upon the payment of a fine for his consent,63 and where such 
a fine is demanded the tenant may proceed with the transaction without paying it.64  If 
the tenant should pay the fine however, he will not be able to recover it in court.65  
The landlord may charge the tenant for any reasonable costs incurred in giving 
consent.66 
The substantive question of reasonableness is highly dependent on the facts of 
individual cases,67 and is discussed at length in Chapter 4, below. 
3.2 User covenants 
As with disposition covenants, landlords often wish to restrict how a tenant may use 
property.  While a change in user may be linked to an assignment or sublease, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, a portfolio landlord may be most concerned about ensuring 
that the use to which a property is put does not cause difficulties for other nearby 
tenants of the landlord.  
3.2.1 The common law position 
At common law, a tenant is entitled to use the let premises for any purpose, provided 
that such use is not illegal or prohibited by the lease and would not fall foul of the 
doctrine of waste.68  It has, however, for quite some time been common practice to 
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restrict the use to which tenants may put such property.69  As with disposition 
covenants, covenants restricting the user of a property may be absolute, qualified or 
fully qualified.  Unlike disposition covenants, however, there is no statutory 
modification of merely qualified user covenants, preventing the landlord from 
refusing consent on unreasonable grounds70 (although such statutory intervention was 
recommended by the Law Commission in 1985).71  Thus with both absolute user 
covenants and merely qualified ones, the landlord may consent to a change in user, or 
may refuse consent for any reason. 
It is for the landlord to demonstrate that the use to which the tenant is putting the 
premises is prohibited by the user covenant.72  In cases of doubt, user covenants will 
be interpreted in favour of the tenant.73 
3.2.2 Statutory intervention 
The most noteworthy aspect of statutory intervention in relation to user covenants is 
the lack of it.  Merely qualified user covenants do not prevent a landlord from being 
unreasonable in refusing consent, so a landlord's decision may not be challenged.74 
Even where a tenant has negotiated the inclusion of a fully qualified user covenant in 
the lease, there is no statutory duty on landlords to be reasonable when deciding 
whether or not to give consent or in how long they take to make their decision.  
Therefore damages will not be available for a landlord's unreasonableness unless the 
landlord has covenanted specifically not to be unreasonable in considering such 
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applications.75  Further still, where applications are made simultaneously for an 
assignment and change of user, statutory damages for unreasonable delay or 
withholding of consent may not even be available in relation to the assignment, if the 
breach of statutory duty cannot be said to have caused the loss.76 
The only statutory modification of covenants restricting user came in the form of 
section 19(3) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1927.  Where a lease contains a 
qualified or fully qualified user covenant,77 this section prohibits landlords from 
charging a fine or increasing rent in exchange for consent to a change of user, save 
that it: 
does not preclude the right of the landlord to require payment of a reasonable 
sum in respect of any damage to or diminution in the value of the premises or 
any neighbouring premises belonging to him and of any legal or other 
expenses incurred in connection with such licence or consent. 
Nor does this provision apply to applications for change of use which would require 
structural alterations to the property.  The Law Commission has criticised this 
provision, as no such fine would be payable if such alterations (which would amount 
to improvements)78 were sought on their own and it seems strange to allow the 
levying of a fine for two consents sought together, neither of which alone could be 
charged for.79 
While section 19(3) cannot be contracted out of, unless the covenant is fully qualified 
the landlord may use the withholding of consent to pressure the tenant into entering 
into a new lease on terms kinder to the landlord in order to change the user. 
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Where the landlord offers consent in exchange for a sum of money, the tenant may 
bring proceedings challenging the reasonableness of the sum requested. Where the 
court identifies a sum that would be reasonable, the landlord is required to give his 
consent upon payment of that sum. 
3.2.3 Fully qualified user covenants 
As with covenants restricting disposition, a fully qualified covenant against change of 
user will only bind the tenant insofar as the landlord reasonably refuses consent to a 
change of use.  Once a tenant has applied for consent, he may proceed with the 
change of use if consent is unreasonably withheld.  Because of the relative paucity of 
cases examining the reasonableness of refusals of consent to a change of use, the 
courts have looked to decisions on the reasonable refusal of consent to dispositions to 
guide them in this area.80  A detailed analysis of the law in relation to the 
reasonableness of withholding consent is given in Chapter 4. 
A number of points should be noted as resulting from the absence of legislation in this 
area similar to the Landlord and Tenant Act 1988 for dispositions.  Where the tenant 
is challenging the reasonableness of a refusal of consent, it is for the tenant to show 
that consent to assignment was unreasonably withheld.81  The landlord is not bound to 
follow a reasonable procedure in dealing with requests.82 
Unlike the position for disposition covenants prior to the enactment of the 1995 Act, a 
fully qualified user covenant may provide for circumstances in which it will be 
reasonable for a landlord to withhold consent.  Any such circumstances will be strictly 
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construed and it will be for the landlord to show that an otherwise unreasonable 
withholding of consent is permissible under such a provision.83 
As with the reasonableness of refusals of consent to deal with a leasehold interest, 
section 53 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 gives the County Court jurisdiction to 
determine the reasonableness of refusals of consent. 
3.2.4 Obsolete user covenants - Section 84 of the Law of Property 
Act 1925 
Where more than 25 years have expired on a lease for a term of at least 40 years, the 
tenant may apply to the Lands Chamber of the Upper Tribunal84 to have a user 
covenant modified or set aside, where it has become obsolete by reason of a change to 
the character of the property, the area in which it is situated, or any other factor which 
the Tribunal deems relevant, where the covenant is impeding some reasonable user of 
the premises.85  An order may be granted by consent of the landlord or if the change 
will not affect his interests. A sum of money may be awarded to compensate anyone 
who benefits from the covenant for any loss suffered as a result of the discharge or 
modification of the covenant, or for the difference in consideration that would have 
been realised had the covenant not been in force. 
3.2.5 Keep open covenants 
As discussed in Chapter 2, “keep open” covenants may be critical to the success of a 
development.  The question may arise, however, whether these covenants are 
enforceable.  The courts are generally reluctant to compel someone to carry on a 
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business, either by injunction or by order of specific performance.86  In Co-operative 
Insurance v Argyll Stores, the Court of Appeal found that the circumstances, where 
the defendant closed a supermarket, a destination unit in the Plaintiff’s shopping 
centre, at very short notice and without trying to find an assignee, were extreme 
enough, and in particular that the defendant’s conduct was egregious enough, to 
warrant the granting of specific performance of the keep open covenant.87  The House 
of Lords overturned the decision, however, holding that because of the level of 
judicial oversight that might be required to enforce such an order, and the onerousness 
of it to a business forced to keep a shop open at a significant ongoing cost, such an 
order would not be appropriate.88  While the House of Lords did look to the drafting 
of the covenant to determine whether it was precise enough to be specifically 
enforced, it has been suggested that no keep open covenant could be drafted in such a 
way as to make it specifically enforceable.89 
3.3 Alterations and improvements 
At common law, a tenant may make alterations to let premises, so long as they do not 
amount to waste, or breach other obligations of the tenant.  It is common practice for 
leases to restrict the tenant from making alterations or improvements to the property.  
Different types of alterations may be restricted in different ways.  Such clauses may 
be absolute, qualified or fully qualified, but as with disposition covenants, merely 
qualified covenants against improvements are modified by statute to become fully 
qualified.90  This section also applies where the covenant prohibits the making of 
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alterations without consent and the alterations actually sought to be made amount to 
improvements. 
The Equality Act, 2010, prohibits landlords from unreasonably withholding consent to 
alterations made to facilitate access to people with disabilities.91 
3.3.1 Defining alterations and improvements 
What exactly is prohibited by the covenant will come down to interpretation of the 
lease, but the courts have stressed that there will be limits to any formulation.92  
“Alterations” has been held to mean “alterations which would affect the form or 
structure of the premises.”93  In Bickmore v Dimmer, the affixing of a clock to the 
exterior wall of a jeweller’s shop was not in breach of the alterations covenant.94 
Stirling LJ noted that such a covenant did not restrict alterations “absolutely essential 
to carrying on the business”, nor anything “fixed to the premises and convenient for 
the carrying on the business in a reasonable, ordinary, and proper way.”95 
“Improvements”, for the purposes of the 1927 Act, are improvements from the 
perspective of the tenant.96  The landlord may seek compensation for damage to his 
interests and may set as a condition that the premises be returned to their prior 
condition before the tenancy comes to an end.97 
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3.3.2 Reasonableness 
A tenant may apply for a declaration that consent to improvements was unreasonably 
withheld.  The onus of proving that the consent was unreasonably withheld rests on 
the tenant.98  As to the question of reasonableness generally, the courts have looked to 
the cases on alienation,99 although as s19(2) allows for the landlord to require the 
payment of compensation where the alteration sought might damage his interests, or 
to have the property restored if the alterations will not improve the rent achievable by 
the property, the courts will scrutinise whether the landlord could have protected his 
interests by such a requirement rather than by withholding consent.100 
3.4 Property retained by the landlord 
The landlord may also retain some property for use as common areas by tenants.  
While tenants will be granted easements of access over such common areas, and 
guarantees in respect of opening hours, the landlord generally retains broad powers of 
control over the common areas.  The duties of the landlord in relation to how such 
control is exercised are discussed in Chapter 6. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The ability of landlord to exercise control over his portfolio will depend significantly 
on the types of covenant included in the lease. For absolute covenants (or merely 
qualified user covenants), the specific wording used in the drafting of restrictions will 
be the most significant factor, and so should be considered carefully, as any such 
restrictions will be construed strictly against a landlord. 
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In the case of fully qualified covenants, the courts' interpretation of reasonableness is 
likely to have a much greater impact on a landlord's ability to control his portfolio in 
the long run.  This is discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
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4. The reasonable landlord and the portfolio 
As it becomes more and more common for restrictions contained in leases on how and 
by whom leasehold property may be used to be fully qualified,1 the importance of 
how the courts understand the qualification that the landlord may not unreasonably 
withhold consent will grow in importance.  The procedural elements of 
reasonableness are set out in Chapter 3: The landlord may only rely in court on 
reasons which actually led to his decision; any bad reasons relied upon must not 
corrupt the good reasons;  and the burden of proof rests on the tenant in respect of 
changes of user but on the landlord in relation to dispositions.2  Additionally in 
respect of assignments, the landlord may only rely on reasons given to the tenant 
within a reasonable time of the application for consent being made.3 
Once these procedural elements have been met, it is up to the court to determine 
whether any refusal of consent was reasonable.  Although the nature of 
reasonableness makes it impossible to avoid uncertainty completely,4 concerns have 
been expressed, that the way the courts have gone about interpreting reasonableness 
has not helped the situation, making it excessively unpredictable and not providing 
sufficient certainty for landlords (or indeed tenants) faced with making decisions 
about whether to consent (or challenge a refusal of consent).5  Some have also 
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suggested that the courts' approach to reasonableness has been unduly favourable to 
tenants.6 
It is only relatively recently that the courts have tried to put a cogent framework on 
when it is reasonable for a landlord to refuse consent to a disposition or change of use 
in the context of a fully qualified covenant.  The development of guiding principles 
which have been identified may be traced through case law.  Very often, these 
principles are discussed with reference to landlords seeking to abuse their power, and 
so restrictive interpretations of reasonableness have been favoured.  However, it must 
also be borne in mind that the ability of a landlord to exercise some level of control 
over a portfolio will affect how well that portfolio (and in turn the landlord's tenants) 
performs in the long run.7  In order to encourage investment, care must be taken to 
avoid excessively curtailing landlords' freedom in questions of management. 
This is particularly relevant in the context of property portfolios, where landlords 
have the capacity to create value through prudent management, to the benefit of all of 
their tenants.  As has been demonstrated in Chapter 2, commercially minded landlords 
ought to give consideration to a much wider range of factors in managing an 
individual property forming part of a portfolio than a landlord managing the same 
property in isolation.  Such factors may include the effect of any change on other 
properties in the portfolio (or on the portfolio as a whole), the precedent that might be 
set by giving consent to a change, or practical considerations relating to the 
administration of a portfolio of properties.  The extent to which these factors can 
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reasonably be taken into consideration in deciding whether to give consent will have a 
significant bearing on the willingness of portfolio landlords to accept fully qualified, 
as opposed to merely qualified or absolute, covenants relating to user and alienation 
(where they have any choice8).  The courts' approach to reasonableness will also play 
a role in informing the ongoing management of such portfolios, and even the 
legislature's attitude towards mandatory full qualification.9 
This chapter examines how the additional complexities of property portfolios are dealt 
with by the courts, and how the case law in the context of portfolio properties might 
inform an understanding of reasonableness in a broader sense.  The portfolio cases 
hint at a more flexible judicial approach to reasonableness than some accounts would 
acknowledge; one that takes account of both the economic motivations and 
commercial realities facing the landlord. 
4.1 Dispositions 
As will be apparent from the discussion of the case law below, the facts of individual 
cases play a crucial role in whether a refusal of consent is reasonable, but some 
general themes emerge, which may be useful in thinking about reasonableness in the 
abstract. Therefore, before examining the range of cases in the area, it is useful to 
consider some general principles of the law as identified by the appellate courts and 
discussed by commentators. 
A move towards general principles of reasonableness in relation to landlords' 
withholding of consent began with Lord Denning MR’s dicta in Bickel v Duke of 
                                                 
8
 See 3.1.3 above (Landlord and Tenant Act 1927); 5.4.2 below (where I suggest that full qualification 
be implied into all covenants restricting user and alienation). 
9
 The Law Commission, Codification of the law of landlord and tenant: Covenants restricting 
dispositions, alterations and change of user, 141 (The Law Commission, 1985). See chapter 5.  
Although of course a legislature has greater scope than an individual landlord, being able to alter the 
general law relating to reasonableness if the judicial attitude to the question is standing in the way of 
mandating full qualification. 
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Westminster.10  Although his speech stands as a key defence of a factual, case-by-case 
approach to reasonableness, it does point to the emergence of broad principles which 
might guide practitioners in anticipating when a court might find it reasonable for a 
landlord to withhold consent.  Drawing on the earlier decision of the House of Lords 
in Viscount Tredegar v Harwood,11 he rejected the idea that individual cases would be 
binding on a subsequent court, suggesting instead that the likely decision of a court in 
a given case might be determined by reference to the body of case law as a whole:12 
When [the words of a fully qualified covenant] come to be applied in any 
particular case, I do not think the court can, or should, determine by strict 
rules the grounds on which a landlord may, or may not, reasonably refuse his 
consent.  He is not limited by the contract to any particular grounds.  Nor 
should the courts limit him.  Not even under the guise of construing the words.  
The landlord has to exercise his judgement in all sorts of circumstances.  It is 
impossible for him, or for the courts, to envisage them all […] Seeing that the 
circumstances are infinitely various, it is impossible to formulate strict rules 
as to how a landlord should exercise his power of refusal. The utmost that the 
courts can do is to give guidance to those who have to consider the problem.  
As one decision follows another, people will get to know the likely result in 
any given set of circumstances.  But no one precedent will be a binding 
precedent as a strict rule of law.  The reasons given by the judges are to be 
treated as propositions of good sense – in relation to a particular case – 
rather than propositions of law applicable to all cases. 
The position which Lord Denning MR advocated seeks to reconcile the conflicting 
desires for legal certainty and justice in individual cases by supporting the idea that 
reasonableness is assessed based on consistent - if difficult to characterise precisely - 
principles, allowing parties to deduce from previous cases what their likely legal 
position is, but without preventing future courts from deciding subsequent cases on 
the basis of their individual merits.  The question of reasonableness is to be assessed 
in the context of all of the facts of the case, including the intention of the parties in 
drafting the covenant.  Conceptually, this strikes an appealing balance, but practical 
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 Bickel v Duke of Westminster, [1977] QB 517. 
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 Tredegar (Viscount) v Harwood, [1929] AC 72. 
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 Bickel v Duke of Westminster, supra note 10 at 524. 
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difficulties associated with maintaining consistency in the absence of firm rules have 
led courts and commentators to seek to define principles governing the concept of 
reasonableness. 
In, International Drilling Fluids Ltd v Louisville Investments (Uxbridge) Ltd, the 
Court of Appeal approved this case-by-case approach in general terms.13  Balcombe 
LJ did, however, lay down the following “propositions of law” – elicited from 
previous judgments – for determining reasonableness:14 
(1) The purpose of a covenant against assignment without the consent of the 
landlord, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld, is to protect the 
lessor from having his premises used or occupied in an undesirable way, or by 
an undesirable tenant or assignee. […] 
 (2) As a corollary to the first proposition, a landlord is not entitled to refuse 
his consent to an assignment on grounds which have nothing whatever to do 
with the relationship of landlord and tenant in regard to the subject matter of 
the lease […] 
(3) The onus of proving that consent has been unreasonably withheld is on the 
tenant […]15 
(4) It is not necessary for the landlord to prove that the conclusions which led 
him to refuse consent were justified, if they were conclusions which might be 
reached by a reasonable man in the circumstances […] 
(5) It may be reasonable for the landlord to refuse his consent to an 
assignment on the ground of the purpose for which the proposed assignee 
intends to use the premises, even though that purpose is not forbidden by the 
lease […] 
(6) There is a divergence of authority on the question, in considering whether 
the landlord's refusal of consent is reasonable, whether it is permissible to 
have regard to the consequences to the tenant if consent to the proposed 
assignment is withheld […] a proper reconciliation of those two streams of 
authority can be achieved by saying that while a landlord need usually only 
consider his own relevant interests, there may be cases where there is such a 
disproportion between the benefit to the landlord and the detriment to the 
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 International Drilling Fluids v Louiseville Investments, [1986] 1 Ch 513. 
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 Ibid at 519–21. 
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 This been reversed in England and Wales by s1(6) of the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1988: See 3.1.5. 
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tenant if the landlord withholds his consent to an assignment that it is 
unreasonable for the landlord to refuse consent. 
(7) Subject to the propositions set out above, it is in each case a question of 
fact, depending upon all the circumstances, whether the landlord's consent to 
an assignment is being unreasonably withheld. 
Balcombe LJ's propositions leave the question of reasonableness to be decided by the 
courts on the facts in most cases, with only the first and second propositions imposing 
concrete limits on landlords' conduct. 
The House of Lords finally considered the question of reasonableness in the context 
of landlords' consents in the case of Ashworth Frazer v Gloucester City Council.16  
Lord Bingham identified "three overriding principles" for determining the 
reasonableness of a refusal of consent:17 
The first, as expressed by Balcombe LJ in International Drilling Fluids Ltd v 
Louisville Investments (Uxbridge) Ltd is that 
"a landlord is not entitled to refuse his consent to an assignment on 
grounds which have nothing whatever to do with the relationship of 
landlord and tenant in regard to the subject matter of the lease ..."  
The same principle was earlier expressed by Sargant LJ in Houlder Bros & 
Co Ltd v Gibbs [1925] Ch 575, 587:  
"in a case of this kind the reason must be something affecting the 
subject matter of the contract which forms the relationship between the 
landlord and the tenant, and ... it must not be something wholly 
extraneous and completely dissociated from the subject matter of the 
contract."  
While difficult borderline questions are bound to arise, the principle to be 
applied is clear.  
Secondly, in any case where the requirements of the first principle are met, the 
question whether the landlord's conduct was reasonable or unreasonable will 
be one of fact to be decided by the tribunal of fact. There are many reported 
cases. In some the landlord's withholding of consent has been held to be 
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 Ashworth Frazer Ltd v Gloucester City Council, [2002] 1 All ER 377. 
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 Ibid, paras 3–5. 
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reasonable (…), in others unreasonable (…). These cases are of illustrative 
value. But in each the decision rested on the facts of the particular case and 
care must be taken not to elevate a decision made on the facts of a particular 
case into a principle of law. The correct approach was very clearly laid down 
by Lord Denning MR in Bickel v Duke of Westminster. 
Thirdly, the landlord's obligation is to show that his conduct was reasonable, 
not that it was right or justifiable. As Danckwerts LJ held in Pimms Ltd v 
Tallow Chandlers Company: "it is not necessary for the landlords to prove 
that the conclusions which led them to refuse consent were justified, if they 
were conclusions which might be reached by a reasonable man in the 
circumstances . . ." Subject always to the first principle outlined above, I 
would respectfully endorse the observation of Viscount Dunedin in Viscount 
Tredegar v Harwood [1929] AC 72, 78 that one "should read reasonableness 
in the general sense". There are few expressions more routinely used by 
British lawyers than "reasonable", and the expression should be given a 
broad, common sense meaning in this context as in others. 
In Channel Hotels v Tamimi, Peter Gibson LJ commended these principles, describing 
them as being "indubitably correct."18 
4.1.1 The general principles 
While the propositions in International Drilling and "overriding principles" of 
Ashworth Frazer have been broadly accepted as useful syntheses of the principles 
determining the reasonableness of a landlord's refusal of consent, there has been some 
debate as to their precedential value.  Some have sought to elevate (at least some of) 
them to rules of law,19 while others have seen more flexibility, pointing to the 
repeated approval by subsequent courts20 of Lord Denning's factual reasonableness 
approach in Bickel, and describing the propositions in International Drilling and other 
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 Channel Hotels & Properties (UK) Ltd v Tamimi, [2004] EWCA Civ 1072, para 48. 
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 Crabb, supra note 4; Crabb, supra note 6; Letitia Crabb & Jonathan Seitler, Leases: covenants and 
consents, 2nd ed (London: Sweet And Maxwell, 2008). 
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 International Drilling Fluids v Louiseville Investments, supra note 13; Ashworth Frazer Ltd v 
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cases as "guidelines (…) to be taken seriously"21 or "no more than guidelines in what 
is essentially an issue of fact."22  
The largely procedural fourth of Balcombe LJ's seven propositions in International 
Drilling, (repeated in Lord Bingham's third overriding principle) and the broad 
guidance of propositions five and six have not been very controversial.  Legislative 
change has reversed the position of the third proposition, relating to the burden of 
proof, following recommendations from the Law Commission.23  The legal situation 
is in any event relatively straightforward in respect of each of those principles and is 
discussed in Chapter 3.24  The key difference in opinion amongst commentators 
relates to the relationship between the first and second propositions and the last (or 
between the first and second overriding principles). 
Kodilinye suggested that there are in fact three reasonableness standards used by 
courts: The personality or user test, a contractual approach and a broad approach.25  
He suggests that in different cases the courts have used different approaches in 
assessing the reasonableness of a withholding of consent, or have referred to a 
mixture of them. 
The personality or user test 
In interpreting fully qualified covenants, and the meaning of "reasonably", the courts 
have often sought to ascertain the purpose of the covenant.  The answer to this 
question favoured by Balcombe LJ, and comprising his first proposition is said to be 
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founded in the judgment of AL Smith LJ in Bates v Donaldson,26 as approved by the 
Court of Appeal in Houlder Bros v Gibbs.27 
The comments of AL Smith LJ in Bates should be viewed in context, as an abridged 
version has the potential to give the impression of a statement of more general 
significance than was actually the case: 28 
[The clause] was in my judgment inserted alio intuitu altogether, and in order 
to protect the lessor from having his premises used or occupied in an 
undesirable way or by an undesirable tenant or assignee, and not in order to 
enable the lessor to, if possible, coerce a tenant to surrender the lease so that 
the lessor might obtain possession of the premises […] 
This wording is rather more consistent with a finding of fact than a general statement 
on how this type of covenant ought to be construed.  The reference to the purposes for 
the insertion of the clause are equally non-generalisable.  It is difficult to accept that 
AL Smith LJ intended to suggest that any reason not relating to the personality of the 
intended assignee or intended user of the premises would be unreasonable. 
It appears that Pollock MR in Houlder Bros took a similar approach to AL Smith LJ 
in Bates in examining the purpose of the covenant on the facts of that particular case, 
in the context of the relationship between the parties:29 
For my part, I agree with A. L. Smith L.J., and I think that one must look at 
these words in their relation to the premises, and to the contract made in 
reference to the premises between the lessor and lessee; in other words, one 
must have regard to the relation of the lessor and lessee inter se, or, perhaps 
one may add, to the due and proper management of the property, as in 
Governors of Bridewell Hospital v. Fawkner. 
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This affirmation does not seek to limit the grounds of refusal which a landlord may 
reasonably rely upon to a defined list, but rather gives the type of consideration which 
a landlord is entitled to take into account. 
Kodilinye has pointed to the common form of covenant used in the early cases upon 
which this principle is said to have been established: Where consent was not to be 
withheld "in the case of a respectable or reasonable person."30  He argues that this 
principle arises partly out of an interpretation of those words, and so should not be 
taken as a general rule.31 
Examining this question in the abstract and by reference to Chapter 2, which deals 
with the commercial underpinnings of the leasehold property market, the purpose 
suggested by this test appears to be a reasonably sensible explanation for such clauses.  
Often, two of the most relevant factors for a landlord in assessing the suitability of a 
proposed assignee will be his financial standing or other personal characteristics, and 
the use to which he will put the property. 
While it is true that many objections may be brought within the scope of the test,32 it 
is curiously selective.  Why not limit the purpose of such covenants to controlling 
who uses the property?  A landlord wishing to control the use to which a property is 
put has the option of insisting upon a separate user clause, which can be enforced 
independently.33  One might also take a broader view: Perhaps a landlord might wish 
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to exercise control over the physical state of his premises by maintaining a veto over 
any alienation.  He might also want to preserve his legal interest in a property.34 
It seems arbitrary to limit the court’s scope, and indeed, some decisions appear to 
have had to employ legal gymnastics to contort the facts into a position where they 
might be said to fall within the confines of this proposition.35  The House of Lords 
doubted the principle in Viscount Tredegar v Harwood,36 and courts in Canada and 
Ireland have moved away from it, viewing it as excessively narrow.37 
It also seems odd that this was adopted as a "proposition of law" by Balcombe LJ, 
when it was specifically rejected as such by Lord Denning MR in Bickel, whose dicta 
was relied upon by Balcombe LJ in setting out the propositions.  Crabb and Seitler 
now believe this test to have been implicitly rejected by its exclusion from Lord 
Bingham's overriding principles.38 
The contractual approach 
This approach, also known as the "the principle of no uncovenanted advantage",39 is 
based on the second of Balcombe LJ's propositions and the first of Lord Bingham's 
overriding principles.  It seeks to limit the landlord's power to withhold consent to 
reasons relating directly to the terms of the lease. 
In Lord Bingham’s judgment in Ashworth Frazer, the principle is stated to be that the 
landlord’s reasons for withholding consent must not be “wholly extraneous and 
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completely dissociated from the subject matter of the contract”40 or “nothing 
whatsoever to do with the relationship of landlord and tenant in regard to the subject 
matter of the lease”.41 
An example often cited as an application of this principle is the Court of Appeal 
decision in Bromley Park Garden Estates v Moss.42  It concerned a landlord who 
sought to procure a surrender of the lease by his refusal of consent to an assignment, 
in order to re-let the property together with the restaurant below on conditions more 
favourable to the landlord.  The Court of Appeal drew attention to the drastic 
implications of the landlord’s actions, which would amount to expropriating the 
tenant of the benefit of the lease.  Dunn LJ set out:43 
[…] there is nothing in the cases to indicate that the landlord was entitled to 
refuse his consent in order to acquire a commercial benefit for himself by 
putting into effect proposals outside the contemplation of the lease under 
consideration, and to replace the contractual relations created by the lease by 
some alternative arrangements more advantageous to the landlord, even 
though this would have been in accordance with good estate management.  
West Layton Ltd. v. Ford shows that in considering whether the landlords' 
refusal of consent is unreasonable, the court should look first at the covenant 
in the context of the lease and ascertain the purpose of the covenant in that 
context. If the refusal of the landlord was designed to achieve that purpose 
then it may not be unreasonable, even in the case of a respectable and 
responsible assignee; but if the refusal is designed to achieve some collateral 
purpose wholly unconnected with the terms of the lease, as in Houlder 
Brothers & Co. Ltd. v. Gibbs, and as in the present case, then that would be 
unreasonable, even though the purpose was in accordance with good estate 
management. [Citations omitted.] 
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Jonathan Gaunt has suggested that this rule may be limited in its strictest form to the 
types of factual scenario encountered in Bromley Park or Houlder Bros v Gibbs.44 
There is, of course, a need to strike a balance between the rights of landlord and 
tenant.  Clearly, a stipulation that consent may only be withheld if reasonable to do so 
is intended by the parties (and indeed Parliament, where it is inserted by operation of 
statute45) to limit in some way the power of the landlord to veto an assignment.  This 
would be rendered ineffective if "reasonably" were equated to "rationally" in the 
economic sense, as was hinted at by the House of Lords in Viscount Tredegar v 
Harwood.46  If landlords were permitted to refuse consent whenever it is in their 
interests, the landlord in Bromley Park would have been reasonable in seeking the 
surrender of the lease so it could be re-let at a higher rent,47 and the landlord Council 
in Anglia Building Society v Sheffield City Council could have forced the tenant to 
find a proposed assignee who intended to convert the unit for use as a retail shop.48  A 
key reason for the popularity of this contractual view is that limiting the landlord to 
using the withholding of consent to protect interests retained under the lease takes the 
question out of the hands of the court, leaving it to the parties to determine their 
respective rights.  This is in line with a preference for freedom of contract. 
Kodilinye suggested that reasons relied upon by a landlord should be limited to those 
"(i) ensuring the observance of covenants in the lease; (ii) recovering possession of 
the premises at the end of the lease; and (iii) any other circumstances expressly agreed 
in the lease."49  While this list covers many of the interests which a landlord might 
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wish to protect, forcing landlords to ground their decisions in the wording of the lease 
may not be very helpful, as it may lead to the drafting of unnecessarily complicated 
leases intended to give the landlord as much cover as possible.  Where that has not 
been done, landlords may ground their refusal in abstruse interpretations of covenants, 
leading to unnecessarily complex and uncertain litigation. 
Crabb and Seitler take a slightly different approach, suggesting a two-stage test for 
identifying whether a reason for refusal of consent can be justified.50  The first stage is 
to ask whether in fact the landlord's commercial interests will be prejudiced by the 
proposed disposition.  The second stage is to ask whether the commercial interests 
that might be prejudiced are protected in the lease.  Crabb and Seitler's approach is 
somewhat broader than Kodilinye's in recognising collateral contracts and other 
implied rights which would have been within the contemplation of the parties at the 
time of entering into the lease.51 
This interests-based approach is certainly an improvement over a strict contract-based 
view.  It allows interests protected expressly or by implication in the lease to be used 
as justification for a refusal of consent, even if the particular threat to the interest in 
question is one that could not have been foreseen,52  such as in the Rent Act cases.53  
Crabb and Seitler place some restrictions on these rights, however.  They argue that a 
management policy not in place or contemplated at the time the lease was made could 
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never reasonably ground a consent,54 and that Balcombe LJ's fifth proposition55 is on 
shaky ground.56 
Straudley Investments v Mount Eden Land (No 1) supports the contractual approach 
as a general proposition, but in a more qualified manner.57  Here, Phillips LJ deduced 
from the propositions in International Drilling that:58 
(1) It will normally be reasonable for a landlord to refuse consent or impose a 
condition if this is necessary to prevent his contractual rights under the 
headlease from being prejudiced by the proposed assignment or sublease. 
(2) It will not normally be reasonable for a landlord to seek to impose a 
condition which is designed to increase or enhance the rights that he enjoys 
under the headlease. 
This supports the general tenet of the test proposed by Crabb and Seitler in respect of 
the principle of no uncovenanted advantage, but is somewhat more circumspect.  By 
qualifying his language, Phillips LJ leaves open the possibility that in a particular case 
it may be reasonable for a landlord to withhold consent for reasons which are not 
grounded in the contract itself. 
The kinds of reasons which have fallen foul of this principle are where the landlord 
has sought to regain possession of the premises,59 to prevent another tenant of his 
from taking up the lease and thereby leaving the landlord with another vacant 
property,60 or where a landlord has sought to use his refusal to procure additional 
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rights from a new tenant.61  In these cases, the landlord's conduct has been far beyond 
what might reasonably be expected of a landlord in the context of their relationship, 
not just of the contract.  Additionally, in all of these case, the landlord is adopting a 
property-led management approach, seeking to secure a greater share of the value of 
the premises, rather than attempting to add value.62  
Some of the more extreme cases falling under this rule could amount to an attempt by 
the landlord to derogate from his grant.  Neuberger J stated obiter in Moss Bros v CSC 
that a general policy against a change of use where such was provided for in the lease 
by a fully qualified covenant might amount to a derogation from grant.63  Browne-
Wilkinson LJ pointed in this direction during his judgment in Rayburn v Wolf:64 
But it is quite clear that the lease itself envisages not only assignments but 
also underleases; therefore it is plainly within the purview of this lease that 
there were to be underleases. So the mere possibility of an underlease being 
granted by a proposed assignee (being something anticipated by the headlease 
itself) cannot be a ground for objection. 
Indeed, the distinction drawn by Dunn LJ in Bromley Park between that case and the 
cases cited by the landlord as supporting a broader justification for a refusal of 
consent on estate management grounds is similarly concerned with preventing the 
landlord from undoing his grant altogether:65 
in no case has it been held reasonable for a landlord to refuse his consent for 
the purpose of destroying the lease in question or merging it on terms with 
another lease in the same building 
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As Lord Bingham stated in Ashworth Frazer, "while difficult borderline cases are 
bound to arise, the principle to be applied is clear".66  There is indeed a clear link 
between the cases where a landlord's refusal of consent is said to have been found 
unreasonable on the basis of this approach.  Courts may be wise, however, to avoid 
tying themselves down with rigid rules, lest they, in the words of Lewison J, "fall into 
the trap identified by Lord Denning MR in Bickel v Duke of Westminster."67 
The broad approach 
What Lewison J referred to as Lord Denning's "trap" is of course the fact that the 
circumstances in which both landlords and tenants find themselves will tend to vary 
quite considerably over the course of their relationship, and it will never be possible 
to identify at the outset all of the myriad possibilities in which consent might be 
sought. 
Some have identified a broad approach in how the courts might deal with assessing 
reasonableness.68  This approach is based on the dictum of Lord Denning in Bickel, 
and rejects firm rules for determining reasonableness on the ground that such rules are 
antithetic to the flexibility required by courts in assessing reasonableness in a 
particular set of facts.  It might also be said that such strict rules are likely to stymie 
the effective management of property portfolios in the long run.69  Much criticism has 
been levelled at this approach as failing to protect tenants. Crabb and Seitler argue 
that it:70 
[M]inimises the concerns of the tenant but seems even broader in its scope 
[than the personality/user test] allowing landlords to refuse consent 
whenever, from their point of view, it is commercially reasonable to do so.  It 
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would endorse, for example, a refusal of consent on the basis of an estate 
management policy which was outside the contemplation of the parties when 
the lease was made. 
Perell, on the other hand, argues that the effect of Bromley Park is not to move away 
from a reasonable man test: "Rather, it puts that test in a context."71  Of course, the 
lease which created the relationship of landlord and tenant must be considered as part 
of the context in which reasonableness is assessed, as well as any other agreements or 
dealings between the parties, commercial factors, and any other relevant aspects of the 
relationship in which the parties actually find themselves.  It is certainly not clear that 
by requiring a landlord to be reasonable in withholding consent, parties to a lease 
intend to confine the landlord to only have regard to interests protected under the 
lease. 
Although the judgments of Balcombe LJ in International Drilling and Lord Bingham 
in Ashworth Frazer both qualified the approach of Lord Denning MR in Bickel, 
stating that factual reasonableness was subject to other rules, it is not clear how 
rigidly these should be interpreted. 
It is, perhaps, unfortunate that Balcombe LJ chose the phrase "propositions of law" to 
describe the guidance he set out in International Drilling.  Lord Denning MR had 
rejected that very same construction in Bickel out of a fear that anything purporting to 
be a proposition of law may cause difficulties for a future court asked to determine 
reasonableness in the context of a novel set of facts.  The Master of the Rolls made 
this point even having considered the purported rule which later formed the basis of 
Balcombe LJ's first proposition.  In setting out definite rules beyond the procedural 
elements required to establish the factual situation – where the burden of proof lies; 
                                                 
71
 Perell, supra note 32 at 356. 
 -71- 
whether factual reasonableness should be assessed subjectively or objectively; etc. – 
the decisions in International Drilling and Ashworth Frazer risk introducing a rigidity 
into the law that the factual approach seeks to avoid. 
Such conditions applying to the reasons relied upon by a landlord should be 
distinguished from the type of “guidance” suggested by Lord Denning MR in Bickel. 
Examples of this type of guidance might be the fifth72 or sixth73 principles in 
International Drilling.  Such guidance does not bind a later court's discretion either 
way, contrary to the expectations of some landlords.74  As stated by Lord Rodger 
when overruling the rule in Killick v Second Covent Garden Property Co,75 (that a 
landlord could not reasonably refuse consent to an assignment based on the merely 
anticipated intended user of the proposed assignee):76 
It is important not to exaggerate the effect of overruling Killick. In particular, 
it does not establish any contrary rule of law that it will always be reasonable 
for a landlord to withhold consent to an assignment simply on the ground that 
the proposed assignee intends to use the premises for a purpose which would 
give rise to a breach of a user covenant. While that will usually be a 
reasonable ground for withholding consent, there may be circumstances 
where refusal of consent on this ground alone would be unreasonable. As 
Lord Denning MR stressed, it will depend on the circumstances of the 
particular case. 
There is therefore little danger in allowing the courts discretion.  Following on from 
this, if a rigid test might yield some undesirable results, even though it would arrive at 
a just result in most cases, it is not suitable.  Thus, while the contractual approach 
presents a compelling argument which is capable of explaining much of the 
jurisprudence and will likely lead to the correct result in the majority of cases, it 
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should not be adopted as a rule of law if it would lead to the wrong result in some, no 
matter how few. 
The House of Lords in Ashworth Frazer endorsed a broadly flexible view of 
reasonableness: Lord Rodger described the value of a reasonableness test generally as 
being “precisely because it prevents the law becoming unduly rigid.”77  Approving the 
statement of Viscount Dunedin in Tredegar v Harwood that the reasonableness 
required of landlords is “reasonableness in the general sense”,78 as well as Lord 
Denning’s dicta in Bickel, Lord Rodger suggested that the correct test was to 
“consider what the reasonable landlord would do” in the circumstances.79 
The reaffirmation of Bickel in Ashworth Frazer may hint to a re-emergence of factual 
reasonableness as the key determinant in these cases.  The proposition laid out in 
Killick v Second Covent Garden Property Co80  was rejected not because it was 
deficient as a rule, but because rigid rules are intrinsically unsuitable for determining 
reasonableness in these cases:81 
[As] Bickel shows, the correct approach is to consider what the reasonable 
landlord would82 do when asked to consent in the particular circumstances. 
The rule of law derived from Killick introduces a rigidity which makes it 
impossible to apply that approach. 
It is also interesting to examine the language of the passages chosen by Lord Bingham 
in illustrating his first overriding principle:  “Nothing whatsoever to do with” and 
“something affecting […] not wholly extraneous[…]” point to a loose guideline rather 
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than a strict rule.  It seems clear from the judgment that it is the broad principle that 
Lord Bingham affirms, rather than a particular formulation.  It also acknowledges the 
“infinitely various”83 circumstances which might be faced by the courts in 
determining reasonableness and how the facts of individual cases may pose problems 
for such a rule. 
Although Lord Bingham’s affirmation of a general reasonableness test is subject to 
the aforementioned principle, the wording of his judgment indicates that the first 
principle might be interpreted flexibly.84  In describing the cases upon which his first 
principle is based as “of illustrative value”, he is leaving it to be decided on a case-by-
case basis whether in fact the reason relied on by the landlord falls within the 
relationship of landlord and tenant. This would allow a broader reasonableness test to 
be applied in the difficult borderline cases mentioned.85 
The overall tone of both judgments on reasonableness is similar to that of Lord 
Denning MR’s in Bickel. It re-affirms the spirit of Lord Denning MR’s dicta: this area 
of the law concerns aspects of commercial practice that are subject to myriad 
variables and do not lend themselves to strict rules.  A loose formulation of the 
contractual approach, as adopted by Phillips LJ in Straudley Investments86 might be a 
better guide for future courts than the firm application of the contractual approach. 
4.2 User 
The courts' approach to the reasonableness of landlords' refusals of consent is most 
developed in the context of disposition covenants, perhaps because landlords' and 
                                                 
83
 Bickel v Duke of Westminster, supra note 10 at 524. 
84
 Ashworth Frazer Ltd v Gloucester City Council, supra note 16, para 4. 
85
 See, for example: Whiteminster Estates v Hodges Menswear, (1974) 232 EG 715 (Ch); Crown 
Estates Commissioners v Signet, supra note 51. 
86
 Straudley Investments v Mount Eden Land (No 1), supra note 57. 
 -74- 
tenants' interests are more likely to be aligned in the case of user covenants,87 because 
disposition covenants are more likely to be fully qualified than other types of 
covenant,88 or because a change of user is more likely to be sought in the context of a 
transfer of the property than by a sitting tenant.  Due to the lack of litigation on the 
reasonableness of a refusal of other types of consent, courts have looked to cases on 
dispositions for guidance.89 
A landlord's objections to user are also likely to centre on different grounds than an 
objection to a disposition.  It may relate to a concern about the viability of the 
proposed business,90 or the effect that a change of user may have on the legal rights 
and obligations attaching to the premises.  It is also interesting to note how many of 
the decisions where a refusal to consent based on user were upheld related to the 
impact of the proposed user on other property of the landlord.91 
Many cases concerning user have arisen in the context of a landlord's refusal of 
consent to a disposition, where the landlord has objected to the intended user of the 
proposed disponee.  Such circumstances bring an additional set of interests into play 
for the landlord to those involved in disposition without a change of user.92  A 
landlord might, for instance, be worried about the premises losing some advantage 
arising out of a licence or continued user, which could not be regained by a 
subsequent occupier.  The proposed user could damage the value of the reversion by 
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making it more difficult to find a tenant in future, or affect the rent obtainable upon 
review.  In addition, a change of user could have a significant impact on neighbouring 
properties, whether by causing a nuisance or by removing a benefit arising as a result 
of the current occupation.  In cases involving multiple requested consents, the 
reasonableness of refusal of consent to assignment and user (as well as to any other 
consents that might be necessary, such as for alterations) should be addressed together 
where they amount to one scheme.93  It may not be appropriate for a tenant to seek 
consent to a change of user intended to benefit an assignee, as such an application 
should be made together with the application for consent to assign.94 
In Killick v Second Covent Garden Property Company,95 the tenant of a property had 
sought to assign the lease to another company, which was likely to turn it into offices 
in breach of the user covenant in the lease.  The Court of Appeal held that as the 
landlord would be in the same position legally after such an assignment, being able to 
enforce the user covenant against the assignee, he could not reasonably refuse consent 
to the assignment.  Although this case was decided before Bickel, it came to be 
interpreted as a rule of law that a landlord could not reasonably object to an 
assignment based merely on an anticipated breach of the user clause by the proposed 
assignee, where consenting (with a reserved right to enforce user covenants if 
necessary) would not affect his legal position after the assignment.96  This rule was 
heavily criticised,97 with Lord Rodger even referring to a description of it as “the 
refuge of the desperate”.98 
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Although a number of subsequent courts were able to distinguish Killick,99 the rule 
was seen as sufficiently problematic for the House of Lords to address it in Ashworth 
Frazer, striking it down as an inappropriate fetter on landlords' discretion.  It is now 
considered generally reasonable to withhold consent on the grounds that the 
anticipated user of a proposed assignee would be in breach of a user covenant, 
although if the user covenant is fully qualified, the refusal of consent to change user 
must also be reasonable. 
Quality of user 
The substantive purpose for which a proposed assignee wishes to use a property may 
not be the only factor relevant to a landlord's decision.  As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
difference between two ostensibly similar uses can be vast in terms of the number and 
types of customers that they attract, and therefore to the landlord's management 
plans.100  Of course in some instances, a landlord's interests in this regard may be 
capable of being protected through careful drafting of a user covenant,101 but this will 
not always be possible.  In the absence of a clause such as this, a landlord will most 
likely be unable to prevent a sitting tenant from making subtle changes to the manner 
of user, it may be reasonable for a landlord to object to a disposition on such 
grounds.102 
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In Canada, it has been suggested that even where a proposed assignee intends to use 
the premises for substantially the same purposes, the subtle differences in the manner 
of occupation may be relevant in determining reasonableness:103 
The mere fact that the proposed subtenant is acknowledged to be respectable 
and responsible does not preclude a landlord from saying that the subtenant is 
not suitable having regard to all the circumstances, including the 
circumstances that existed when the head lease was entered into.  It is well 
known that in shopping centres, the ‘personality’ and use of lead tenants is 
very important and material factor in the overall value of the shopping centre.  
I would not like to say that a shopping centre landlord is never justified in 
withholding consent to a sublease where the sublessee, although respectable 
and responsible, is nevertheless operating a different class of store, especially 
in the case of a lead tenant. 
4.3 Reasonableness - special cases 
There are some cases where, although unreasonable at first sight, a refusal of consent 
may be justified by reference to some special factor.  It had been suggested that the 
Rent Act cases fell under a special category but it appears that this is not the case.104 
4.3.1  Express provisions in the lease 
In order to avoid any doubt, a portfolio landlord might be tempted to include a list of 
circumstances in which it would be reasonable for the landlord to refuse consent.105  
The courts have interpreted many of these clauses quite narrowly, even where they are 
drafted to give the landlord as much manoeuvrability as possible.  In Berenyi v 
Watford Borough Council (relating to a user covenant), the council was entitled under 
the lease to withhold consent to a change of user on the ground "that the trade or 
business proposed to be carried on is considered by the corporation to be one which 
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would be in conflict with the corporation's interpretation of good estate 
management."106  The Court of Appeal held that as the council had not appeared from 
its minutes to have given thought to the user, they could not rely on the clause cited 
above.  Courts may also interpret the general reasonableness requirement more strictly 
against the landlord where the lease contains specific reasons for withholding consent, 
and the landlord seeks to rely on another reason, as has been done in Canada.107 
The inclusion of such conditions in the lease, whether as limits to the fully qualified 
covenant permissible at common law in respect of user, as conditions precedent to the 
fully qualified covenant coming into operation, or under section 19(1A) of the 1927 
Act in relation to alienation cannot, however, be seen as a win-win situation for the 
landlord.  Although such devices do allow for some degree of manoeuvrability 
between the extreme positions of absolute prohibitions108 and fully qualified 
covenants,109 landlords are advised to minimise any restrictions imposed as rent 
achievable upon review will take into account the real situation facing the tenants, not 
merely the appearance of a fully qualified covenant.110 
In their report, the Association of British Insurers' Working Party on the 1995 Act did 
not recommend including any safeguards into leases to protect a landlord's ability to 
refuse consent on grounds relating to good estate management, as in its opinion, 
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refusal on any ground that might be covered by such a covenant would be reasonable 
in the normal course of events.111 
Tenant mix covenants 
While specific covenants may be useful in preserving freedom of action for landlords, 
they may occasionally limit a landlord's freedom to make changes.  In Dunnes Stores 
(Ilac Centre) Ltd v Irish Life Assurance the landlord's refusal to consent to a change 
of user was deemed unreasonable, in part because of the drafting of the fully qualified 
user covenant. 112  It stated expressly that the landlord must consider the need for uses 
to be "as diverse as possible" when considering applications for consent to change of 
user.  The landlord had sought to keep the tenant mix to only clothing-related retailers 
in one part of the shopping centre.  It is clear, therefore, that landlords ought to be 
careful about how such covenants are granted, as they may cause difficulties for the 
long term management of a centre.113 
4.3.2 The unreasonable behaviour of others 
While it is clear that the landlord may not act unreasonably in refusing consent, a 
question which has arisen in a number of cases is the degree to which he is entitled to 
take into account the unreasonable opinions of others. 
Tenant relations 
In some cases it may not be the landlord who objects to a particular change, but other 
tenants of the landlord, or their customers.  Certainly in the case of tenants, if their 
objections are not based on anything material, the landlord may not be permitted to 
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take account of their apprehensions.114  This may be different where the tenants were 
in a position to vacate their properties.  Given that these fears would then represent a 
real situation facing the landlord, some signs suggest he may be allowed refuse on this 
ground,115 although this cannot be taken for granted.116 
Superior Landlords 
Where a superior landlord's consent is required for a landlord to grant consent, subject 
to it not being unreasonably withheld, it appears as though a landlord will not be 
reasonable in relying on an unreasonable withholding of consent by that superior 
landlord.  Thus both the head landlord and the landlord of the subtenant will be 
unreasonable in withholding consent.117 
Market forces and reasonableness 
Sometimes the landlord may themselves be subject to wider market forces.  For 
example, the value of the reversion can be affected considerably by the covenant 
strength of the tenant.  On one view, this will at most entitle a landlord who is 
planning to sell his reversion to take into account the value of the reversion. In 
International Drilling, a question was raised about the relevance of paper value alone 
in this regard.118  This again indicates that the courts are more likely to approve the 
withholding of consent where it is done in pursuit of a business-led management 
strategy, than when a landlord is basing his decisions on a property-led strategy.119 
In other cases, a landlord might fear his other tenants losing customers as a result of a 
new (undesirable) tenant moving in, as in Egan Film Services v McNamara (where a 
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Christian bookshop tenant feared losing customers as a result of a bookmakers 
moving in next door).120  Dixon J, in the Irish High Court, held that the landlord was 
not unreasonable in refusing consent, even though he might not have been reasonable 
in refusing consent based on his own moral objections.121 
4.3.3 Statutory or freely negotiated 
Another question to be asked is whether the origin of a covenant affects the standard 
of reasonableness to be applied, in particular where it has been implied by statute.  If 
reasonableness is, in the normal course of events, to be assessed by the intentions of 
the parties, how might it be interpreted in light of the fact that a covenant was inserted 
by operation of statute rather than by the intention of the parties? 
The courts may look to the purpose of a statute to see how it may affect 
reasonableness.  Section 19(1)(a) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1927 was intended 
to improve the position of tenants subject to merely qualified disposition covenants 
and so it will not act to imply into a lease a less favourable covenant than the tenant 
was able to obtain in negotiations. 
The wording of the statute will be essential. Legislatures may not been as content as 
private parties to leave the interpretation of such covenants to the courts.  For 
example, the Rent Restrictions Act 1946 in Ireland imposed a very severe assignment 
clause on landlords (under which a landlord could only withhold consent if greater 
hardship would, owing to the special circumstances of the case, be caused by granting 
the consent than by withholding it).122  
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The Irish Supreme Court recently examined section 66 of the Landlord and Tenant 
Act, 1980 in the case of Meagher v Luke J Healey Pharmacy Ltd.123  In that case, 
Murphy J in the High Court had held that the landlord’s consent to assignment had 
been unreasonably withheld, and had suggested that had the tenant been able to 
establish loss as a result of the landlord’s unreasonable refusal of consent, damages 
would in principle be payable.124  Finnegan J, giving the judgment for the Supreme 
Court, rejected this view.  The 1980 Act implies a qualification into any restriction of 
alienation, but does not place a statutory duty on a landlord not to withhold consent 
unreasonably.  This is in contrast to the decision in Kelly v Cussen, which interpreted 
the Rent Restrictions Act 1946.125 
4.4 Reasonableness in the context of a portfolio 
Where does this standard of reasonableness leave the portfolio landlord?  If the 
reasonable landlord may only consider the subject matter of the lease in deciding 
whether to grant consent or may only refuse consent in order to promote interests that 
are protected in the lease, can a landlord ever take account of tenant mix, externalities 
or damage to neighbouring property?  Ought landlords of property portfolios insist 
upon absolute user and assignment clauses to avoid the risks of a refusal of consent 
being challenged?  In order to answer these questions, it is instructive to examine how 
the courts have treated landlords who have refused consent on such grounds. 
It has been held or implied in numerous decisions at first instance126 and in the 
appellate courts,127 that landlords are not precluded as a matter of law from 
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considering their broader interests in deciding whether or not to give a consent 
requested by a tenant. It was thought at one time, that the landlords of property 
portfolios had a very broad discretion to withhold consent in order to promote their 
own interests relating to the estate to which an individual property belonged.128  
However, the notion that portfolio landlords have unlimited discretion in managing 
individual properties was comprehensively dismissed by the Court of Appeal in 
Bromley Park Garden Estates v Moss.129 
The boundary between acceptable management of a property for the benefit of a 
broader portfolio and an abuse of the landlord's power under the lease to secure a 
collateral advantage is best understood through the case law.  As the courts have taken 
a similar approach to determining reasonableness in respect of fully qualified user, 
assignment and alterations covenants, all three shall be addressed together. 
4.4.1 The case law 
Governors of Bridewell Hospital v Fawkner (the Salvation Army case) is an early 
reported case of a landlord seeking to rely on apprehended damage to its neighbouring 
property to refuse consent to assignment.130  The sitting tenant sought consent to 
assign the lease to "General" Booth, founder of the Salvation Army, for use as office 
space.  The landlord refused consent on the basis of professional advice that the 
occupation of the premises by the Salvation Army, even just as office space, could 
have a detrimental effect on nearby property.  This refusal was upheld as reasonable 
("not arbitrary" and with "good and sufficient reason") on the grounds that the 
Corporation, as managers, had to consider "not merely the tenant of any particular 
premises forming part of that estate, or the rent he had to pay, or the covenants into 
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which he had to enter, but the wellbeing of the whole estate."131  The Court held that, 
notwithstanding the virtues of a proposed user in itself, any injury likely to be caused 
by it to neighbouring property of the landlord could reasonably be taken into account. 
In Re Spark's Lease, a landlord shared a building with its tenant, including the front 
entranceway. 132  The tenant sought consent to a subletting subject to an identical user 
clause to that in the head lease, which the landlord granted, subject to the proviso that 
his consent be required for any further subletting by the proposed sublessee.  Swinfen 
Eady J held that this was a reasonable condition, as the landlord had a direct interest 
in the user of his neighbour, pointing out that excessive use by any occupant of the 
common entranceway could damage the value of the landlord's premises.133 
This can be contrasted with the case of Berenyi v Watford Borough Council, where 
the landlord's apprehensions regarding the effect of a subletting on traffic flow were 
held to be unjustified, as had been found in an appeal of an earlier planning decision 
by the council.134 
The landlord in Houlder Bros v Gibbs sought to prevent an assignment of a lease with 
five years left to run to an existing yearly tenant of the landlord in adjoining 
premises.135  The landlord's fear was that the proposed assignee would vacate the 
other premises at the first opportunity, leaving the landlord with a unit unoccupied in 
an unfavourable letting market. Considering the Salvation Army case, Pollock MR 
described it as: 
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an illustration of a withholding of consent on broad grounds bearing upon the 
estate of the lessor, or it may be on grounds which are important between the 
lessor and other lessees of that property, or that estate, of which the lessee had 
cognizance. But I do not think the words of the covenant can be so interpreted 
as to entitle the lessor to exercise the right of refusal when his reason given is 
one which is independent of the relation between the lessor and lessee, and is 
on grounds which are entirely personal to the lessor, and wholly extraneous to 
the lessee. 
The court rejected the landlord's refusal as having no relation to "the relationship of 
landlord and tenant in regard to the subject matter of the demise".136 
In Tredegar v Harwood, the lease of a house included a covenant requiring the tenant 
to keep the house insured with a particular company (Law Fire) or another responsible 
company, subject to that other company being approved by the landlord.137  An 
assignee of the original tenant had insured the house with a different company (Atlas) 
in compliance with a term of her mortgage, and the landlord sought to compel her to 
take out a policy with Law Fire.  The reason for the landlord's insistence upon Law 
Fire was related to his estate management practices.  Requiring that all tenants use the 
same insurers made the sisyphean task of ensuring that all of the thousands of houses 
in his estate were insured somewhat easier.  The Court of Appeal held that the 
covenant ought to be construed analogously to a fully qualified assignment covenant, 
and that once the tenant suggested a respectable insurance office, the landlord could 
not object on grounds unconnected with the relationship of landlord and tenant.  
Although a majority of the House of Lords rejected this construction, both Viscount 
Dunedin and Lord Shaw went on to discuss the concept of reasonableness, both 
suggesting that the landlord's reasons would have been reasonable in any event.  
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Questioning the generalisability of the judgment in Houlder Bros, Viscount Dunedin 
stated:138 
I am not inclined to adhere to the pronouncement that reasonableness was 
only to be referred to something which touched both parties to the lease. I 
should read reasonableness in the general sense (…) 
Lord Shaw expressly referred to the relevance of the property being managed as part 
of a broader estate, opining that if the clause were subject to a qualification that the 
landlord could not unreasonably withhold consent to another insurance company 
being used "it would be wrong to confine the reason in such case to the particular 
house exclusive of all considerations as to the management of the estate to which it 
belonged."139 
In Premier Confectionery v London Commercial Sale Rooms,140 one tenant occupied 
two nearby units owned by the same landlord in a block of buildings under separate 
leases, entered into approximately one year apart.  One, known as the "kiosk", was 
much smaller than the other and commanded significantly less rent. Each was subject 
to a qualified covenant against assignment (converted into a fully qualified covenant 
by the 1927 Act) and a user covenant restricting the premises to use as a tobacconist.  
Both were assigned together to the plaintiff, which later went into liquidation.  The 
liquidator sought consent to assign the kiosk on its own. The landlord refused to 
consent to the assignment, pointing to a policy against having two tenants in the same 
building competing against one another.  Bennett J, sitting in the Chancery Division, 
accepted the commercial evidence as demonstrating clearly that the operation of the 
kiosk separately to the shop would cause damage to the landlord's interest in respect 
of the shop, to which a reasonable landlord would have regard if he were so entitled.  
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As the leases were made separately, it was argued that the landlord was relying on 
factors external to the relationship of landlord and tenant, and so the landlord was not 
entitled to take the apprehended harm into account.  Bennett J held that in all the 
circumstances, the landlord was entitled to take such factors into consideration, 
although unfortunately scant reasoning is given as to why this would be so.  It appears 
to be based on the personality or user test from Bates v Donaldson,141 with Bennett J 
linking the refusal to the proposed manner of user and occupation, and indicating a 
willingness to take into account a very broad range of circumstances, encompassing 
the relationship between the parties and the landlord's commercial position.142 
This was accepted in Re Town Investments Underlease, a case where the landlord 
objected to a sublease of part of a property on terms involving the payment of a 
significant premium in return for rent being set at below market rate.143  The landlord 
feared that the effect of this transaction could be to make it more difficult to charge or 
rent the property in future.  Dankworths J cited Premier Confectionery as:144 
[A]uthority for the proposition that, in considering whether to give or 
withhold consent, the landlords were entitled to consider the effect which the 
transactions might have upon their ability in the future to let satisfactorily the 
different parts of their property, particularly in case of default on the part of 
their tenant in performing his obligations. 
In Whiteminster Estates v Hodges Menswear, the landlord of a retail unit refused its 
tenant consent to assign the property to a competitor of the landlord.145  The unit 
neighboured the landlord's menswear shop and the landlord feared that if it were to be 
occupied by a competing store, the landlord's business would be harmed.  Although 
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the sitting tenants argued that a concentration of clothing shops could draw in more 
customers, increasing profitability of individual shops,146  Pennycuick VC accepted 
the landlord's reasoning, holding that the court could only intervene where the 
landlord's reasons were perverse.  The court accepted as a given that a landlord is 
entitled to take into account reasons not only relating to his interests as landlord but 
also affecting him in other capacities. 
The reasons cited in court by the landlord in Bromley Park Garden Estates v Moss147 
related to trying to realise some marriage value148 of the flat which formed the subject 
matter of the proceedings and a restaurant below.  Recovering possession of the flat 
would allow the landlord to re-let the whole building on advantageous terms.  The 
landlord relied on a statement in Woodfall to the effect that a landlord could 
reasonably refuse consent to an assignment if to do so is in the interests of good estate 
management.149  Although the Court of Appeal accepted that it would be good estate 
management for the landlord to refuse consent, Dunn LJ distinguished permissible 
estate management grounds from the case at hand, stating:150 
The cases cited in support of the proposition as stated by Woodfall show that, 
although the question of unreasonableness depends on all the circumstances 
of the case, including considerations of proper management of the estate of 
which the demised premises form a part, in no case has it been held 
reasonable for a landlord to refuse his consent for the purposes of destroying 
the lease in question or merging it on terms with another lease in the same 
building, even though that would probably be good estate management and 
would be a pecuniary advantage to the landlord. 
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Considering the Salvation Army Case and Premier Confectionery, he continued:151 
In both cases the landlords were seeking to uphold the status quo and to 
preserve the existing contractual arrangements provided by the leases (…) 
there is nothing in the cases to indicate that the landlord was entitled to refuse 
his consent in order to acquire a commercial benefit for himself by putting 
into effect proposals outside the contemplation of the lease under 
consideration, and to replace the contractual relations created by the lease by 
some alternative arrangements more advantageous to the landlord, even 
though this would have been in accordance with good estate management. 
Slade LJ also distinguished those cases, pointing to the fact that both of the landlords 
involved would have suffered detriment if the proposed assignment were to have been 
permitted.152 
In FW Woolworth v Charlwood Alliance, the plaintiff tenant operated a department 
store which was the anchor tenant in the defendant landlord's shopping centre.153  It 
was subject to a keep open covenant.  The landlord refused to consent to an 
assignment of the lease unless the proposed assignees gave an undertaking that they 
would be able to comply with the keep open covenant.  Judge Finlay QC, sitting in the 
High Court, held that the landlords were entitled to make their decision having regard 
to the likely effect of the transaction on the centre:154 
The landlords here are, in my judgment, entitled to consider the likely effect 
upon their ability to let other parts of the property and, indeed, to obtain the 
appropriate rents for their other property in the centre. At all material times 
there was a high likelihood, now shown to be a certainty, that the assignee 
would not keep the store open and the landlords are entitled to consider the 
effect which that would have upon their ability not only to let the other 
property in the centre but to obtain satisfactory rents for them. 
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In Sportoffer v Erewash BC, the plaintiffs operated squash courts on property let from 
the local Borough Council.155  Over several years since the club's establishment (and 
through several operators), it reacted to a fall in the popularity of squash by varying 
the facilities it provided, bringing it into competition with the landlord council's own 
leisure facilities.  Eventually, the owners sought permission to assign the lease to a 
company operating a chain of health and fitness clubs, which wanted to further 
diversify the club's offering, including the addition of a swimming pool.  The council 
objected to the change of use, pointing to the detriment it would cause to the council's 
adjacent swimming pool and other nearby leisure facilities, both by competing 
directly against them and causing congestion in the car park shared by the squash club 
and the council's swimming pool.  It was argued on behalf of the plaintiff that the 
second of Balcombe LJ's propositions from International Drilling precluded the 
landlord from considering his interests in respect of other properties belonging to him.  
Referring to Whiteminster Estates v Hodge's Menswear, Lloyd J stated:156 
I would find it surprising if a landlord could not reasonably take into account 
the circumstances of other property of his own, whether let or in hand, when 
considering an application for a consent to change of use under a lease. A 
shopping centre is an obvious example, but not the only case, where estate 
management considerations may suggest that one type of use be allowed 
under a lease but others not, because of the circumstances of other adjoining 
property. 
I find nothing in Balcombe LJ’s judgment, nor in the case cited by him in 
relation to the proposition which I have mentioned, which suggests that this is 
not legitimate or that Sir John Pennycuick’s decision in Whiteminster Estates 
Ltd is wrong. I therefore hold that, following Sir John’s decision, a landlord 
can legitimately take into account considerations relating to adjoining 
property of his own, whether let or not. 
The plaintiff also made a more subtle argument based on the contractual approach 
discussed above.  One of the council's facilities which it feared would be subjected to 
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competition by the proposed change of use was built in 1987, after the lease had been 
granted and after the club had begun to diversify its facilities.  It was thereby argued 
that in trying to prevent the change of use, the landlord was seeking an uncovenanted 
advantage.  Lloyd J rejected this argument, preferring to look at the relationship as it 
existed at the time the consent was sought, and arguing that as the relationship 
between the parties is bound to change over the course of a long lease, so are the 
interests each will want to protect:157 
Given that this is a 99-year lease, it seems to me unrealistic to suggest that the 
only other property which the council could legitimately take into account, 
and the only other uses of property, are those in existence at the date of the 
lease. It stands to reason that a landlord would take such a covenant to 
protect the interests that it needs to protect at any time during the whole term. 
As local authority, it is bound to have such interests and highly likely that they 
will change during the period of 99 years. 
In a sense, Miss Jackson's proposition was advanced as a forensic one as well 
as separately as a legal one, namely, that the borough council could not be 
regarded as entitled to complain of competition, if there be any, with the 
Albion Centre because they came to the competition. But in my view that is not 
a fair assessment of the facts.  
The recent case of Sargeant v Macepark further illustrates these principles.158  The 
Defendant tenant operated a hotel next to the claimant's golf course, which was used 
inter alia for management training and conferences.  The tenants applied for consent 
to the construction of an extension.  Eventually, the landlords sought to impose a 
condition on the consent, that the extension only be used for management training 
conferences, to prevent the tenant from competing with the landlord, which 
occasionally allowed its premises to be used for weddings and other functions.  
Lewison J held that the landlord was entitled to insist on a condition to protect its 
existing business interests relating to weddings, but not to seek to prevent the tenant 
                                                 
157
 Ibid. 
158
 Sargeant v Macepark (Whittlebury) Ltd, supra note 67. 
 -92- 
from conducting conferences other than management conferences, as the tenant was 
already pursuing business in this area.  Relying on Sportoffer, Lewison J held that:159 
In my judgment there is no rule of law which precludes a landlord from 
relying under any circumstances on perceived damage to his trading interests 
in adjoining or neighbouring property as a ground for refusing consent to an 
assignment or change of use. Whether the particular perception is reasonable 
and whether, if reasonable, it justifies a refusal of consent or the imposition of 
a condition, is a question of fact in each case. 
Further on, in relation to alteration covenants, he states:160 
(…) in an appropriate case, a landlord is entitled to object to alterations on 
the ground that he has a reasonable objection to the use that the tenant 
proposes to make of the altered property, whether that use is the same as or 
different from the use carried on in the remainder of the property. 
To hold otherwise would be to fall into the trap identified by Lord Denning 
MR in Bickel v Duke of Westminster (…) 
Finding on the facts that the landlord's business interests were protected in the lease 
(there was an express clause prohibiting the landlord from competing with the tenant, 
save for in relation to a few defined areas of business) but that the covenant as drafted 
went further than to merely protect the landlord's existing business, Lewison J ruled 
that the landlords were only entitled to protect their existing business and therefore 
found the condition to be unreasonable.  As in Sportoffer, the court paid attention to 
the actual state of the relationship between the parties at the time consent was sought. 
In Chelsfield MH Investments v British Gas, the defendants had entered into a lease 
with the plaintiff for a unit in a shopping centre which was subject to a fully qualified 
covenant restricting user to the sale of gas appliances and related goods.161  The user 
covenant was subject to a condition that the landlord could have regard to estate 
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management considerations in deciding whether or not to consent to a change of user.  
The defendants had sought the landlord's consent to a broadening of the covenant to 
include the sale of certain other white goods.  The landlords refused consent as such a 
use would be competing with a nearby vendor of electrical appliances, who was also a 
tenant of the landlord.  The landlord had previously enforced that shop's user 
covenant to prevent it from selling gas appliances in competition with the defendant's 
shop.  Knox J was asked to decide whether an interim injunction should be granted to 
prevent the tenants from breaching the user clause.  Analysing the landlord's 
reasoning for withholding consent, he said:162 
The evidence now shows that the plaintiff landlord claimed to have a tenant 
mix policy which they seek to enforce in the Merry Hill Centre and that this 
includes the avoidance of too great a concentration of similar uses in too close 
proximity, that this is seen as beneficial by tenants and prospective tenants 
and that its maintenance has a beneficial effect, as a result, on a rent reviews 
and thus protects the value of the landlords' reversion in the Centre. 
There is some support, on the evidence, for these propositions. 
Assessing the defendant's case, Knox J suggested that a landlord will have a 
significant degree of freedom in designing and implementing tenant mix policies:163 
The highest the case can be put - and indeed was put by Mr Reynolds - is that 
the plaintiff's policy is insufficiently specific. There is no evidence at all that 
no reasonable landlord of such premises would pursue a non-specific tenant 
mix policy and I refrain from expressing views of my own on the subject, 
conscious as I am of a lack of expert qualification on the subject. But, on the 
evidence before me, there is now no serious issue to be tried on the specificity 
of the landlord's tenant mix policy. 
A similar provision existed in Moss Bros v CSC.164  In that case, the plaintiff, whose 
unit in a shopping centre was bound by a user covenant limiting the use of the 
property to men's outfitters, had sought consent to assign its lease to a chain of video 
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game stores.  The landlord objected to the assignment and change of use on the basis 
that it would interfere with the landlord's policy of grouping fashion retailers in that 
part of the shopping centre.  Like in Chelsford, the user covenant was subject to a 
good estate management exception, and the landlord objected to the change on the 
ground that it would be contrary to its tenant mix policy.  The plaintiff argued that no 
such policy was in place, or that it was unreasonable.  Neuberger J held that although 
the policy was not formal (other than insofar as the landlord sought to attract anchor 
tenants), it had in fact been operating a policy of maintaining a retail fashion mix in 
the relevant part of the centre.  
Crown Estate Commissioners v Signet related to a premises on London's Regent 
Street.165  The sitting tenants, who operated a jewellers, sought to assign to a company 
(TTT Moneycorp) who proposed to split the premises into two units: one to be 
occupied by them as a travel agency and bureau de change and one to be sublet to a 
fashion retailer.  Although the fully qualified user covenant did not expressly allow 
the landlord to reject a change of user on the basis of inconsistency with the landlord's 
estate management policies, it was argued that on the facts the refusal was still 
reasonable. 
Judge Bromley QC placed great emphasis on the factual background to the landlord's 
refusal.166  The judge examined at great length commercial evidence relating to the 
management of the Commissioners' property.  The Commissioners adduced evidence 
attesting to the importance of having shop frontage displaying finished goods in order 
to generate comparison shopping across the whole estate. 
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Judge Bromley QC accepted this reasoning as sound commercially, before 
considering whether the landlord was entitled to take into account factors relating to 
other property owned by it.  In deciding that it was reasonable to do so, he considered 
not only the landlord's right to take the impact of the change of user on other property 
it managed into account, but also the fact that the common ownership was well 
known:167 
I use the word "estate" deliberately, since, in my judgment, the commissioners 
are entitled to look, as landlords, at this whole close-compacted property 
estate. Nor do I consider that tenants should be surprised at the estate's 
objectives, provided those objectives fall within the bounds of the reasonable, 
proper and relevant to the landlord and tenant relationship in question and 
certainly where the context is apparent to the tenant, as, in my judgment, it 
was in the present case, to both Signet and to TTT. 
In short, the unity of the Regent Street Crown estate is, in my judgment, both 
relevant and known to tenants.  I consider the commissioners in considering 
an application relating to one only small unit on the estate are entitled to have 
regard to general estate management considerations of the nature I have 
identified. It is reasonable for the landlords in the context of this case to do so. 
Continuing, he addressed the question of whether the specific policy being pursued by 
the landlord had to be known to the tenants in order for the landlord to rely on it in 
refusing consent:168 
Mr Reynolds made the point that these considerations were not generally 
known. In detail, they may well not have been, but the overall estate unity of 
ownership and to a considerable extent of management or management 
potential was certainly generally known. 
In my judgment, while the lack of knowledge of policies in a particular case 
may go to the reasonableness of the refusal, this is not such a case, where the 
essential estate unity was known and "the retail strength of Regent Street", 
which is a quotation from the annual report cited above, was public 
knowledge. In any event, Signet and TTT had only to await the refusal letter to 
be better informed if they had not known or suspected before, but they elected 
not to. I add that I do not consider that the commissioners are limited to 
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objections extant or known at the time of the lease. In my judgment, the 
reasonableness of the refusal has to be considered at the time of the refusal. 
Judge Bromley QC's emphasis on knowledge of the parties, rather than knowledge of 
the original tenant may be a necessary result of the length of time that had elapsed 
since the lease was originally granted.  Nevertheless, it points to the fact that the court 
may be willing to look at the parties' relationship as it actually stood.  Once it is 
known that the properties are managed together in accordance with some overall plan, 
the landlord will be allowed to refuse consent in order to maintain a reasonable 
lettings policy. 
This can be contrasted with the case of Anglia Building Society v Sheffield City 
Council, where the aim of the council was to increase the value of neighbouring 
property by encouraging the conversion of the premises in question from a service use 
to a retail use.169  The sitting tenants, an employment agency, sought to assign the 
premises to a building society for use as one of their branches.  The landlords 
submitted that they were entitled as reasonable landlords to seek to maximise the 
rental value of their portfolio, and that the use of the premises as a building society 
branch harmed rental values.  If the property were to be converted for a retail use, it 
would boost the rent achievable not only from the property itself, but also from 
neighbouring property.  However, the Court of Appeal noted that the proposed change 
would have no effect and that any detriment suffered by the landlord was already 
being suffered.  In attempting to force a change of user, the council was seeking to 
obtain a collateral advantage, which was not reasonable. 
In BRS Northern v Templeheights, the landlord refused consent to a subletting on the 
grounds that it would prejudice the assignment of the reversion to Sainsbury's, which 
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was planning to build a supermarket on neighbouring land.170  The tenant was 
proposing to assign the premises to Safeway, a competitor of Sainsbury's, which was 
intending to use it as part of a supermarket development on land adjoining it on the 
other side to the Sainsbury's development.  Neuberger J held in the High Court that 
the landlord was entitled to take account of its interests in the development of 
neighbouring land. 
The situation in Ireland is similar. In Rice v Dublin Corporation, pursuant to a general 
policy, the local authority landlord sought to prevent premises from being used as a 
public house.171  Maguire CJ emphasised the need for both the landlord and the court 
to treat each case on its facts, so that while a general policy might justify a refusal of 
consent, the landlord should give consideration to the particular facts at hand:172 
[W]hile it is the duty of the Court to consider each case upon its merits, there 
is no reason why a landlord may not properly base a refusal of consent upon 
grounds of general policy in relation to the management of his estate. The 
question whether the grounds upon which a decision to refuse consent to the 
alteration of the user of premises is reasonable in reference to a particular 
case is a matter for the Court. No general rule can be laid down because it is 
easy to conceive cases in which a refusal to agree to an alteration of user 
based on a decision of policy in the management of the landlord's estate would 
be entirely reasonable. On the other hand the Court may hold that such a 
ground is not a reasonable ground for withholding consent in a particular 
case. 
4.4.2 The position of the portfolio landlord 
Although it is clear from the above cases that the landlord is not always confined to 
considering factors relating solely to the property which is the subject matter of the 
lease, this may not always be the case.  If the contractual approach applies, a landlord 
will be limited to taking into account interests in respect of other properties which 
were either expressly protected in the lease, or implicitly because they formed part of 
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the factual matrix in which the lease was granted.  The broad approach would allow 
landlords somewhat more flexibility, permitting them to consider not only the factual 
matrix at the time the lease was granted, but the facts - and the relationship between 
the parties - at the time consent is sought.  A third option - the much derided 
personality or user test - would broaden the field of landlords who may take such 
interests into account, but limit their reasons significantly. 
In order to assess whether the landlord may rely on a particular policy, two questions 
should be asked.  First, is the landlord entitled to rely on reasons relating to other 
property belonging to it at all, and second, whether the policy itself is reasonable. 
When can a landlord consider the impact of a change on neighbouring properties? 
Certainly in the cases where the landlord expressly reserved the right to impose an 
estate management policy, such as in Moss v CSC and in Chelsford, the landlord will 
be able to take account of other property owned by him.  Under the contractual 
approach, a refusal of consent must be grounded in the lease, although in such cases a 
refusal may still be unreasonable on the facts.173  The state of knowledge of the lessee 
at the time of the contract would probably also be enough to permit a landlord to 
reasonably base a refusal of consent on apprehended damage to other property under 
the contractual approach.  Discussing the Salvation Army case, Pollock MR in 
Houlder Bros v Gibbs suggested that a landlord could take into account factors 
relating to the "due and proper management" of the landlord's property, including 
other property, or the landlord's relationship with other tenants, once those factors 
were within the cognisance of the lessee.174 
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In addition to the Salvation Army case, to which Pollock MR referred, the courts in 
Sportoffer and in Signet both considered the knowledge of the parties in deciding that 
it would be reasonable for a landlord to take its interests relating to neighbouring 
property into account.  It appears from some authorities that once the mere fact of 
common ownership was known to the parties, it will be reasonable in principle for a 
landlord to consider those properties in coming to any decision on whether to 
consent.175  In Signet, however, the knowledge that Judge Bromley QC considered 
was not the knowledge at the time of the lease being granted, but at the time that 
consent was being sought.  This might be as a result of the time that had passed since 
the lease was granted.  In any event, it points to a more flexible judicial approach, 
taking into account the relationship of the parties as it stood, not as it had initially 
been created.  In contrast, Cumming-Bruce LJ found in Bromley Park that it could not 
have been within the contemplation of the parties that the covenant be used to re-unify 
the estate of the landlord, which had not been in common occupation immediately 
before the lease was granted.176   
However, it is not clear that knowledge or contemplation is even necessary for a 
landlord to take its ownership of neighbouring property into account.  Bromley Park is 
not a flat-out rejection of the proposition that a landlord may take account of 
neighbouring premises in making its decision; in that case, the Court of Appeal 
rejected the landlord's particular reasons, rather than its contemplation of 
neighbouring property per se.  In Premier Confectionery, Re Town Investments 
Underlease, Hodge's Menswear and other cases,177 the courts appear to have accepted 
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the proposition that a landlord is generally entitled to take its interests in respect of 
neighbouring property into account in making decisions about consent. 
In suggesting that the interests of a contracted purchaser of the reversion might be 
taken into account, BRS Northern v Templeheights widens the range of circumstances 
in which a landlord may consider the effect of a change on neighbouring property.  
The interest of the landlord in selling its reversion to allow neighbouring property not 
owned by it to be developed could not have been in the contemplation of the parties.  
If the landlord were permitted to consider the interests of a purchaser of the reversion, 
it follows naturally that the purchaser could also consider those same interests after 
stepping into the landlord's shoes.  Neuberger J appears to have assumed that the 
landlord was only relying on reasons that the prospective purchaser could have relied 
upon. Discussing a hypothetical scenario where the proposed assignee could not offer 
a good covenant, he said: "it would seem absurd that consent could be withheld in 
such circumstances before the contract was entered into, and after it was completed, 
but not during the period in between."178  He went on to say that it will be a matter of 
fact in each case whether a landlord will be entitled to take account of a particular 
interest, or whether a refusal is reasonable. 
At its most restrictive then, the law permits a landlord to consider the broader estate in 
which a property is situate if it were so situated when the lease was entered into.  This 
is likely to be a particularly strong argument in shopping centres,179 or where the 
landlord has retained some other control over management.180  Further still, Sportoffer 
suggest that a landlord will be permitted to take account of interests relating to 
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property acquired after the lease was entered into if it was conceivable at the time that 
the landlord might acquire such interests over the course of the lease.  Finally, if BRS 
Northern represents the law, the court will take a broad view, similar to that taken by 
the High Court in Signet, looking at the facts of the case and the relationship between 
the parties at the time consent was sought. 
Finally, the acceptance by the court of reasons relating to the landlord's own, non-
property, business as good justifications for withholding consent181 indicates that the 
law in relation to consent takes adequate account of the concerns of businesses letting 
out excess property as part of a Corporate Real Estate Management strategy.182   This 
will help to ensure that non-property business can use their property efficiently. 
When will a landlord be reasonable in refusing consent to protect neighbouring 
properties? 
Even where a landlord is entitled to consider the impact of a change on its 
neighbouring properties, this should not be considered a carte blanche to refuse 
consent whenever there are reasons that are somewhat related to neighbouring 
property in common ownership.183  Again, the contractual approach would suggest 
that any reasons have to be grounded in the lease or surrounding context; the broad 
approach assesses the reasonableness of a refusal in the context of all of the facts at 
the time an application for consent is made; and the personality or user test permits a 
landlord to refuse consent so long as its refusal can be grounded in an objection to the 
personality or intended user of a proposed assignee. 
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Given the role of landlords of retail developments in managing tenant mix, it appears 
that the courts will generally permit reasons relating to managing tenant mix, whether 
a landlord's right to do so is specifically protected in the lease184 or not.185  However, 
the courts will not accept an invocation of tenant mix as definitive proof of the 
landlord's reasonableness.186  In order for a refusal on the grounds of tenant mix to be 
reasonable, it must be based on some apprehension of damage to the trade of 
neighbouring property or to the landlord's interests.  A landlord's apprehension may 
be as a result of a one-off assessment187 or of a broader policy.188  Where it is done as 
part of a broader policy, it may help to demonstrate that a refusal of consent is not 
aimed at the tenant in an arbitrary or capricious manner. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, it is best practice for landlords of property portfolios to 
maintain and actively develop management policies to guide the development of their 
portfolios over time.189  For retail landlords, this is necessary in order to maintain an 
appropriate tenant mix in response to changes in the market.  The ability to 
dynamically adjust a tenant mix policy in response to exogenous challenges is the 
landlord's most important tool in adding value to a retail portfolio, and ensuring the 
continuing vitality of a retail development. It appears as though the codification of a 
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landlord's practices in a policy will help to demonstrate that a particular refusal was 
not unreasonable.190 
The conflict between the benefits achievable through comparison shopping and the 
risks of excessive competition damaging the business of existing tenants is a common 
theme in the case law.  Where a landlord is seeking to protect a tenant (or its own 
business) from competition, the tenant seeking consent may argue that comparison 
shopping will lead to an overall benefit. 191  Conversely, tenants may seek to challenge 
a landlord's invocation of the concept where it does not suit their interests.192  This 
seems at first sight like a question which is ripe for adjudication by the courts on the 
basis of expert evidence, but the courts have shied away from such analysis, not 
wanting to substitute judicial opinion for that of a landlord.  Instead, once the position 
taken by a landlord could be taken by a reasonable landlord, it does not matter that 
some (or most) reasonable landlords would take a different position.193  Thus the final 
leg of Lord Bingham's three overriding principles allows landlords to exercise 
significant discretion.  It is stated concisely by Nicholls VC:194 
[W]hat has to be shown is that the covenantee's refusal is outside the band of 
possible decisions which a reasonable body could reach. 
This freedom allows a landlord to engage in active management without having to 
worry about challenges to the overall policy by individual tenants.  Once the landlord 
is entitled to take neighbouring properties into account, and the lettings policy is 
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reasonable, it will provide a solid grounding for decisions by the landlord, unless on 
the facts some exception to the policy should be preferred.195 
The mere claim of a policy, however, will not be sufficient to protect the landlord's 
refusal of consent.  The courts have been suspicious of professed policies which in 
reality were just attempts to obtain a pecuniary advantage from the tenant.196  The 
way in which a policy is pursued will be equally relevant.  While the objectives of 
landlords in Signet and Anglia Building Society cases were the same (to achieve a 
primarily retail tenant mix), the courts' treatment of the two cases was very different.  
While it is one thing to use the withholding of consent to defend an existing letting 
policy, using it to effect a new policy is something different altogether.  As Dunn and 
Slade LJJ held in Bromley Park, while a landlord might be entitled to withhold 
consent to protect the position it actually enjoys, doing so in the hopes of improving 
its position will be unreasonable. 
In cases not involving retail developments, it may be difficult to link the interest 
pursued by the landlord to the contract between the parties.  In Sportoffer v Erewash, 
much of the apprehended competition would be faced by a leisure centre that had 
been opened by the landlord subsequent to the lease being granted.  Similarly, in 
Sargeant v Macepark, the court appeared to recognise the right of the landlord to take 
into account its business at the time consent was sought, rather than having to rely on 
its position at the time the lease was granted.  In these cases, it also appears that the 
relevant question is not what the parties originally contracted for, but how their 
relationship operated at the time the request for consent was made.  The landlord is 
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not permitted to use a withholding of consent to unilaterally change the relationship, 
as was attempted in Bromley Park and in Anglia Building Society, but is entitled to 
preserve the relationship as it stood when the request was made, as in Sargeant v 
Macepark or Signet.  Similarly, the withholding of consent to secure an advantage 
completely removed from the relationship actually existing between the parties as in 
Houlder Bros v Gibbs will be unreasonable. 
Of course the contractual relationship between the parties will form a relevant part of 
the context in which the reasonableness of a landlord's refusal of consent is 
determined.  It appears, however, that facts arising after the contract is entered into 
must also be considered.  The courts have allowed landlords to take account of how 
the character of retail developments,197 as well as of their own business interests198 
have changed over the course of the landlord and tenant relationship.  While such 
changes cannot be used as an excuse to compel the tenant to give up any rights, 
landlords can use the withholding of consent to protect themselves from any damage 
which might occur as a result of the transaction or change going ahead. 
4.5 What does the case of portfolio interests teach about 
reasonableness generally? 
In West Layton v Ford, the Court of Appeal rejected the notion that the Rent Act cases 
had been determined on principles other than those applying to cases in this area 
generally.199  In Bromley Park, the Court of Appeal again rejected the notion that a 
special broad exemption applied to landlords implementing estate management 
policies.  It therefore appears that the conduct of portfolio landlords is assessed 
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according to the same broad principles of reasonableness as those applying to 
landlords of standalone properties.  Embracing a factual basis of reasonableness, any 
difference is likely attributable to the practical differences between the management 
of individual and portfolio properties, rather than to principle.200 
The portfolio cases are interesting because there are more moving parts to them.  Over 
the course of a lease - especially a long lease - there are changes not only to the 
market affecting the tenant and to the property market for the property the tenant 
occupies, but wider economic and commercial shifts: The markets for goods and 
services offered by neighbouring tenants will also be changing; the effects that each 
tenant has on the success of others as a result of spill over effects will evolve; and the 
mix of tenants in a development may change as a result of conscious planning by the 
landlord or through organic shifts.  This is a much more extreme environment than 
that facing the standalone landlord-tenant relationship, but one which demonstrates 
why the de facto relationship of landlord and tenant may be more important to the 
reasonableness of a withholding of consent than the original agreement between the 
parties. 
In the context of an evolving relationship, the original agreement between the parties 
may not represent the real position in which they find themselves.  Of course their 
relationship will be influenced by the original agreement between them, but as the 
commercial realities facing both the landlord and tenant are constantly in flux, their 
business relationship must be allowed to adjust to those factors, without the need for 
constant re-drafting of their legal relationship.  Against this background, it is 
understandable that a court which is sensitive to the commercial needs of both 
landlord and tenant would have a view to the factual relationship existing between the 
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parties, by assessing reasonableness in the context in which the landlord has to make a 
decision. 
In the case of portfolio properties, it appears that courts are more likely to give a 
landlord leeway in seeking to prevent real damage or protect a real benefit to the rest 
of the landlord's estate, as opposed to merely seeking a pecuniary advantage, through 
the forced surrender of a lease or the imposition of some extraordinary condition. 
While the courts appear to give landlords  - and in particular portfolio landlords - 
much greater freedom in controlling how their property is used than in relation to 
other aspects of it, the personality and user test alone does not appear to be a reliable 
guide.  Here, commercial best practice and reasonableness also align.  Just as active, 
business-led management of property is encouraged in the professional literature,201 a 
landlord who engages in it by seeking to create value in their portfolio will not be 
treated as acting unreasonably where they seek to protect the value they have 
created.202 
Cases involving portfolio properties are oftentimes more factually complex than other 
cases, forcing the courts to look at the reasonableness of the landlord's actions in the 
context of the relationship between the parties as a whole.203  While the approach 
already adopted by the courts in respect of standalone properties, as exemplified by 
Lord Bingham' three overriding principles from Ashworth Frazer, will continue to be 
used, the lesson to be learned from how the courts have treated reasonableness in the 
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context of portfolio properties is that ultimately, it is the relationship between the 
parties which is determinative, rather than the contract originally entered into. 
4.6 Conclusions 
While the various tests for reasonableness that have been suggested by judges and 
commentators are likely to provide a good indication of whether a landlord’s refusal 
of consent was reasonable in a given set of circumstances, they should be treated with 
caution.  The principles expressed are relatively clear from an examination of case 
law but it is doubtful whether any concise expression of them can capture all the 
nuances of a particular set of decisions, each of which having been based on its 
unique factual matrix. 
Under the most restrictive view, the contractual approach, landlords are entitled to 
take into account their interests in respect of other properties when the fact of their 
ownership by the landlord was known to the tenant at the time of entering into the 
lease.  In most settings involving intensive management by a landlord, it will be 
apparent in the factual matrix surrounding the lease, if not in the lease itself, that the 
landlord intends to manage the property as part of a larger portfolio. 
In actual fact, the view taken by the courts is more flexible.  Judges are willing to 
consider not just the relationship between the parties described in the lease, but the 
relationship actually existing between the parties at the time consent is sought.  This 
approach allows much more flexibility to landlords in the long-term management of 
their portfolio than is acknowledged by proponents of the contractual approach. 
Judges have also tended to give more latitude to landlords' decisions made in pursuit 
of a business-led strategy.  As such, the courts' approach should help to promote long 
term success of well-managed property portfolios. 
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Legal and real estate professionals would be wise to examine carefully the judgments 
from which a particular rule is said to derive before advising on whether a tenant’s 
request might reasonably be refused.  The courts have shown their willingness to look 
beyond general pronouncements on what is reasonable and examine each case on its 
facts.  As Lord Denning suggested would happen in Bickel, as one decision has 
followed another, we have been given a better idea of the likely outcome in a 
particular set of circumstances, but ultimately the courts have declined to be bound 
strictly by individual pronouncements.  Even where purported rules have not been 
expressly overturned, judges have sought to distinguish cases on their facts, and have 
indicated that some rules might be more flexible than they appear. 
The overriding principles set out by Lord Bingham in Ashworth Frazer will continue 
to guide most cases, but underlying them, and ready to emerge when called for by the 
“difficult borderline cases” of which Lord Bingham spoke, is a broad understanding 
of reasonableness.  As the relationship of landlord and tenant progresses, and adapts 
to changing commercial circumstances, it is only natural that these broader 
circumstances relating to the relationship of landlord and tenant will become more 
relevant to the question of the reasonableness of a refusal of consent than the 
agreement originally struck by the parties.  In this respect, the flexible approach 
adopted by the courts supports the efficient long-term management of portfolio 
properties, for which flexibility is a key ingredient. 
On the other hand, attempts by the landlord to withhold consent in the hopes of 
unilaterally changing the relationship persisting between the parties will continue to 
be found unreasonable, no matter how the commercial environment has transformed 
over the course of the relationship.  While a portfolio landlord may withhold consent 
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to a proposed change of user or assignment which might harm neighbouring property 
belonging to him, this will not be possible where the harm is not caused by the 
change.  Similarly, the use of a veto may not be used as leverage to secure the return 
of the reversion.  Thus a portfolio landlord cannot use the power to withhold consent 
as a means of actively directing the tenant mix of a portfolio, but only to passively 
block harmful changes while permitting changes beneficial to the portfolio. 
 
 -111- 
5. Portfolio landlords and legislative policy 
After the judicial approach to reasonableness, the most significant factor impacting on 
how landlords exercise control over their tenants has been the legislative backdrop to 
the landlord-tenant relationship.  Over the course of the 20th century, the legal 
environment in which the relationship of commercial landlord and tenant operates 
experienced fundamental change.1  This period saw a proliferation of legislation 
regulating almost all aspects of the relationship.2  Some of this change was brought 
about in order to simplify or modernise the law, as part of broader reforms in property 
law.3  Much of it, however, involved a rebalancing of the landlord and tenant 
relationship, largely in response to a perceived power disparity between landlords and 
tenants.  Generally, this meant shifting the balance of power between the parties 
further towards the tenant by limiting the freedom of landlords to exercise control 
over let property.4 
In this context, the position of a landlord of a property portfolio poses a number of 
challenges for regulators.  On the one hand, such a landlord is likely to be able to 
wield far more power over tenants than landlords of standalone properties: By 
controlling nearby properties, such a landlord may apply pressure on tenants from 
multiple sides.  A portfolio landlord might also possess "market power", allowing a 
landlord to distort competition. On the other hand, with the interests of a wide 
portfolio in mind, such a landlord may have the ability and incentive to manage and 
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develop properties in accordance with a bolder and more long-term vision than the 
landlord of a single property would be able to.5  Such an approach carries with it 
obvious benefits not just for the landlord, but for tenants and for society as a whole. 
The extent to which policy makers have recognised this important role, and taken into 
account the special characteristics of portfolio landlords will have a significant 
bearing on whether the potential gains from common ownership of property can be 
realised. 
5.1 Regulating landlords  
In order to assess the efficacy of the current regulatory regime, it is necessary to 
examine why regulation was seen as necessary in the first place.  While this chapter 
will examine the question predominantly in economic terms, it should not be assumed 
that the sole measure of success ought to be economic efficiency.6 
Ogus distinguishes between justifications for regulation that are based in economics 
and those that are justified by some other means.7  The "economic" interventions are 
ones that seek to correct some market failure: in other words, they aim to maximise 
economic welfare by achieving the same allocation of resources that a perfectly 
functioning market would.8  Such interventions may be designed to account for 
externalities or to address problems arising due to imperfect information, among other 
things.9 
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Non-economic justifications for such regulation may include distributional factors, 
paternalism or the promotion of particular societal norms or ideals.10 
5.1.1 The grounds for regulation of commercial leases 
Introducing the second reading of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1927 to the House of 
Lords, Viscount Cave set out some of the legislative objectives underlying the 
legislation.  Referring to covenants restricting disposition, assignment and change of 
user, he said that:11 
All these are, I think, quite reasonable stipulations if they are fairly and 
reasonably used—used, that is, for the protection of the freehold against 
depreciation—but sometimes they are used for quite different purposes. It 
happens rather often that while the landlord has no objection to a change of 
use or an improvement of his property, he takes care to exact a fine for giving 
consent to that change, sometimes a fine of considerable amount. In other 
cases consent is refused without any reason being given, possibly for some 
prejudice or caprice or for some less worthy motive, and the trader of course 
suffers. These grievances which I have so summarised are not imaginary 
grievances put forward with a view to enabling a tenant to acquire someone 
else's property. They are genuine hardships injurious to trade and industry in 
this country, and hardships which a reasonable landlord will not impose. 
While this speech was made some time ago, it still exemplifies the policy factors at 
play in the regulation of commercial landlord-tenant relationships.  These policy goals 
have featured prominently in debates surrounding legislative interference in 
commercial landlord and tenant law, and still shape the challenge of balancing 
competing interests of landlord and tenant. 
Viscount Cave's speech contrasts good management with bad management; virtuous 
landlords with unscrupulous landlords.  This distinction, drawn between the "bad" 
landlord who is the target of regulation and the "good" landlord who ought to be 
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protected from excessive regulation, can be seen throughout parliamentary debates on 
these issues, from the 1927 Act to the most recent Act in 1995.  This might be seen as 
regulation in line with what Ogus refers to as "community values".12  While it is 
clearly seen to be in the public interest for landlords to be permitted to protect their 
position, profiteering from a power imbalance is another matter.  Regulation is seen as 
necessary in order to protect tenants from the less worthy motives of ruthless 
landlords.  Such prejudices are recognised as harms not only to individual tenants, but 
to broader national interests.  At the same time, those national interests may also be 
promoted by the prudent management policies of reasonable landlords.  A preference 
is indicated for regulatory intervention which will not harm the position of those 
benevolent landlords but, in the words of then Home Secretary Sir William Joynson-
Hicks MP, "to protect the tenant against the action of a harsh or unconscionable 
landlord…".13 
From a very early stage, economic factors featured prominently in driving and 
shaping regulation.  Viscount Cave's speech implicitly points to the position of 
commercial property as a factor of production in the wider economy, indicating that 
unscrupulous behaviour on the part of landlords can impact negatively upon the 
economy.  In more recent times, this has turned into a focus on flexibility and choice 
in business leases.14  This is in response to difficulties which tenants had with rigid 
institutional leases,15 but addresses the same issue of the effect of the commercial 
property market on the economy in general.  Flexibility in leasing arrangements, it has 
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been argued, is important because all tenants have different needs and a one size fits 
all approach is unsuited to promoting economic growth.16  In line with a preference 
for freedom of contract, some policies have sought to promote flexibility by allowing 
the parties greater scope to negotiate according to their individual circumstances.17  
The insertion of section 19(1A) into the Landlord and Tenant Act 1927 by section 22 
of the Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995 provides an example of Parliament 
seeking to promote welfare by facilitating choice.  This permits the parties to a lease 
to specify circumstances in a fully qualified assignment covenant under which it 
would be reasonable for a landlord to refuse consent.18  Assuming the parties to know 
best how to maximise their own welfare, allowing them more scope to tailor the 
contract to their own needs should lead to more suitable leases.19 
Economics is concerned with achieving the optimal allocation of productive 
resources.20  Another factor which may be considered desirable is achieving a just 
distribution of outputs within society.  Achieving this may involve redistributing 
wealth through the tax system, or through regulation.21  Although this may 
traditionally have been more of a concern in consumer rather than commercial 
settings,22 Hughes and Crosby have noted a shift in government policy to include 
fairness as a goal in addition to efficiency.23  In her report into the future of high 
streets, Mary Portas cited fairness between landlord and tenant as a key to ensuring 
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the vitality of the high street, calling for "widespread contracts of care between 
landlords and their commercial tenants."24 
Paternalism is another justification which features in debates relating to regulation of 
commercial letting.  In its strongest sense, paternalism is the substitution of one 
party's judgment for another's.25 It may be a justification for regulation where policy 
makers do not think that individuals left to their own devices are capable of making 
utility maximising choices.26  Paternalist motives are based on the assumption that in 
some contexts, even if fully informed, some individuals will be unable to make the 
best choice for themselves.  Evidence pointing to the failure of small business tenants 
to seek better terms than those offered by landlords or to seek commercial lettings 
advice may point to a need for paternalistic regulation.27 
A softer version of paternalism has been suggested as "libertarian paternalism" or 
"nudge" theory.28  This involves regulation which does not prohibit conduct which is 
thought to be welfare reducing, but seeks to steer people towards better choices 
through the application of behavioural psychology.  It may involve changing the 
default choice, mandating a waiting or "cooling off" period, or presenting information 
in a way which seeks to lead people to make a particular choice.29  The procedure for 
contracting out of the security of tenure provisions under the Landlord and Tenant Act 
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1954 may provide an example of this.30  The landlord must provide in a specified 
form, what has been described as a "health warning"31 to a tenant before an agreement 
to exclude the statutory protection can take effect.  This may deter tenants from 
surrendering their statutory rights without proper consideration. 
Paternalism (or indeed libertarian paternalism) ought to be distinguished from 
measures designed to enhance individual decision-making, for example by providing 
more information.  This is an alternate, less intrusive, strategy for addressing market 
failures arising out of imperfect information among market participants.  It has the 
advantage of leaving the final choice to individuals, who are still assumed to be best 
placed to maximise their own welfare, but seeks to ensure that individuals are 
adequately informed in making their decisions.32  Information provision has been at 
the centre of recent attempts to fix problems in the commercial property market.  The 
Code for Leasing Business Premises33 and its previous iterations have been promoted 
by successive governments.34  They were designed to increase awareness of 
commercial factors of relevance to tenants and to reduce rigidity in lease structures, 
however this approach has not immediately had a dramatic impact on information 
levels, especially among small business tenants.35 
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5.2 Taking account of portfolio landlords 
Portfolio landlords are in a unique position, placed to take account of broader interests 
- including those of neighbouring tenants and to some extent the public at large,36 in 
making management decisions relating to individual properties.  Parliament has in 
some instances recognised the potential for such control to promote the public 
interest, and taken account of portfolio landlords in legislating.  In debates 
surrounding the enactment of the 1927 Act, Horace Crawfurd MP spoke up for the 
ability of portfolio landlords to exercise control over their estates, pointing to the 
benefits of management by a landlord and the necessity of concomitant restrictions:37 
I agree that there is a good deal to be said for the leasehold system when it is 
properly used, and what is most to be said in its favour is that a good many 
leasehold estates are well planned. I know that this planning has been 
accompanied by what I would call something in the nature of restrictions. 
Debating similar provisions, Lord Phillimore made a passionate case against 
excessive interference with the ability of a portfolio landlord to manage the portfolio 
as a whole:38 
I consider that the landlord is a trustee—a trustee for all the property on the 
estate, to see that no one tenant ruins the property by his or her particular 
action, and it is very doubtful whether any further restraints should be put 
upon landlords with regard to such matters as covenants not to use a property 
for a particular purpose, or covenants not to build in a particular way, than 
they are under now, because they really act as the guardians of the interests of 
the whole estate, and it would be a very great pity if their powers in that 
respect were curtailed. 
The need to maintain the position of portfolio landlords as masters of their estates can 
be linked to the benefits which this can have for all of the landlord's tenants.  Lord 
Phillmore also relies on the noble ideal of a "trustee" or "guardian" landlord, 
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protecting the interests of the whole body of tenants and promoting general welfare.  
This extension of the "good" landlord may point to a legislative preference for the 
business-led (rather than property-led) approach to property management identified 
by Howard.39  Landlords following the business-led approach aim to improve the 
performance of their tenants first and foremost, with increases in the profitability of 
their portfolio coming as a result of improvements to the tenants' businesses.  Thus, 
measures intended to protect the ability of the portfolio landlord to manage their 
portfolio as a whole also serve to promote the landlord as a benevolent overseer. 
In some cases this recognition of the position of portfolio landlords has taken the form 
of explicit provisions in legislation enabling portfolio landlords to protect their 
interests in respect of their portfolio as a whole when managing individual properties. 
In others, it has resulted in the rejection of otherwise desirable proposed policies.  
Examples of each will be examined below. 
Portfolio landlords may also present dangers to the public good.  The ability to 
exercise control over a number of properties may give a portfolio landlord some 
degree of market power, insulating them from the competitive forces of the market.  
This might allow them to force up rents or bestow effective monopolies in some 
product markets on one tenant, to the detriment of potential competitors as well as of 
consumers.  In reaction to this danger, traditional deference towards portfolio 
landlords' judgment in imposing restrictive covenants has been displaced by a more 
cautious approach.  Regulation has been imposed in the form of competition law, 
which takes a measured approach to overseeing landlords' conduct. 
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5.2.1 Explicit recognition in law - The "fines" provisions 
A number of provisions have been enacted to protect tenants by preventing a landlord 
from extracting money (generally referred to as a “fine”) from tenants in return for a 
required consent.40  In enacting these provisions, Parliament have, however, 
incorporated some protections for portfolio landlords.  For example, section 19(3) of 
the Landlord and Tenant Act 1927, which prohibits the landlord from demanding the 
payment of a fine in return for granting consent to a change of use under a merely or 
fully qualified user covenant, states expressly that it:41 
does not preclude the right of the landlord to require payment of a reasonable 
sum in respect of any damage to or diminution in the value of the premises or 
any neighbouring premises belonging to him and of any legal or other 
expenses incurred in connection with such licence or consent. 
Similarly, section 19(2), which implies a reasonableness requirement into all merely 
qualified alteration covenants, allows a landlord to require the payment of 
compensation in respect of damage or diminution of the value of his property, 
including his own neighbouring property, arising out of such an alteration. 
The effect of these provisions may be greater than merely to preserve a landlord's 
contractual right to levy a fine for consent.42  In Holding and Management (Solitaire) 
Ltd v Norton,43 a similar provision44 was held to go beyond merely permitting the 
landlord to levy charges contained in the lease relating to its expenses, but justified 
the demand for payment in respect of the reasonable expenses incurred by the 
landlord, even where there was no express basis in the lease for such a demand.  This 
suggests that sections 19(2) and (3) themselves provide sufficient grounds for 
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demanding the payment of a fine to compensate the landlord for any damage to his 
neighbouring property. 
In general, what can be seen from the legislature's approach to the levying of fines for 
landlords' consent is that where a change sought by a tenant of one property could 
have adverse consequences on other properties owned by the landlord, the legislature 
will ensure that the landlord is permitted to require the tenant to pay compensation for 
those consequences. 
5.2.2 As a influencing factor in policymaking - Mandatory full 
qualification 
It has, at various times been suggested that absolute user or disposition covenants 
should have implied into them words fully qualifying any restriction.45  Whenever this 
is raised, it is the suggestion of full qualification of user covenants that seems to draw 
the most objections.  While other reasons (many of which also apply to the insertion 
of reasonableness requirement into absolute disposition covenants) have been 
suggested for keeping absolute covenants,46 the role of absolute user covenants in 
managing property portfolios has played a decisive role in distinguishing user 
covenants.  For example, David Maxwell Fyffe, then Home Secretary, set out the 
following reasons for not dispensing with absolute covenants in the a debate on the 
Landlord and Tenant Bill 1954:47 
One of the recommendations of the Committee was that we should do away 
with the absolute covenant and it was suggested that it should be converted 
into a covenant not to act without the consent of the landlord. We accepted 
that recommendation with reservation, as stated in the White Paper. 
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It is interesting to see, as we go on with discussions, how far our experience 
has been changed. One of the objects of a White Paper is to try to test public 
opinion. A great many professional and other organisations, and also 
individual members of the public, sent us their views on the White Paper and 
this proposal about covenants in leases attracted more criticism than anything 
else. 
There were various arguments; a perfectly reasonable one was that the 
landlord might have let the premises to a particular individual or for a 
specified purpose at a relatively low rent. If he did that he was entitled to be 
certain that the benefit of the tenancy at the low rent could not be assigned to 
someone else and that the premises could not be used for a much more 
valuable purpose. The argument which I think impressed me most was that the 
right to impose an absolute covenant is essential for good estate management. 
The most comprehensive discussion of the issues involved was contained in the Law 
Commission’s 1985 Report on covenants restricting dispositions, alterations and 
change of user.48  The Law Commission recognised that there may be a case to be 
made for the modification of very narrow user clauses in commercial leases, due to 
the risk of changing commercial circumstances but pointed to a number of reasons as 
militating against the mandatory full qualification of user covenants. 
The Law Commission in 1985 was quite ready to imply additional words into 
absolute disposition covenants, turning them in to fully qualified covenants.49  There 
was some support for this in Parliament.50  User covenants have previously been 
distinguished on the grounds of their centrality to the control of property by portfolio 
landlords.51  This factor was critical to the Law Commission's recommendation to 
retain absolute user covenants. 
The Law Commission suggested that such a change would cause an increase in rent 
(on rent review, although not necessarily initially) for tenants who would otherwise be 
                                                 
48
 The Law Commission, supra note 45. 
49
 Ibid, para 4.31. 
50
 e.g. Lord Meston: HL Deb 16 December 1987, vol 491, col 809. 
51
 Jenkins, supra note 45, para 312. 
 -123- 
subject to absolute user covenants.52  The Law Commission was also concerned about 
the liability of landlords subject to freehold covenants.53  If a landlord bound by a 
freehold covenant was not able to demand an absolute user covenant from their 
tenant, they could be liable in damages to the freehold covenantee if it would be 
unreasonable to withhold consent to a change to the user covenant, and the tenant 
breached the freehold covenant as a result.54 
However, the most significant of the Law Commission's objections to the mandatory 
full qualification of user covenants related directly to covenants which benefit the 
landlord's other tenants, or other property of the landlord.  Pointing to the analogous 
position of freehold covenants taken for the benefit of land neighbouring the burdened 
land, the Law Commission's report finds trouble with the anomaly which would arise 
if absolute covenants were not permissible in a leasehold setting.55  Exempting such 
covenants, however, might exclude a significant portion of the letting market from a 
new law. 
A more serious question was raised in relation to user covenants intended to protect 
the interests of other tenants of the landlord.56  The Law Commission noted the 
desirability of such arrangements, whether operated at the landlord's discretion, 
through an obligation on the landlord to enforce covenants, or by tenants in a letting 
scheme,57 pointing to the ability of such cooperation to promote the common interests 
of a development.  It was suggested that such schemes would be impossible in the 
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absence of absolute restrictions on user.58  If a landlord were in a position to grant 
consent (which could not be unreasonably withheld) then letting schemes may not be 
possible, as a landlord would be able to unilaterally alter the obligations between 
tenants, frustrating the certainty underlying such schemes.59 
It is not that the Law Commission did not recognise the potential for landlords to act 
unjustly in refusing to permit a change of user where an absolute covenant had been 
secured.  Their suggested solution to this problem was to expand section 84 of the 
Law of Property Act 1925 to include all leases, as opposed to just leases of at least 40 
years of which at least 25 years have elapsed.60  Section 84 of the Law of Property 
Act 1925 empowers the Upper Tribunal to discharge or modify restrictive covenants 
in certain circumstances.61  It is primarily designed to affect freehold property but 
currently extends to certain long leases.62  The suggested change would allow any 
tenant to apply to the Upper Tribunal for discharge of or amendment to a restrictive 
covenant in certain circumstances. Parliament has not, however, made this change. 
5.2.3 Competition law 
Although the ability of a portfolio landlord to exercise control over how property 
within the portfolio is used has the potential to create benefits for society through 
internalising externalities and exploiting economies of scale, it may also carry risks to 
the welfare of society as a whole.  Competitive markets produce goods and services 
closer to the optimal level than non-competitive markets, promoting social welfare.  
Where a landlord is able to exercise market power, the gains available to the public 
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through competition may not be realised.  Competition law aims to safeguard these 
gains by preventing competition between market players – a key component of a 
functioning free market – from being distorted by factors such as the concentration of 
market power or the erecting of barriers to entry into markets. 
Historically, agreements relating to land had been largely exempted from the purview 
of competition statutes63 and the doctrine of restraint of trade.64  Various justifications 
for this have been suggested, such as the limited geographical effect of land 
agreements and their positive effect on the property market.65 
Chapter I of the Competition Act 1998 prohibits agreements between undertakings 
which have as their object or effect the distortion of competition. However, the Act 
gives the Secretary of State the power to exclude land agreements – either in general, 
or of a particular type – from its ambit.66  A broad exception was introduced by 
Statutory Instrument, on the grounds that land agreements were unlikely to infringe 
the Chapter I prohibition and that a failure to exempt them would lead to an excessive 
workload for the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) as land agreements were notified to 
them as was required for potentially anticompetitive agreements at the time.67  This 
was based on the experience in Ireland after the Competition Act 1992 came into 
force.68 
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The OFT had the power to withdraw the benefit of an exclusion from a particular 
agreement, where it considered that the agreement would infringe the Chapter I 
prohibition in the absence of the exclusion,69 although it is unclear whether this power 
was used in practice. 
The problem with the exclusion 
Peel notes the contradiction of a restraint of trade doctrine cloaked in the language of 
“public interest”, which effectively ignored the harm to the public which could flow 
from restrictive covenants in land agreements.70  In the United States, legal 
commentators have for a long time expressed doubts as to the benefits of this special 
treatment afforded to land.71 
In 2008, a Competition Commission report into the groceries sector found that in 
some areas, land agreements were being used to prevent suitable sites from being used 
in competition with major supermarkets, in order to prevent the entry into the market 
of competitors.72  It was therefore suggested that the land agreements exclusion 
should not apply to the groceries sector.  The government noted that the land 
agreements exclusion was anomalous, especially in light of the OFT’s view that land 
agreements were in fact no more or less likely to restrict competition than other types 
of agreement.73  While the anticompetitive effects of a land agreement tend to be very 
local, there are some relevant markets whose geographical scope will be equally 
restricted.  Competition law already takes into account the geographic impact of 
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potentially anticompetitive behaviour in the market definition phase. Case by case 
analysis is likely to provide more consistent results across different relevant markets 
than broad exclusions. 
One of the main reasons for the original exemption was the reporting regime in 
operation at the time and the fear that the OFT would be inundated with precautionary 
reporting of land agreements, most of which would not be in breach of the Chapter I 
prohibition. As this regime was abandoned in 2003 in favour of self assessment by 
businesses, this justification no longer stood. 
Even though the OFT had the power to withdraw the exemption in respect of a 
particular agreement, this did not have the effect of subjecting land agreements to the 
same level of scrutiny as other agreements.  It entailed a relatively lengthy procedure 
and even where the exemption was withdrawn from an agreement, it would only come 
under the scope of the Competition Act from the date of the OFT’s order, meaning 
that that date was the relevant one for the purposes of penalties and other 
consequences of breach of the Act.  
For these reasons, and after a consultation,74 the land agreements exclusion order was 
revoked.75  The exclusion ceased to have effect as of April 2011, one year after the 
making of the Revocation Order, in order to give businesses time to assess their own 
land agreements for compatibility with the 1998 Act. 
The OFT guidance 
In advance of the change taking effect, the OFT issued guidance to assist landlords 
and tenants in assessing whether any agreements to which they were party might be in 
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breach of the Chapter I prohibition.76  Whether a particular agreement will have any 
effect on competition is heavily dependent on the factual matrix of the particular case.  
This approach allows the law to react to changes in practice and the emergence of 
unexpected threats to competitive markets.  This assessment will involve an economic 
analysis, which seeks to define a relevant market by reference to the products sold and 
the area served, and determine whether competition may be distorted by an 
agreement.  In particular, it might look at whether the agreement divides customers 
between the parties to it, whether it prevents others from accessing the market, and 
whether there are other, similar agreements in force in the market.  Competition law 
does not prohibit every agreement that could conceivably affect competition.  Some 
agreements may be so insignificant that they will not affect competition, some classes 
of agreement may be exempted on policy grounds and others will have benefits for 
society as a whole and so they are allowed, subject to some safeguards.  The Law 
Commission indicated that most estate management related agreements will not be 
affected by the Competition Act.77  This is in line with the guidance issued by the 
Irish Competition Authority for shopping centres.78  However, some exclusivity 
agreements or combinations of agreements effectively granting a monopoly in a 
market to one tenant may be in breach of competition law.79 
Crucially for portfolio landlords, Section 9 of the Competition Act 1998 creates an 
exemption for agreements which are likely to have beneficial effects for consumers.  
This exemption is only relevant where an agreement otherwise breaches the Chapter I 
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prohibition.  Where a party to an agreement can demonstrate that the agreement 
contributes to some form of advance in production or technology, without going 
further than is necessary to achieve that benefit, that it does not allow the parties to it 
to substantially eliminate competition, and that The benefits flowing to consumers 
from the agreement compensate them for the detriment they suffer as a result of the 
agreement, it may be exempt.  The OFT has pointed to the maintenance of a tenant 
mix beneficial to customers, and the need to attract new retailers as possible examples 
of how the exemption might apply.80 
The effect on landlords' management of regulation under the competition law regime 
is examined at 6.3, below. 
5.3 Effect of law – economic analysis 
While a multitude of objectives are relevant to the regulation of commercial landlord-
tenant relationships, maximising economic welfare appears to take priority.  Once 
other objectives can be met, regulatory systems which better promote the maximising 
of economic welfare ought to be preferred.  In analysing the appropriateness of 
regulation in this area, it is therefore instructive to examine the extent to which the 
current law promotes economic welfare and growth. 
5.3.1 Portfolio landlords: subjects or instruments of regulation? 
Generally, it may be assumed that the landlord is a subject of any regulation intended 
to govern the landlord-tenant relationship.  If the aims of the regulation are to protect 
tenants from the caprices of unjust landlords, then the regulations constrain landlord 
behaviour in order to prevent landlords from abusing their powers.  This may have 
roots in the power imbalances often present between landlords and tenants. 
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Another key goal of policy makers might be to ensure that land is used efficiently.  
This might be achieved through the planning system or through common law 
doctrines such as nuisance.81  As discussed in Chapter 2, a significant threat to the 
efficient use of land relates to market failures arising as a result of externalities.82  
Such externalities will not be eliminated through a market mechanism where 
transaction costs, which may be significant in complex factual situations, are higher 
than the gains achievable.83  Bringing a property causing an externality and the 
property experiencing the external effects into common ownership will internalise the 
externality, as the common owner will experience all of the benefits and disbenefits of 
any choice which might otherwise cause externalities.  Thus, the common ownership 
of property is an efficient way of ensuring the optimum allocation of resources.84  
Thus, the landlord may be in a better place than national regulators to ensure the 
efficient use of property through the imposition of Pigouvian taxes and subsidies on 
tenants, or strict regulatory controls over his portfolio.85  This might provide a 
justification for regulators to grant portfolio landlords enough freedom in the 
management of their properties to capture these benefits.  As such, in one sense, the 
position of the portfolio landlord might be seen as not subject of regulation, but 
instrument of regulation. 
Regulatory approaches such as planning law or nuisance may be adept at reducing 
negative externalities, but they suffer from a significant drawback in not being able to 
mandate activity which would generate positive externalities.86  Significant costs may 
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also be involved where a high degree of regulatory oversight is required, as in the 
planning system.  Taking advantage of the fact that landlords’ incentives are 
ultimately driven by the aggregate profitability of their portfolios87 may provide a 
more nuanced approach to supporting growth, while also minimising the costs 
involved.  Portfolio landlords can be seen as having an instrumental role in achieving 
this aim. 
It will be considered whether, and to what extent, the different approach taken by 
policy makers to portfolio landlords is attributable to the positive impact of good 
estate management on other policy goals. 
Is self regulation the solution? 
Self regulation has become a feature of the commercial lettings market in recent 
years.  Successive governments have supported a series of codes of conduct for 
commercial leasing drawn up by industry bodies.88  These codes recommend that 
landlords should not demand terms more restrictive than needed to protect the 
landlord's interests.89  Policy makers have historically preferred freedom of contract in 
commercial lettings.90  Reliance on self regulation permits policy makers to abstain 
from departing from this trend. 
Ogus points to three conditions necessary for self regulation to be in the public 
interest:91 There must be some form of market failure in the relevant activity; private 
law must not be sufficient to remedy the failure; and self regulation must be a more 
efficient solution than public regulation.  It is clear that there are market failures in the 
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commercial leasing sector arising as a result of externalities and information 
asymmetry.92  Private law is well suited to addressing problems arising as a result of 
externalities,93 but significant information asymmetries still exist between large and 
small market participants.94  The appropriateness of private regulation is then a 
question of whether it provides a better solution to the market failures identified than 
public regulation. 
Self regulation may be favoured over public regulation because market participants 
have a greater knowledge of the industry and will therefore be able to craft more 
appropriate responses to market failures.95  The implementation of a code by an 
industry body may also lend the regime greater legitimacy amongst landlords than a 
system of public regulation.96  The Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) 
has played an active role in encouraging responsible behaviour on the part of 
landlords.  Recently, the Institution has released a lease targeted at small retail 
businesses, which is designed to provide the flexibility necessary in the first few years 
of trading.97  However, the voluntary nature of the industry's efforts still presents a 
problem.  The efforts to improve levels of commercial awareness amongst small 
business tenants through the use of a code appears to have been a failure, as 
knowledge of the code itself remains low.98  Unscrupulous landlords, who create the 
need for regulation, are not obliged to abide by the code.  The voluntary nature of the 
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code and lack of take-up by landlords has been cited as justifying regulatory 
intervention.99 
5.3.2 Fines provisions 
The primary purpose of the fines provisions appears to be the protection of tenants 
from unscrupulous landlords, who might use the temporary leverage afforded to him 
by a tenant's request for consent to extract additional money from the tenant.100  While 
much of the rhetoric surrounding this measure was paternalistic in nature,101 there are 
also solid economic justifications for it.  The effect of the fines provisions preferred in 
the 1927 Act is to maximise the incentive for the tenant, as the party precipitating any 
change, to take advantage of opportunities to use premises more efficiently, while 
compensating the landlord for any losses arising as a result of the change. 
The fines provisions under the 1927 Act are confined to prohibiting unscrupulous 
demands for payment in return for consent.  If a landlord were to act perfectly 
rationally in the economic sense, they would grant consent to a change where the 
expected benefits of the change to them outweigh their expected costs.  The exception 
for fines intended to compensate landlords for damage to their neighbouring property 
prevents landlords from being compelled to give consent without compensation where 
it would damage their legitimate interests. 
There are a number of justifiable circumstances in which landlords may withhold 
consent in the absence of payment. In the case of a standalone landlord, the only cost 
which a change will normally have is in relation to the property let to the tenant.  
Portfolio landlords, on the other hand, will want to consider any effect that a change 
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may have on their neighbouring property and neighbouring tenants.  Excluding factors 
external to the parties, such a change would be Pareto efficient as at least one party 
would benefit (the tenant, who would not have suggested the change if this were not 
the case) and no one would suffer.  As a landlord is able to require the payment of 
compensation for any negative externalities affecting neighbouring property 
belonging to them, the costs to them of the change ought to be zero once this has been 
factored into account.  Where a rent review clause is included in the lease, a change to 
a more profitable user may also lead to an increase in rent at a later stage. 
The imposition of a fine in respect of any negative externalities forces a tenant to 
consider the costs imposed on others (at least within the landlord's portfolio) by any 
proposed change.  Thus, the imposition of a fine in such circumstances can be seen as 
a Pigouvian tax, intended to internalise the expected negative externalities connected 
to any contemplated change into the tenant's decision making.  A tenant who is 
required to pay compensation in respect of harm likely to be caused to neighbouring 
property will only proceed with a change where the expected gain from the change is 
greater than the harm caused to neighbouring property owned by the landlord.  
Permitting a landlord to levy such a Pigouvian tax enables him to act as an effective 
regulator at a local level. 
The internalising of externalities through fines provisions may also allow positive 
externalities to be captured.  For example, where a landlord has granted a low profit 
tenant a lease on very favourable terms in order to create positive externalities,102 the 
"no fines" provision should not allow that tenant to take advantage of that low rent 
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when changing to a more profitable user.103  The low rent can be characterised as a 
Pigouvian cross subsidy from other tenants to the tenant enjoying low rent, to enable 
that tenant to operate a business that will generate positive externalities for other 
tenants.104  The reduction in rent, or subsidy, should not exceed the benefit to the 
other tenants.105  If changing the user of this unit would prevent these externalities 
from accruing (or diminish them), this could be characterised as causing a diminution 
in the value of the landlord's neighbouring property.  Because the discount would not 
have been higher than this diminution in value, the tenant may be required to pay a 
fine (presumably in the form of a rent increase) at most matching the value of the 
positive externalities that will be extinguished.  Such a change should not, therefore, 
proceed unless the aggregate expected value of it is positive, including any 
externalities within the landlord's portfolio. 
The fines provisions, in particular section 19(3) in relation to user, have been 
criticised on the basis that it is unclear whether they are effective in fulfilling their 
original purpose of preventing unscrupulous landlords from demanding unreasonable 
fines.106  Workarounds exist in relation to merely qualified covenants,107 and section 
19(3) does not apply to absolute covenants, or changes of user involving 
alterations.108  In spite of this, it appears that to the extent that the 1927 Act sought to 
empower landlords to manage their portfolios efficiently and protect the incentives 
which help portfolio landlords in their management, it is well crafted. 
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5.3.3 Mandatory full qualification 
As discussed in Chapter 3, tenants bound by fully qualified user covenants are in a 
much better position to tenants restricted by absolute covenants.  In addition to the 
protection from fines, they are not bound by the restriction to the extent that a 
landlord has unreasonably withheld consent.109  Thus, a landlord could not use the 
withholding of consent to procure a prohibited fine, as might be possible with merely 
qualified covenants. Nor could a landlord arbitrarily or capriciously prevent a change 
of user from proceeding.110  In fact, apart from certainty, the only benefit to a landlord 
of having an absolute, as opposed to a fully qualified, covenant is the power to 
withhold consent in circumstances that a court would find unreasonable.111  It seems, 
therefore, that mandatory full qualification of user covenants would be apt to protect 
tenants from unscrupulous landlords.112  This has not been disputed by the Law 
Commission or policy makers.113  Rather, objections have been based upon a 
preference for freedom of contract or choice;114 fear of creating legal anomalies 
between the operation of freehold and leasehold covenants;115 and decisively, the goal 
of policy makers to ensure that landlords are free to exercise the degree of control 
over their portfolios necessary to realise the benefits of common ownership for 
society.116  It is the final and most influential of these objections that is the focus of 
this section. 
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Exaggerated apprehensions? 
The apprehensions of landlords and regulators about the effects of mandatory full 
qualification of user covenants may be overstated.117  To the extent that policy makers 
seek to ground a rejection of mandatory full qualification in the needs of portfolio 
landlords, they may therefore be misguided.  In 1950, the Jenkins Committee rejected 
this suggestion on the grounds that any refusal of consent on these grounds would be 
reasonable.118  More recently, a working group of the Association of British Insurers, 
rejected the inclusion in assignment covenants of circumstances related to estate 
management which would reasonably ground a refusal of consent to assign,119 on the 
grounds that any reason which might be included would be reasonable even without 
the inclusion of the condition.120 
The value of absolute covenants to portfolio landlords in managing a group of 
properties is frequently cited.  It is not clear, however, that absolute covenants are 
necessary for this purpose.  As is argued in detail in Chapter 4, it is clear that a 
landlord's interests in respect of their portfolio as a whole will be taken account of by 
the courts in determining the reasonableness of any withholding of consent to a 
change of use, as well as alienation.  Any reason relating to the landlord's other 
property which might retrospectively have justified the imposition of an absolute user 
or disposition covenant is likely to be a reasonable ground for refusing consent.  On 
the basis of all three judicial approaches to reasonableness discussed in chapter 4,121 
portfolio landlords will generally be on good ground in refusing consent to a change 
of user in order to protect the interests of neighbouring property.  Under the broad 
                                                 
117
 See 4.4.2, above. 
118
 Jenkins, supra note 45, para 312. 
119
 Under Landlord and Tenant Act 1927, supra note 2, s 19(1A), as inserted by the Landlord and 
Tenant (Covenants) Act, 1995, s22. 
120
 Report of the ABI Working Party on the Landlord and Tenants (Covenants) Act 1995 (London: 
Association of British Insurers, 1996). 
121
 See 4.1.1, above. 
 -138- 
approach, a court would look to the commercial realities of the relationship between 
the parties. Applying this approach, the courts have generally upheld the right of 
portfolio landlords to withhold consent on the basis of apprehended harm to 
neighbouring property owned by them.122  Even under the more restrictive contractual 
approach, portfolio landlords would not stand to lose out from the modification of 
absolute covenants into fully qualified covenants.  The Law Commission assumes that 
a landlord would only demand an absolute user covenant where there are specific 
reasons why a landlord would not want to consent to any change of user.123  Any 
factor which might sway a landlord to insist upon an absolute user covenant will 
necessarily have been known to them at the time the lease was granted.  Even if they 
were prohibited from imposing absolute restrictions, a landlord could ensure that the 
interest which the landlord might wish to protect with an absolute user restriction was 
clearly within the knowledge of the tenant, and possibly protected in the wording of 
the lease.  Once the relevant interest is made clear in the contract or contractual 
context, it appears that a landlord would be reasonable under the contractual approach 
in withholding consent on those grounds.124 
In spite of this, a belief remains that absolute covenants are required by portfolio 
landlords for estate management reasons in certain circumstances.  One problem may 
be that presumably all of the leases where a landlord believes themselves to be better 
off with absolute user restrictions are currently bound by absolute user restrictions.  
Tenants are also likely to be advised against challenging a landlord's refusal of 
consent unless they have a good chance of winning, because of the cost implications 
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of losing.  This means that very few cases get to court where the landlord has strong 
estate management reasons for opposing a change of user, and that landlords who are 
accustomed to using absolute user covenants to protect the interests of their portfolio 
do not have experience in dealing with fully qualified covenants, and over estimate 
the “danger” of them.  It may therefore be necessary to convince landlords just how 
reasonable the courts' approach to reasonableness is before a proposal for mandatory 
full qualification of user covenants can garner widespread support. 
Another justification: legal certainty 
Regardless of the fairness or efficiency implications of decisions, a case may be made 
for the retention of absolute user covenants on the grounds of certainty.  Under an 
absolute covenant (or merely qualified user covenant, which has the same effect), it is 
clear that a landlord will always be permitted to withhold consent to a change in user, 
whereas the ability of a landlord to prevent a change in the context of a fully qualified 
covenant cannot be determined until all the facts are known.  At the time the tenant 
seeks to make a change, this certainty would help to reduce the transaction costs 
entailed in ascertaining whether or not a landlord's withholding of consent was 
reasonable.  Thus, it may be easier for the parties to re-negotiate their respective 
rights, re-allocating them efficiently.125  This certainty would also make it easier for 
parties who comply with the rational expectations model of behaviour to accurately 
price the lease at the time it is entered into.  Absolute user covenants also create 
certainty for tenants, who can rest assured that the landlord's tenant mix policy cannot 
be challenged.   
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The economic model of rationality has, however, come under some scrutiny.126  It 
assumes that individuals aim to maximise their own welfare and that they in fact make 
choices which are most likely to achieve this aim.127  In reality, the ability of 
individuals to make welfare promoting choices is inhibited by a number of factors 
including imperfect information and a limited ability to process it.  The neoclassical 
economic model assumes that individuals react to such difficulties by only 
considering the most likely outcomes.128  Behavioural psychology suggests instead 
that in dealing with such difficulties, people actually use cognitive shortcuts or 
heuristics when making decisions.129  The use of such heuristics may lead to 
systematic departures from the model of rationality favoured by neoclassical 
economics.130  If these biases apply to the commercial lettings market, and lead 
participants to adopt irrational approaches to valuing lease terms, this may justify 
paternalistic intervention. 
For example, the "availability heuristic" leads individuals to place too much emphasis 
on salient facts, in a manner inconsistent with the economic rational actor model.131   
In the context of small business leases, Crosby et al have found that small business 
tenants tend to focus in negotiations on the terms that are immediately relevant to 
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their business, neglecting terms which are only important in the long run.132  This may 
justify regulatory intervention intended to promote the long term welfare of tenants. 
Other heuristics which may be relevant to regulators include the "endowment effect", 
which is the phenomenon that individuals tend to attribute a higher value to a thing if 
they own it.133  Thus, it may be the case that a landlord would not waive an absolute 
user covenant even where the costs of the change were negligible.  Research in this 
area has not been conducted but may help to inform policy in future. 
An alternative: Expanding the power of the court to modify restrictive covenants 
The Law Commission did recognise the need for flexibility in leasehold covenants, 
and the risks of land becoming over burdened with restrictions.  In its 1985 report, it 
suggested extending the procedure for modifying or setting aside covenants under 
section 84 of the Law of Property Act 1925, to provide additional flexibility for 
tenants.134  Under the 1925 Act, the Land Chamber of the Upper Tribunal may set 
aside or modify a restrictive covenant which has become obsolete because of changes 
to circumstances; if it impedes a reasonable user without securing practical benefits of 
substantial value to persons entitled to the benefit of the covenant (or is contrary to 
the public interest) and money will be adequate compensation; or if the removal of the 
covenant will not harm the persons entitled to benefit under it.  Currently the 
provision only applies to leases of at least 40 years, of which 25 years or more have 
expired.135  The Commission expressed a "desire to make the section available to all 
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tenants who may seek its relief",136 so any changes would likely involve the following 
elements: 
i. Reducing the amount of time required to pass on a lease before an 
application can be made to the Upper Tribunal137 
ii. Reducing the length of leases to which section 84 applies138 
iii. Allowing the Upper Tribunal to increase the rent payable to landlords 
to compensate them for any change to a restrictive covenant in the 
lease. 
The effect of such a provision would be to allow any tenant at any time to make an 
application to the Upper Tribunal to have a user covenant set aside if circumstances 
had changed. 
There is some merit to this suggestion.  The procedure under section 84 is expressly 
designed to take account of diverse interests, ensuring that all relevant interests are 
taken into account in a situation where multiple parties have an interest in the 
restriction sought to be modified. As such, it may be particularly useful in resolving 
disputes arising under letting schemes.  It may also allow those parties to be 
compensated for any detriment suffered as a result of the change.  It would entitle 
landlords to damages for any disadvantage they might suffer as a result of any 
discharge or modification, or the difference it might make to the level of rent 
achievable in the market. 
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However, there are also a number of drawbacks to using the section 84 procedure 
instead of mandatory full qualification. It was designed with freehold covenants in 
mind, with limited applicability for leasehold covenants only being added in at a late 
stage.  As a procedure, it is more suited to addressing problems related to long-term 
change in circumstances than the day-to-day movements in the market which may 
best be addressed by the exercise of a reasonable landlord's discretion.  The 
availability of an expanded section 84 would not, therefore, supersede the case for 
mandatory full qualification. 
5.3.4 Competition law 
The government's decision to withdraw the exclusion from competition law that land 
agreements had enjoyed demonstrates an acceptance of the dangers which can result 
from the concentration of control of land in too few hands.  The decision to remove 
the exclusion from all land agreements rather than just those preventing competition 
in the groceries sector creates a uniform regulatory regime positioned to prevent the 
use of restrictive covenants to distort competition in all sectors.  This recognises the 
dangers which may be posed by the inappropriate exercising of control by portfolio 
landlords. 
The economically informed approach taken by the OFT, which has power to 
investigate and enforce competition law,139  is not likely to disrupt the ability of 
portfolio landlords to exercise best practice in managing tenant mix or capturing 
economies of scale.140  The application of competition law to the property sector 
allows for a well developed system of regulation to protect against the dangers posed 
by restrictive covenants, while permitting agreements which, through common 
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management of property, work to promote social welfare.  Like the earlier restrictions 
on fines which sought to protect tenants from disreputable landlords without harming 
the interests of virtuous landlords, the competition regime is designed to restrict only 
those practices which seek gain for the parties to an agreement at the expense of 
society as a whole, and not those intended to benefit consumers through prudent 
management. 
The removal of the exclusion also paves the way for private actions in competition 
law, as breaches of the 1998 Act may be litigated as a breach of statutory duty.141  The 
implications of this for portfolio landlords are discussed in detail in Chapter 6 of this 
thesis.142  While a regulator is present in the context of competition law, private 
enforcement would be in line with many other regulatory provisions affecting the 
landlord-tenant relationship,143 and the government has expressed a preference to 
make private enforcement of competition law more easily accessible.144 
5.4 The balance struck in other jurisdictions 
Other jurisdictions have faced similar dilemmas in seeking to reconcile the benefits of 
common ownership and control of property by portfolio landlords with the risks of 
unscrupulous landlords abusing their position.  Ireland has long restricted the terms 
which landlords may impose in respect of alienation and user, and in 2007 the Irish 
Law Reform Commission reiterated support for this approach in a draft updated 
landlord and tenant bill.  Since the 1980s, every Australian state has enacted 
legislation to protect small business tenants.  The balances struck in these jurisdictions 
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may be instructive in considering how regulation might be developed in England and 
Wales. 
5.4.1 Ireland 
The Law Reform Commission set out five guiding principles for its consultation on 
the reform of commercial tenancy law, which indicated a preference for freedom of 
contract, as well as a desire to keep the law in line with commercial practice.145  
However, this was qualified by the need to protect tenants from unscrupulous 
landlords:146 
At the very least, there ought to remain those provisions which are designed to 
prevent unreasonable behaviour or provisions in leases operating unfairly 
[footnote referring to Part IV of the Landlord and Tenant (Amendment) Act 
1980, which implies full qualification into absolute and merely qualified 
covenants].  Indeed, as indicated later, the Commission takes the view that 
these provisions should be made more effective. 
This represents a longstanding policy preference against allowing landlords absolute 
discretion in exercising control over their tenants.147  Yet, the imposition of limits on a 
landlord's control sits happily with a preference for freedom of contract and 
commercial practice.  The experience in Ireland has been that portfolio landlords are 
adequately protected by the approach taken by the courts to reasonableness.148 
The twin objectives of ensuring that the law promotes flexibility, choice and 
efficiency while protecting tenants from unfair behaviour of landlords are in line with 
the policy factors cited in England and Wales. These objectives are similar to the 
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policy discussions taking place in England and Wales insofar as flexibility is seen as a 
key goal, driven by an underlying policy of promoting economic growth. 
The Irish system may be improved with the importation of the fines provision from 
the 1927 Act in England and Wales.149  The provision for fines under Irish law does 
not permit a landlord to demand payment for any detriment which a change of user 
might cause to other property belonging to them, outside of tightly defined causes, 
which appear to exclude the effect of externalities.150  Thus a landlord could 
reasonably withhold consent to a change which might harm neighbouring property, 
but could not grant consent subject to an increase in rent to compensate for this harm.  
This is ripe for amendment in line with the stated objective of the Law Reform 
Commission to ensure that the law "does not force landlords and tenants into 
arrangements which suit neither group."151  The combination of this measure with the 
mandatory full qualification already in place would prevent the workarounds available 
in England and Wales from being used. 
5.4.2 Australia 
The regulation enacted in various Australian states since the Beddal Report into 
problems facing small businesses152 is particularly relevant in view of the fact that the 
regulation of commercial landlord-tenant relationships arose as a result of fears that 
portfolio landlords - in particular the landlords operating large regional shopping 
centres - were abusing their position in negotiations to the detriment of small business 
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tenants.153  This led to a focus on protecting small businesses.154  There were also 
some competition concerns raised.155 
On the other hand, most states have no security of tenure provisions, which Crosby 
attributes to the need for landlords to maintain control over tenant mix in shopping 
centres: "The landlord's case for the right to manage the centre seems to hold sway at 
present over the tenant's claims of misuse of power at lease expiry."156 
The types of protection granted to small business include the mandatory provision of 
information and the prohibition of certain terms.157  Although fully qualified user 
covenants are not made mandatory, the policy objectives seek to restrain the 
landlord's exercise of control over user: "While a landlord has a fundamental right of 
control over the use of its property, this right does not extend to engaging in unfair 
business practices."158  Thus provisions governing unconscionable conduct may be 
invoked where a landlord unreasonably refuses to waive a user covenant. 
Difficulties have, however, arisen in targeting small businesses.  Crosby and Hughes 
found that the ability of a business to negotiate effectively with landlords is associated 
most closely with the number of people it employs.159  Protecting tenants based on 
number of employees is problematic, however, as it may lead to harsh outcomes at the 
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margins.160  It may also disadvantage small business, who might be competing for the 
same property against a larger alternative tenant.  A landlord would rightly prefer to 
have a larger tenant if the larger tenant enjoyed less legal protection.161  A common 
approach in Australia has been to grant protection to tenants based on the size or level 
of rent and service charges.162  This is not an effective way of targeting small 
businesses, as many larger corporations may also be protected, and some small 
business may escape protection.163 
5.4.3 Lessons to be learned from Ireland and Australia 
The Australian example demonstrates that state intervention can be more effective 
than purely voluntary self regulation in increasing awareness amongst small business 
tenants.  A variety of measures adopted in different states have been tailored to the 
needs of a class of tenants believed to be particularly vulnerable.  Many of these 
measures have been largely successful, demonstrating a number of alternatives for 
protecting small retail tenants.  The success of mandatory provision of information in 
increasing levels of commercial awareness amongst small business tenants 
demonstrates a potential way forward for the system of self regulation. 
The history of mandatory full qualification of user covenants in Ireland demonstrates 
that this measure, which is largely effective in preventing landlords from abusing their 
power over tenants, does not prevent landlords from managing their portfolio as a 
whole in accordance with best commercial practice.  This option would work 
particularly well to promote economic welfare when implemented alongside the 
existing fines provisions in England and Wales. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
The intention of policy makers appears to have been to promote economic efficiency 
by allowing portfolio landlords control over how their properties are used, while 
balancing the risks to tenants and society of giving landlords too much control.  An 
effort appears to have been made to give the "good", business-led landlord as much 
scope as possible to deal with his property portfolio as a unit, in order to benefit 
society as a whole, while attempting to shield tenants from the "unscrupulous" 
landlord. 
The goal of the fines provisions was to (i) prevent unscrupulous landlords from 
making unreasonable demands for payment in return for consent, while (ii) not 
preventing portfolio landlords from taking the interests of their other properties into 
account.  They work well insofar as they allow portfolio landlords to manage their 
portfolios in line with principles of good estate management, They are well crafted to 
facilitate the management of externalities within portfolios through the use of 
Pigouvian taxes on tenants, which should in theory allow the landlord to align the 
interests of individual properties with those of the portfolio, to help ensure an optimal 
distribution of uses in a development.  The provisions fail in respect of (i), however, 
due to the availability of workarounds.   
Much of the policy appears to have assumed that absolute user covenants are only 
used where the landlord has very good reasons for insisting upon them.  Following on 
from this, the aversion to mandatory full qualification of user covenants is based 
largely on fears about the impact that such a change might have on portfolio 
landlords.  From the detailed analysis of the case law contained in Chapter 4, it 
appears that such fears are unfounded.  Mandatory full qualification of user covenants 
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would help to prevent landlords from circumventing the fines provisions, or from 
otherwise preventing a tenant from changing how a property is used without good 
reason. 
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6. The ongoing relationship of landlord and tenant 
In Chapter 2, the commercial basis of the landlord-tenant relationship was outlined, with 
emphasis being placed on the interdependence of landlords and tenants: A landlord's income 
comes not from the property itself, but from the rent paid by the tenant. Equally, the success 
of the tenant in a commercial development will be significantly affected by how well the 
landlord manages the development; in particular, the character of the development and users 
of neighbouring tenants.  Chapters 3 and 4 focused on examining what control the law permits 
a landlord to exercise over units in a development.  Chapter 5 expanded on this, analysing the 
policy approach taken by the legislature in regulating the control which a landlord might 
exercise.  Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are all concerned with examining how the portfolio 
management goals of a landlord may justify exercising control in a particular way over 
individual properties. 
This chapter looks at the issue from the other side, asking what influence the needs of a single 
tenant may have on the landlord's management policy for his entire portfolio.  It seeks to 
identify what control individual tenants might have over the management of a landlord's 
development, whether by influencing the landlord, asserting rights against the landlord or 
enforcing covenants against other tenants. 
The long term nature of retail developments as business propositions means that the optimal 
tenant mix will vary over time,1 and that flexibility is necessary to ensure that returns are 
maximised.2  Retail developments may go through a number of redevelopments to keep up 
with market changes and landlords may favour a shuffle in tenant mix as a cost efficient 
                                                 
1
 Steven R Grenadier, “Flexibility and Tenant Mix in Real Estate Projects” (1995) 38:3 Journal of Urban 
Economics 357. 
2
 Ibid at 373–8. 
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alternative to making physical changes.3  Any limitations on being able to make such changes 
will be harmful to a landlord's interests, and so landlords are keen to avoid being tied down by 
legal obligations,4 as the lower the cost of changing tenant mix, the more efficiently the 
development can be managed in the long term.5 
On the other hand, tenants may be attracted to a development (and induced to pay a higher 
level of rent) by their belief in how it will be managed in the future.  This belief may be 
supported by the landlord's plans, the covenants which might be imposed on other tenants in 
the centre, or assurances given specifically to the tenant.  This chapter examines the extent to 
which these inducements or beliefs may bring about legal obligations. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the control which landlords are often able to exercise over 
properties may be used to distort competition.6  The exemption which land agreements once 
had from competition law has now been repealed.  In light of this, it is examined how 
competition law may constrain a landlord's freedom in managing lettings policy.  Individual 
tenants may seek to use private actions in competition law to escape restrictions contained in 
their leases.  The implications of this for the landlord's ability to control his portfolio in the 
long run are assessed. 
Legal obligations cannot, however, be the only considerations for landlords and tenants.  The 
difficulty, cost and time required to enforce legal obligations through the courts, as well as the 
acrimony that is commonly associated with litigation, may act against the interests of both 
parties.  In this context, this chapter also examines briefly how cooperative management 
                                                 
3
 Gerard Prendergast, Norman Marr & Brent Jarratt, “An exploratory study of tenant-manager relationships in 
New Zealand’s managed shopping centres” (1996) 24:9 International Journal of Retail & Distribution 
Management 19. 
4
 Marc E Rosendorf & Jill Reynolds Seidman, “Restrictive Covenants - The Life Cycle of a Shopping Center” 
(1998) 12 Prob & Prop 33. 
5
 Grenadier, supra note 1. 
6
 See 5.2.3, above. 
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processes might be used to avoid disputes, and the role that might be played by alternative 
dispute resolution in avoiding the pitfalls of litigation. 
6.1 The role of tenants in the management of retail developments 
It is in the interest of the landlord of a retail portfolio to manage the development in such a 
way as to stimulate tenant profitability, which in turn will tend to push up rental values.7  This 
symbiosis is illustrated by Pitt and Musa, who describe a good tenant mix as "a variety of 
stores that work together to enhance the centre's performance, and operate successfully as 
individual businesses […] underlying objective of maximising shopping centre profitability."8 
Peters argues that it is the tenants, rather than the landlord, who are correctly positioned to 
dictate the direction of tenant mix in a shopping centre.9  It is certainly tenants who first feel 
the effects of good or bad tenant mix, and management in general.  Where a landlord retains 
control, this means that a high degree of information sharing is required to ensure that the 
landlord is able to factor into account, the effects of his management on the tenants.10  The 
length of time between rent reviews or lease renewals, coupled with the unrealistic methods 
of rent calculation at these points, means that the effect of management may not be 
successfully captured in the rent payment (which would be the normal signalling method in 
economic analysis).11 
The ability of a landlord and tenant to work together in pursuit of shared goals has a 
significant impact on the profitability of both.12  Taking advantage of the benefits possible in 
                                                 
7
 John Peters, “Managing shopping centre retailer mix: Some considerations for retailers” (1990) 18:1 
International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management 5. 
8
 Michael Pitt & Zairul N Musa, “Towards defining shopping centres and their management systems” (2009) 8:1 
J Retail Leisure Property 39 at 52–53. 
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 Peters, supra note 7. 
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 Elizabeth Howard, “The management of shopping centres: conflict or collaboration?” (1997) 7:3 The 
International Review of Retail, Distribution and Consumer Research 263. 
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a shopping centre or other portfolio setting requires cooperation between neighbouring 
tenants (possibly mediated through the landlord) as well as with the landlord.13  The quality of 
the relationship may even have a bearing on the environmental performance of buildings.14 
Such cooperation is more likely to be possible where the development manager is located in 
or close to the centre, and one-on-one meetings may be useful in ensuring that landlords are 
attuned to the needs of their tenants.15  Trust is another factor that will have a significant 
impact on landlord-tenant relations.16 
The lease forms the basis of the relationship, and its structure will play a key role on the level 
of cooperation, with turnover-related rents and mandatory membership of a tenants' 
association encouraging close cooperation.17  This cooperation may not, however, be very 
prevalent in practice,18 with parties not viewing the portfolio as a single business with 
common interests.19 
Tenants' committees 
Tenants' committees (or associations) are often used as a means of communication between 
shopping centre managers and tenants.20  They may meet on a regular basis, and include 
representatives of tenants and management.  Warnaby and Yip identified their role as being to 
"facilitate relationships, form partnerships and, importantly, communicate..."21  In some cases, 
tenants' associations may become involved with broader issues, like managing tenant mix, but 
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 Howard, supra note 10 at 267. 
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the larger tenants are likely to have most sway.22  The existence of an effective tenants' 
association is cited by McAllister as a source of business value for shopping centres.23  There 
is, however, a dearth of empirical work as to the workings of tenants' committees. Informal 
conversations with two Ireland-based professionals familiar with the workings of tenants' 
committees suggested that their main function related to marketing and that there was little 
engagement by tenants due to a perceived lack of influence.  This is in line with the need 
identified by Roberts et al for empowerment of tenants,24 and Howard's findings relating to 
the adversarial nature of many landlord-tenant relationships.25 
6.2 Tenants' rights in the management of the landlord's portfolio 
In the absence of cooperation and trust between the landlord and tenant, the parties may seek 
to fall back on legal rights to protect their positions.  As discussed in Chapter 3, portfolio 
landlords commonly retain significant rights to control aspects of the operation of their 
properties.  The courts have also given portfolio landlords a significant amount of leeway in 
interpreting the reasonableness of withholding consent.26  In the context of a property 
portfolio, a tenant is likely to be concerned not only with how the landlord exercises control 
against him, but also against other tenants.  Given the landlord's power to create positive 
externalities and eliminate negative externalities, a tenant may wish to have some rights to 
ensure that his landlord exercises control appropriately in relation to neighbouring property. 
6.2.1 Specific covenants 
In some instances, specific covenants might be included in leases to give tenants some 
guarantee about how the landlord's powers will be exercised.  A covenant might be included 
                                                 
22
 Peters, supra note 7. 
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 Patrick McAllister, From rents to revenues: Can property become a service industry (RICS Education Trust, 
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 Roberts et al, supra note 16. 
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 Howard, supra note 10. 
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 See 4.4, above. 
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to require a landlord to enforce neighbours' covenants,27 or to dictate what services a landlord 
ought to provide.  A landlord might also be required to exercise his functions according to 
some independent standard. 
Very often, the construction "good estate management" is used to describe such a standard.28  
However, there are a number of problems associated with this term.  It is not defined by the 
RICS, or other professional bodies.29  Furthermore, judicial approaches to the term have 
varied from tautology ("the prudent management of more than one property of a landlord, 
normally adjoining or at least contiguous"30) to not restrictive of the landlord at all.31  If the 
addition of the words to terms in leases is to mean anything, it must place some limits on how 
landlords are to behave.  The courts have therefore dealt with such covenants on a case-by-
case basis. 
Good estate management covenants 
Many lease agreements with a variable service charge impose strict controls on the services 
which a landlord can use the charge to pay for.32  While this protects tenants from being 
forced to pay for unnecessary services, it may cause difficulties by unnecessarily ossifying the 
services covered by the charge as those seen as necessary at the time the lease was originally 
drafted.33  In some cases, leases may give a landlord broader discretion to adapt the services 
provided to prevailing circumstances.  In order to prevent costs to tenants from spiralling out 
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of control, the landlord's discretion may be qualified.  For instance, the landlord may only be 
allowed to charge for additional services insofar as they are incurred in the interests of "good 
estate management".  For example, in Boots UK Ltd v Trafford Centre Ltd, the landlord's 
power to pay for promotional activities out of the service charge was limited to "providing 
other services in each case in the interests of good estate management of a high class 
shopping centre."34 
Plantation Wharf Management Company v Jackson is one of the few cases where the 
meaning of "good estate management" is discussed explicitly in the context of a service 
charge.35 Judge Mole QC held that a general service charge with such a qualification did 
cover the legal costs incurred in recovering service charges from tenants who were unwilling 
to pay.36  The judge's reasoning was pragmatic, drawing attention to the fact that in the 
absence of effective enforcement of service charge obligations, the estate could not be 
managed effectively as a whole owing to free rider problems. 
In the case of service charge provisions, good estate management is used to limit the 
discretion of the landlord.  Tenants may also seek to use good estate management covenants 
to impose positive obligations on landlords.  In some leases, typically of premises forming 
part of property portfolios, terms may be included expressly to ensure the proper management 
of the development.37  It appears that these covenants are not intended to grant extra powers 
to the landlord, but rather to limit the exercise of the powers which a landlord has been 
granted under a lease. 
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 Boots UK Limited v Trafford Centre Limited, supra note 28, para 10. 
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 Plantation Wharf Management Company Ltd v Jackson, supra note 28. 
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 Shelton, supra note 29; Susan Bright, Landlord and tenant law in context (Oxford: Hart, 2007) at 306.  
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In Romulus Trading v Comet Properties,38 a covenant "to administer the building and the 
common parts and supervise all requisite works thereto in accordance with principles of good 
estate management…" in a schedule to the lease linked to a service charge provision was held 
as not extending to restrict the landlord's letting policy.  The plaintiff had let premises from 
the defendant which it used as a bank, bureau de change and for the renting out of safety 
deposit boxes.  The defendant subsequently let a neighbouring premises to another tenant for 
a similar use, which the plaintiff claimed was in breach of the good estate management 
covenant. 
Curiously, Garland J went further than merely limiting the effect of the good estate 
management covenant to the service charge, opining that even if the obligation had extended 
to cover letting policy, there would be no reasonable cause of action on the covenant, because 
the general law at the date of the signing of the lease would have permitted the landlord to let 
a nearby premises to a competitor of the tenant.39  Presumably, had the lease contained a 
provision expressly prohibiting the landlord from letting a nearby unit to a competitor of the 
plaintiff, the plaintiff would have a good cause of action, notwithstanding the fact that but for 
such covenant the landlord would have been entitled to do so.40  Perhaps Garland J is 
implying that had the parties intended the plaintiffs to benefit from exclusivity, they would 
have entered into an express exclusivity agreement.  However, this is not set out clearly in the 
judgment.  If a good estate management covenant is to mean anything, it must restrict a 
landlord's freedom of action in some respect.  Clearly the parties can grant exclusivity to a 
tenant, so if the good estate management obligation did apply to the landlord's letting policy, 
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 E.g. See the exclusivity covenant in Oceanic Village v Shirayma Shokussan, [2001] L & TR 35. 
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surely the question ought to have been whether it was consistent with good estate 
management to let a nearby unit to a competitor of the tenant.41 
This decision appears to have been justified on the basis of the first reason given by Garland 
J: That the good estate management obligation was contained in a schedule relating 
specifically to service charges and the landlord's duties in maintaining the premises, and ought 
not to have been construed as extending to letting policy.  Even had the covenant extended to 
letting policy, it is not manifestly clear that letting to a competitor of a tenant is bad estate 
management.  However, to the extent that the dicta of Garland J purports to provide authority 
for the proposition that a good estate management covenant will never preclude a landlord 
from letting a property to a competitor of a tenant, it may not be followed by future courts. 
In Capita Trust v Chatam Maritime,42 the owner of a shopping centre (Capita) had let the 
whole centre to a company (Chatam) which was to operate it. The head lease contained a 
covenant requiring Chatam to manage the centre “in accordance with the principles of good 
estate management”.  Chatham sought to use negotiations relating to the proposed installation 
of an anchor tenant to secure a payment from Capita, in return for giving up its break clause.  
This threatened to derail the arrival of the anchor tenant, which could have jeopardised the 
future operation of the centre.  Pumfrey J accepted that failing to enter into a lease with the 
willing proposed anchor tenant would be in breach of the good estate management 
obligation.43  Considering the suggestion that the covenant was so broad as to be 
unenforceable by specific performance, Pumfrey J held that, even though the breadth of the 
covenant might prevent the ongoing enforcement of the obligations under it, the court may 
still direct the carrying out of a single identifiable act, the non-performance of which would 
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be in breach of the covenant, and which could have drastic implications for the covenantee.44  
Thus, Chatam was ordered to enter into a lease with the proposed anchor tenant. 
In Irish Life Assurance plc v Quinn,45 the defendant guarantor of a tenant sought to rely on a 
breach by the landlord of its obligations under a good estate management covenant, to set off 
a claim for unpaid rent and service charges.  The landlord company was alleged to have been 
in breach of its obligations under the covenant, due to its failure to replace an anchor tenant 
that had departed the shopping centre, and its failure to maintain properly, the common areas 
of the shopping centre.  It was claimed that this mismanagement had led to a drop in foot fall 
in the shopping centre.  Dunne J rejected the defendant's claim on grounds relating to the late 
stage at which the issue was raised and the failure of the defendant to set out his claim in 
detail.  The fact that the landlord's management failures had not been raised earlier may 
suggest that the obligation was not seen by the tenant as having teeth.  It would be interesting 
to see how a court might approach a case such as this in light of Capita Trust. 
The uncertainty surrounding the term "good estate management" may explain the relative 
paucity of cases examining such covenants, and the tendency of judges to rely on alternative 
grounds for their decisions where possible.  Guidance issued by the RICS in respect of 
property management agreements now discourages use of the term in favour of more specific 
obligations.46  From a commercial perspective, enhanced cooperation and incentives may be a 
more appropriate way than contractual stipulations, to ensure effective long-run management 
by landlords.47 
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6.2.2 Non-derogation from grant 
In its simplest form, the rule against derogation from grant prohibits the maker of a grant from 
doing anything to deprive the grantee of the benefit for which purpose the grant was made. 48  
In other words, "a grantor having given a thing with one hand is not to take away the means of 
enjoying it with the other."49  In the context of landlord and tenant, it will be particularly 
relevant to the landlord's conduct in using any neighbouring property retained by the landlord.  
Thus, a tenant deriving title under the landlord of a neighbouring patch of ground let for use 
as an explosives storage facility was prohibited from constructing buildings nearby that would 
jeopardise the earlier tenant's explosives licence.50   
Nicholls LJ set out how a derogation from grant might be identified:51 
[It] involves identifying what obligations, if any, on the part of the grantor can fairly 
be regarded as necessarily implicit, having regard to the particular purpose of the 
transaction when considered in the light of the circumstances subsisting at the time 
the transaction was entered into. 
These circumstances include express terms52 and the surrounding circumstances known to the 
parties.53  There is a significant degree of overlap between non-derogation from grant, quiet 
enjoyment and nuisance,54 but nuisance claims against landlords based on the conduct of 
other tenants may be unlikely to succeed in the absence of a derogation from grant.55 
There are a number of ways in which rule against derogation from grant may affect a landlord 
in the management of a commercial portfolio.  As discussed in chapter 4, the principle may 
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restrict how the landlord may deal with the tenant individually.56  It was held in Rayburn v 
Wolf that a landlord of an apartment block was not permitted to have a policy of never 
granting permission to sublet, because the leases anticipated permission being granted in 
some situations.57  Neuberger J's dicta in Moss v CSC referred to the principle explicitly.58  
For present purposes, it is a different application of the principle that is relevant.  Where the 
landlord grants a lease to one tenant for a particular purpose, that tenant may seek to rely on 
the principle to challenge how the landlord uses neighbouring property (or permits it to be 
used). 
An early case involving a retail development was that of Port v Griffith.59  The plaintiff let a 
unit from the landlord for use as a shop selling wool and general trimmings.  Subsequently, 
the landlord let a neighbouring unit to a different tenant for a very similar use.  The first 
tenant claimed that the second lease was in derogation of the grant made in the first lease, as 
the competition from a neighbouring tenant made the unit less suitable for its intended use. 
Luxmoore J in the High Court rejected the claim, holding that it could not have been within 
the reasonable contemplation of the parties that the restrictive user covenant would prevent 
the landlord from letting nearby property to a competitor of the tenant.  He noted that 
competition from a neighbouring tenant did not necessarily make the tenant's premises less fit 
for carrying out the tenant's business, but merely had as an incidental effect, the reduction of 
profitability.60  The Port v Griffith principle was upheld in Romulus Trading v Comet 
Properties, a more recent case involving similar facts.61 
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The position may, however, be different in the presence of special circumstances.  In Oceanic 
Village v Shirayma Shokussan, the landlord had let premises to the claimant tenant for use as 
the London Aquarium gift shop.62  The lease prevented the landlord from permitting the 
operation of any other gift shop within the building, but the landlord later proposed building a 
kiosk in front of the building for use as a gift shop.  While the proposal was held not to be in 
breach of the express covenant, Nicholas Warren QC, sitting as a deputy High Court Judge, 
held that it would be in derogation of grant.  The special characteristics of the arrangement 
between the parties, such as the restrictions on how the shop was to be run, demonstrated that 
the intention of the parties was for the shop to be "the" aquarium gift shop, and that this 
particular purpose included exclusivity as regards the sale of aquarium-related products. 
In the absence of special circumstances, it appears that a landlord will not be precluded from 
letting property to a competitor of a tenant by the duty not to derogate from grant.  It is 
interesting to contrast this position with the law relating to the reasonableness of withholding 
a landlord's consent.63  While the Port v Griffith principle holds that it is not generally 
expected that a landlord will refrain from letting property to competitors of his tenants, he 
may be reasonable in withholding consent in order to protect a tenant's business,64 or even his 
own business65 from competition.  This demonstrates the broad discretion allowed by the 
courts to landlords in the management of commercial property portfolios. 
What is not settled, however, is how the rule might apply in the context of a shopping centre, 
or where there is a known tenant mix, in the context of management or lettings policy at the 
time the lease is entered into.  In Chartered Trust v Davies, the defendant tenant had taken a 
lease of a unit in a retail development marketed as a premium shopping mall, stated to have a 
                                                 
62
 Oceanic Village v Shirayma Shokussan, supra note 40. 
63
 See Chapter 4. 
64
 Chelsfield MH Investments Ltd v British Gas Plc, supra note 41. 
65
 Whiteminster Estates v Hodges Menswear, (1974) 232 EG 715 (Ch). 
 164 
"high class retail" lettings policy.66  After a difficult first few years of operation, the landlord 
accepted a pawnbroker as a replacement tenant in one of the mall's units.  The pawnbroker's 
advertising and loitering customers had caused difficulties for the defendant.  The Court of 
Appeal held that because, inter alia, the landlord had retained some control over common 
areas of the mall, and could charge a service charge, there was an expectation that the 
landlord would exercise that power to protect the tenants.  Henry LJ set out:67 
From the lease, one gets a clear recognition by the landlords that the enjoyment of the 
benefit that the tenant took under the lease here depended, in part, on the actions of 
the landlords in letting and controlling the remaining units in, and the common parts 
of, this small retail development. 
The landlord was therefore found to be in derogation of grant in failing to control the exercise 
of the pawnbroker's business, which created a nuisance for the defendant (although not in 
letting to the pawnbroker per se). 
A similar situation had occurred in Hilton v James Smith & Sons (Norwood) Ltd.68  In that 
case, other tenants of the landlord were blocking a passageway owned by the landlord, which 
the plaintiff had a right to use.  The Court of Appeal relied on the law of nuisance, holding 
that by its failure to prevent the nuisance in the common area still controlled by it, the 
landlord had continued the nuisance. 
In Platt and Others v London Underground,69 the defendant landlord had let to the claimant a 
kiosk at an exit from its train station for use as a shop.  The tenant claimed that the landlord 
was in derogation of grant in closing the exit for most of the day, thereby depriving the kiosk 
of customers.  On the basis of correspondence conducted in connection with the negotiation 
of the lease, and the common knowledge that the success of the kiosk would be dependant on 
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custom from passengers exiting the station, Neuberger J held that the parties contemplated 
that the exit would remain open for most of the time the station operated.  The landlord was 
therefore in derogation of grant in failing to keep the exit open. 
In Petra Investments v Jeffry Rogers, the issue of the obligation of a landlord to consider the 
interests of existing tenants when seeking to adapt a centre was addressed.70  The defendant 
tenant had taken out a lease in a new shopping centre, which was intended to attract "locally 
resident middle-aged women".  After trading difficulties, a new landlord made changes to the 
centre, and introduced new tenants, including a Virgin Megastore, which attracted a 
substantially different group of customers to those originally targeted.  The defendant claimed 
that the landlord was in derogation from grant in effecting a fundamental change to the centre 
through alterations of the physical structure, change to the tenant mix, and advertising focus.  
Hart J expanded upon the Court of Appeal's judgment in Chartered Trust, holding that in the 
context of the centre, the landlord had a duty to consider the expectations of existing tenants.  
This would mean not doing anything "reasonably foreseeable as rendering a particular lease 
materially less fit for the commercial purpose for which it had been granted."71  
Although the existence of a landlord with some powers to control a centre will not necessarily 
imply a duty to exercise those powers for the benefits of tenants, Chartered Trust and Petra 
Investments demonstrate that the courts will be attentive to the particular characteristics of 
retail developments in determining the scope of a grant.  The obligation not to derogate from 
grant may give tenants some protection from the failure of an apathetic landlord to exercise 
control over the common areas of a development, and from manifestly harmful change to the 
character of a development.  On the other hand, the courts have shown sensitivity to the need 
for retail developments to change over time in response to market shifts.  As demonstrated in 
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Petra Investments, any right of a tenant's will only be to prevent the landlord from acting in a 
manner likely to cause harm to their business, not to preserve the state of the development at 
the point in time the lease was granted. 
6.2.3 Remedies 
The remedies available to tenants, either in relation to a breach by a landlord of a specific 
covenant or a derogation from grant, may be limited.  The most valuable remedy for a tenant 
in some circumstances may be specific performance or an injunction, but there are a number 
of difficulties in seeking either.  In particular, where a tenant seeks specific performance, he 
may encounter problems if the obligation is of an ongoing nature or would be difficult for the 
court to police.72  The court will also look to the hardship that might be suffered by both 
parties.73 
In the extreme, a tenant may seek to repudiate a lease because of the landlord's conduct.  It is 
certainly possible in principle to repudiate a lease on the grounds of a landlord's derogation 
from grant,74 or breach of covenant,75 however this may not be available in many cases.76 
6.3 Competition law and lettings policy 
After the repeal of the Land Agreements Exemption Order, the ability of a landlord to set a 
lettings policy may also now be constrained by the Chapter I prohibition contained in the 
Competition Act 1998 (the 1998 Act).77  The Chapter I prohibition outlaws agreements 
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between undertakings78 which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition within the UK or any part of the UK.79 
The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) has issued guidance on the effect of competition law on 
land agreements.80  Agreements which may be affected include exclusive user covenants, as 
well as groupings of restrictive covenants which may combine to affect competition.81  Such 
agreements may act as barriers to entry, protecting existing market participants from 
competition.  The Irish Competition Authority's guidance on restrictive covenants in shopping 
centres is also instructive, as the domestic competition regime in both jurisdictions is 
modelled on EU competition law.82 
Land agreements continue to be excluded from the scope of competition law to the extent that 
they are planning obligations under sections 106 and 299A of the Town and Country Planning 
Act 1990.83  Additionally, agreements which potentially restrict competition in some way may 
not be affected by the 1998 Act if their impact is relatively small, or if they can be justified as 
necessary or beneficial for consumers under section 9 of the Competition Act 1998. 
6.3.1 What agreements may be affected? 
First and foremost, landlords should be aware that they may not seek to use land agreements 
to prevent, restrict or distort competition.  Where such is found to be the object of an 
agreement, it will automatically fall foul of the Chapter I prohibition.  This has nominally 
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been the law in relation to land agreements since the coming in to force of the 1998 Act, but it 
has been noted that some undertakings operated under the impression that land agreements 
did not have to comply.84 
De minimis exception 
Whether a land agreement will be considered to have an appreciable effect on competition 
will depend on a number of factors. First, there is an exemption for agreements between small 
undertakings (the de minimis exception).  This is set out in the European Commission's notice 
on agreements of minor importance,85 which applies equally to EU law and Chapter I of the 
1998 Act.86  As leases are most likely to be "vertical" agreements, only agreements between 
undertakings with a combined market share of 15% or more in a "relevant market" will be 
considered by the OFT.  
There are some circumstances where land agreements entered into by portfolio landlords may 
be horizontal.  The type of agreement considered in Slough Estates v Welwyn Hatfield District 
Council,87 where two competitor centres sought to coordinate tenant mix, is one example.  In 
that case, it was the competitor centres which entered into an agreement.  Another might be in 
the case of a letting scheme, as in Williams v Kiley.88  In such a case, it is the competitor 
tenants who agree covenants with a landlord for the benefit of each other. 
The market is defined both in terms of the product and geographical area served.  These are 
examined based on both supply- and demand-side substitutability.89  This is assessed by 
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examining how consumers, competitors and potential competitors of a firm might react to a 
small but significant non-transient increase in price.90 
Product scope is defined by the products that consumers might switch to in the case of an 
increase in price of the product in question.  Who is a direct competitor is, therefore, defined 
by consumer (demand-side) substitutability. Whether a coffee shop, for example, will be in 
the same market as a restaurant, will depend on whether some consumers would react to an 
increase in price at the coffee shop by switching custom to the restaurant.   
Geographic scope is determined by the distance that consumers will travel for an alternative 
in response to an increase in price.  The further that customers will be willing to travel for a 
cheaper alternative, the larger the geographic scope of a product.  The size of geographical 
markets varies hugely between different product markets.  The market for commercial 
airliners is global, but the market for freshly brewed coffee might only extend to the end of a 
street.  The definition of the geographic scope of a relevant market will be crucial for the 
assessment of land agreements under competition law.  Most land agreements will have 
limited geographic effect, and so in many cases, it is only likely to be relevant markets with 
very narrow geographic scope which will not allow land agreements to avail of the de minimis 
exemption.  Relevant markets in this category will include those such as the market for 
freshly brewed coffee, as consumers are not likely to travel very far in search of a substitute.  
The OFT has used the catchment area of a retail store as an approximation of geographical 
scope.91 
An undertaking may also be subject to competitive constraint from producers outside its 
industry.  If a producer were to increase prices above a competitive level, others may enter the 
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market in search of supernormal profits.  Potential competitors who could easily enter into 
competition with an undertaking will also, therefore, be included when defining the market.  
The degree of any barriers to entry will be significant in assessing potential competition. 
The OFT has indicated that it would be relatively sympathetic towards tenant mix policies, 
but landlords would be advised to ensure that theirs do not amount to a series of parallel 
agreements which have the cumulative effect of restricting competition.92  The Irish 
Competition Authority, which encountered the problem some time ago, suggested that the 
tenant mix strategies commonly employed in shopping centres were generally pro-
competitive rather than anticompetitive and so were unlikely to infringe the equivalent Irish 
provision.93 
The Section 9 exclusion and land agreements 
Land agreements which appear to fall foul of section 2 of the 1998 Act may still be valid 
where they meet the criteria set out in section 9.  It is up to the parties to demonstrate that an 
agreement meets these criteria.  Section 9 requires that:94 
1. The agreement leads to productive or technological gains 
2. The agreement is not more restrictive than it needs to be in order to realise those gains 
3. Consumers get a fair share of the gains achieved; and 
4. The agreement does not allow the parties to it to eliminate competition 
In relation to the first criterion, a distinction must be drawn between agreements which seek 
to benefit the parties through advance in production, distribution or technology and those 
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which merely seek to shuffle the market into a more favourable shape for the parties to the 
agreement.  It is only agreements which are likely to create an aggregate benefit which may 
enjoy the benefit of this exemption.  Agreements which allow for the creation of positive 
externalities, for the opening of new retail units or the maintaining of a tenant mix policy in 
some circumstances, for example, may come under this.95 
Landlords should give some thought to the way that agreements are structured in order to 
meet the second criterion.  A new anchor tenant might need a period of exclusivity in order to 
make its investment economically viable but these terms should not be any more generous 
than would be required to meet this bare viability threshold.  For example, it should not give 
exclusivity in a broader range of goods or for a longer period than would be necessary to 
secure the benefits.96 
The benefit to consumers required under the third criterion may be in the form of increased 
choice, a better layout of retail outlets or lower prices, but the benefit must exceed the cost to 
them from the harm caused to competition by the restriction.  This will have to be assessed on 
a case-by-case basis. 
Finally, potential competition must be considered as well as existing competition for the 
purposes of the fourth criterion.  Exclusivity agreements and networks of user covenants have 
the potential to create substantial barriers to entry.  The same could apply to the type of “land 
banking” agreements entered into by supermarkets, as identified by the Competition 
Commission, which have the potential to lock out competitors who would need very specific 
types of property to enter the market.97 
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6.3.2 Enforcement 
Breaches of the Chapter I prohibition may be addressed by the OFT, or through private 
litigation. 
Enforcement by the OFT 
The OFT may investigate a breach of the 1998 Act of its own accord, or as a result of a 
complaint being made to it, once it has “reasonable grounds” for suspecting that there has 
been a breach of competition law.98  It may require the production of documents or the giving 
of information by anyone thought to have relevant information,99 and it has a range of other 
search powers.100 
The OFT may accept commitments from a party under investigation while an investigation is 
underway.101  If it does so, it shall desist with its investigation to the extent that its concerns 
are allayed by the commitments.102  These commitments are enforceable in the High Court.103  
Where the OFT finds that an agreement breaches the Chapter I prohibition, it may direct the 
parties to the agreement to alter or terminate it.104  Where the parties fail to comply with the 
OFT’s direction, the OFT may apply to the High Court enforce compliance. 
Private enforcement 
The OFT is unlikely to take action in the case of smaller alleged breaches,105 which, together 
with the limited geographic scope of land agreements means investigations relating to tenant 
mix are likely to be exceedingly rare.  It may, however, be open for individuals disadvantaged 
by a particular agreement to challenge it on grounds of its breach of competition law.  Private 
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claims may be pursued in the national courts under Article 101 TFEU,106 and damages may be 
awarded by UK courts for loss sustained by one party as a result of the other’s anticompetitive 
behaviour.107  However, where the impugned agreement relates to land, it is more likely that 
an action under Chapter I of the 1998 Act will be appropriate, as no cross border element is 
likely to be present. 
The availability of damages is not specifically provided for in the 1998 Act, but breaches of 
the 1998 Act may be litigated as a breach of statutory duty.108  Normally this tort does not 
allow damages to be awarded for types of loss which the statute was not intended to prevent, 
and the objectives of competition law will often not coincide with the loss suffered as a result 
of its breach.  The EU legal principle of effectiveness may, however, guarantee a right to 
damages for breach of EU competition law,109 and such damages should be available under 
the UK regime.110 
For many litigants, however, the goal in pursuing an action in competition law may be to have 
an anticompetitive agreement declared void.  Any agreement – or any part thereof – which is 
in breach of section 2 of the 1998 Act will be void and unenforceable.111  Competition law 
may, therefore, be used to challenge a user or exclusivity covenant in a lease, either 
proactively or in defence to a case brought by a landlord for breach of covenant.112  This 
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might also be pursued in order to challenge the validity of an absolute user covenant.113  This 
could be of particular concern to landlords seeking to maintain a tenant mix policy. 
It must be examined in light of contract law in individual cases, whether the void provisions 
of an agreement are severable or whether the whole agreement falls with them.114  They will 
be severable from the lease and the lease will stand where the promise is of a kind which may 
be severed, where it can be severed without redrafting the agreement between the parties and 
where severance does not alter the nature of the agreement.  The kinds of covenant which may 
be severed in the event of illegality have not been precisely defined, although it appears that 
covenants in restraint of trade fall under this category.115  In Chemidus Wavin Ltd v Société 
pour la Transformation, the Court of Appeal ruled that a minimum royalty clause in a patent 
licence agreement was severable from other conditions that were in breach of EU competition 
law.116   
Where the OFT has previously examined an agreement, the High Court will be bound by the 
decision, once the time to appeal has elapsed.117  This may facilitate action by a party that has 
been harmed by an anticompetitive agreement.  However, given the complexity of the law in 
this area, and the difficulty of proving the relevant facts, private enforcement of competition 
law has not had great success in the UK in cases where the OFT has not made a decision.118  
The Government has expressed a desire for private enforcement to play a greater role in 
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competition law, in harmony with the institutional enforcement regime.119  Proposals for 
reform are currently being discussed. 120  Private enforcement of competition law may in 
future become a viable avenue of litigation for tenants faced with absolute user covenants and 
intransigent landlords. 
6.4 Direct enforcement of covenants against neighbouring tenants 
In some cases, a tenant may be able to directly enforce a covenant in the lease of another 
tenant.  Such circumstances will provide a tenant with a much greater degree of security than 
were he reliant on the landlord to enforce such covenants.  Direct enforcement by a tenant 
may be necessary because neither the landlord, nor any other central actor, may be in a 
position of power to control and guide the ongoing management and evolution of a 
development.  In such cases, the initial negotiation stage will be very important as it will 
govern how the development is run, as there may be less scope for variation in the terms of a 
development's operation where covenants are enforced by tenants rather than a landlord. 
Normally, covenants are only enforceable by those with privity of contract or estate with the 
covenantor.  Tenants may, however be able to avail of an exception to this rule to enforce a 
covenant against a neighbouring tenant, such as the case of a letting scheme, or a statutory 
exception under section 56 of the Law of Property Act 1925, or the Contracts (Rights of Third 
Parties) Act 1999.  
6.4.1 Letting Schemes 
Development schemes are an exception to the normal enforceability rules relating to 
covenants.  In the context of leasehold developments they are known as letting schemes and 
allow any tenant who is a part of the scheme to enforce restrictive covenants against any other 
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tenant in the scheme, regardless of when either party joined the scheme.  They have been 
described as a "local law",121 "calculated and intended to add to the security of the lessees, 
and consequently to increase the price of the [relevant property]."122  In the context of retail 
developments, they may be particularly useful in assuring a tenant of the character of a new 
development, where other tenants' user covenants are enforceable by the tenant. 
Lord MacNaghten expressly tied the justification for such schemes to enforcing promises 
made to promote interests shared by the parties:123 
This restriction was obviously for the benefit of all the lessees on the estate; they all 
had a common interest in maintaining the restriction. This community of interest 
necessarily, I think, requires and imports reciprocity of obligation. 
Traditionally, for a scheme of development to arise, the conditions laid out in Eliston v 
Reacher had to apply.124  These were, (i) that both the party trying to enforce the covenant 
and the party subject to it had to derive their title from a common vendor, (ii) that this 
common vendor had laid out a defined area of land in lots for sale subject to similar 
restrictions which were consistent only with the existence of a building scheme and for the 
benefit of all the lots forming part of the scheme, and (iii) the original purchasers from the 
common vendor understood that the restrictions were for the benefit of the other lots forming 
part of the scheme.125 
These conditions have been subtly narrowed down over the years and Harpum et al have 
identified "two prerequisites"; reciprocity, and the existence of a defined area which the 
scheme covers, now necessary for the creation of a scheme of development.126  The focus is 
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on the intention of the parties, in particular the intention that: the restrictions be for the benefit 
of the development as a whole, and that the covenants could be enforced by any of the 
tenants.  A letting scheme will not necessarily arise whenever each lease in a development 
contains similar restrictive covenants, if intention cannot be shown to create the restrictions 
for the benefit of other tenants who would have power to enforce them.127 
In Wiliams v Kiley,128 a local authority had let out a parade of shops in Swansea, each of 
which was bound by a positive covenant to carry on a particular trade, which trade was 
defined to exclude a list of trades corresponding with the permitted users of other shops in the 
development, coupled with a restrictive covenant not to use the premises for anything else.  
Additionally, there was provision for the landlord's agent to resolve disputes between the 
tenants as to permitted user.  The Court of Appeal emphasised the complementary nature of 
the permitted user covenants as well as the dispute resolution mechanism, which clearly 
envisioned a tenant seeking to rely on the user covenants to prevent another tenant from 
encroaching on its business, to find that there was an intention that the covenants be mutually 
enforceable by the tenants.  Buxton LJ approved of the approach taken in the Canadian case 
of Russo v Field,129 which required a clear intention on the part of the parties to the lease to 
create a letting scheme where its effect could be to foreclose competition.130 
As noted in the Law Commission's 1985 report on covenants restricting dispositions, 
alterations and change of user, the mandatory full qualification of user covenants may 
interfere with the successful operation of letting schemes.131  In Andrews v Sohal, the 
existence of a fully qualified user covenant was cited alongside other factors by Terence 
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Cullen QC, sitting as a deputy High Court Judge, as tending to exclude the existence of a 
letting scheme.132  This can be contrasted with Pearce v Maryon-Wilson, where Luxmoore J 
held that the existence of a building scheme did not preclude a landlord from granting consent 
to a variation of the user clause of one or more properties in the scheme, if permitted by the 
lease.133  Cozens-Hardy MR in Elliston v Reacher suggested that a power of the vendor to 
withdraw some property from the scheme should be considered in determining whether a 
scheme existed, but would not be fatal to the existence of one.134  The ability of a landlord to 
consent to a change in the scheme may, nonetheless, make the scheme less valuable to a 
tenant, as it reduces the security provided by the scheme. 
Although letting schemes appear to have been prevalent in retail developments in Canada,135  
their use in the commercial leasehold context in England and Wales seems to be rare.136  This 
may be because the active management role that most commercial landlords intend to take 
would place them as the ideal enforcer of leasehold covenants, because a wider range of 
enforcement options is available to a landlord, or because of a number of drawbacks that 
development schemes may have for the management of commercial developments. 
Difficulties with letting schemes 
From a tenant's point of view, the major advantage of a letting scheme is that they may 
directly enforce restrictive covenants (such as user covenants) against neighbouring tenants 
and may therefore preserve any advantages a tenant has in a retail development.  Their ability 
to protect tenants from the changeable designs of a landlord could make letting schemes quite 
valuable to tenants.  In a set of facts like those present in Petra Investments or Capita Trust, a 
letting scheme might protect a tenant from wholesale change to the character of a 
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development.  The corollary of this is that letting schemes introduce for the landlord, a 
potentially dangerous rigidity in estate management policy.  
Such rigidity will not only harm a landlord.  Tenants may also find themselves constrained by 
covenants into lines of business which have been rendered obsolete or unprofitable by 
changing markets, without agreement from other tenants in the scheme.  Because of a 
landlord's financial interest in the success of his tenants, a landlord may be more likely than a 
neighbouring tenant to waive overly restrictive covenants or provide special accommodations 
to help the tenant's business to adapt.  Tenants do not enjoy protections from other tenants in a 
letting scheme similar to those relating to applications for consent to change of user.  More 
importantly, in the long run, it may be very difficult to agree a redevelopment of a scheme 
which has become outdated, if the agreement of all tenants is required.  A landlord not bound 
by a letting scheme would be in a far better position to reorganise a development which has 
become outdated. 
Once the first property is let out, the letting scheme comes into existence and binds the whole 
area of the development, whether or not the landlord retains possession of the rest of it.137  
Thus, from very early on in the development, a landlord may be constrained, especially if the 
development is not a success. 
An application may be brought under section 84 of the Law of Property Act 1925, but this 
option is only available for long leases where some of the term has already elapsed.138  One 
effect of the Law Commission's 1985 proposal for the expansion of the section 84 regime 
would be to bring a greater level of flexibility into letting schemes. 
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6.4.2 Statutory exceptions to privity 
Section 56 of the Law of Property Act 1925 provides that a party may take the benefit of a 
covenant notwithstanding the fact that he was not a party to the deed granting it.  As such, 
where the deed granting a lease bestows the benefit of a covenant139 on a neighbouring tenant 
(whether individually or as part of a defined class), that covenant will be enforceable by the 
neighbouring tenant as original covenantee and by his successors in title according to the 
usual rules of enforcement. 
Tenants may also be able to enforce the covenants in other tenants' leases under the provisions 
of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.  This will be available where the contract 
expressly permits the tenant to enforce the covenant,140 or where it purports to confer a benefit 
on the other tenant.141  The Act may be excluded expressly or by implication in a lease.142 
6.4.3 Individual enforcement and the collective good 
In either of the above cases, the tenant will be entitled to enforce covenants against 
neighbouring tenants.  This may be detrimental to the success of a development as a whole.  
Howard's description of shopping centres as adversarial settings indicates that giving legal 
rights to individual tenants is unlikely to create mutual gain or to realise the benefits 
achievable as a result of grouping the tenants together.143 
Letting schemes and the 1999 Act create firm property rights,144 enabling tenants to protect 
their position within a development.  As discussed in Chapter 2, the Coase theorem suggests 
that where property use rights are present, an optimal mix of uses will still be achieved unless 
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transaction costs prevent agreement.145  Given the complexities of letting schemes, and the 
number of competing interests that may be present among members of a letting scheme, were 
each tenant to have a veto over any change, transaction costs involved in obtaining permission 
from all tenants would be very high.  It is, therefore, unrealistic to think that the parties to a 
letting scheme will be able to negotiate as efficient a mix of uses as a portfolio landlord 
could.146  Letting schemes are, therefore, unlikely to permit the same degree of dynamic 
flexibility as management by a single landlord. 
6.5 Dispute resolution 
It has been assumed thus far in this thesis that litigation is the default form of dispute 
resolution.  The use of the courts in commercial disputes has a number of distinct advantages, 
such as perceived impartiality, the finality (subject to appeal) and enforceability of judgments, 
and the certainty provided by a large body of precedent.  There are, however, also a number 
of significant drawbacks to court proceedings, such as their cost, the time it takes to bring a 
case to trial, and the fact that sensitive commercial information may make its way into the 
public domain through a court hearing.  Additionally, in the context of an ongoing 
relationship, the adversarial nature of court proceedings can taint the relationship between the 
parties and hamper future cooperation.147  It is in light of these factors that attention has 
turned to alternative dispute resolution (ADR). 
Special court procedures 
It should be noted that some of the problems traditionally associated with litigation may be 
mitigated by the provision of special court procedures.  The use of lower courts for routine 
applications,148 or the provision of special procedures to speed up cases149 may help to reduce 
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costs and delay, but still force the parties into an adversarial competition and are limited in the 
available range of remedies. 
6.5.1 Advantages of alternative dispute resolution 
By its very nature, litigation is often inimical to a healthy ongoing relationship between the 
landlord and tenant.150  Even where the dispute arises because one party is trying to 
discontinue the relationship, there is always a risk that they will not prevail and the two 
parties will have to go on working together after the dispute is settled.  This may prove to be 
particularly problematic where the nature of the relationship requires that the parties work 
closely together, as may more often be the case with retail developments than with standalone 
properties. 
A deeper problem relates to the nature of the remedies available.  As already discussed, 
certain remedies may not be available in court, such as specific performance of a keep-open 
covenant.151  Mandatory injunctions are also likely to be unsuitable for ensuring that the 
landlord fulfils its management functions on an ongoing basis.152  In some circumstances, the 
parties may not have much to gain from merely insisting on their rights.  The enforcement of 
a right may prejudice one party severely with little gain to the other.153  While it is always 
open to parties to negotiate in the wake of a court judgment to arrive at a better solution (and 
this should happen in the absence of transaction costs154) this rarely happens in reality.155  
Discussion between the parties may be the most effective way of promoting their common, as 
well as individual, interests. 
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Howard argues that the legal basis of the landlord-tenant relationship encourages conflict, 
pitting landlords against tenants in an adversarial contest, which does not promote mutual 
gain.156  Negotiation strategies may be competitive, where a hard line is taken, aiming to 
secure as much as possible for the negotiator's own side; or cooperative, where a negotiator 
offers concessions and supplies a lot of information in order to ensure that a solution is 
arrived at.157  In an adversarial setting, competitive bargaining is encouraged, which may lead 
the parties to focus on their positions, rather than trying to agree a mutually beneficial 
solution.  This approach is not ideally suited to promoting the interests of both parties.158 
Fisher and Ury suggest an alternative negotiation style, aimed at promoting the interests of all 
parties in a negotiation.159  "Principled negotiation" involves co-operative problem solving 
which may yield results superior for both parties to insisting on their rights.  Methods of 
dispute resolution which focus on achieving consensual agreement may be best at 
encouraging such win-win resolutions, as parties will only agree to a settlement in such a 
scenario where the solution is no worse than proceeding to court (the "best alternative to a 
negotiated agreement").160 
In the context of landlords' consents, time will often be of the essence.  Excessive delay on the 
part of a landlord may frustrate the object of the consent application. This was the rationale 
behind the procedural duties imposed upon landlords in dealing with requests to assign by the 
Landlord and Tenant Act 1988,161 and for the Irish Law Reform Commission's 
recommendation to introduce similar provisions in relation to all consent applications.162  This 
point was also specifically raised by one Irish property professional in an informal 
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conversation about areas for reform of the law in Ireland.  The landlord is not, however, the 
only source of delays.  Bringing a case to court can cause substantial delays, having a similar 
effect on the proposed transaction.  While damages may be sufficient to compensate a tenant 
for a failed assignment, that may not be the case for other types of consent sought, where the 
risk of losing first mover advantage in changing user, or the costs related to a delayed 
refurbishment may not be readily quantifiable. 
Litigation may also be more expensive than other forms of dispute resolution,163 and the 
courts may not be as well placed to understand the commercial realities facing the parties as 
an mediator or arbitrator with practical expertise.  However, the less formal and less 
expensive methods of ADR, such as mediation, may not result in any settlement, and so may 
merely prolong and add expense to the resolution of the dispute, which may still end up in 
court.  The success of voluntary ADR options depends on the commitment of both parties to 
finding a resolution to their dispute. 
6.5.2 Methods of dispute resolution 
ADR is a catch-all term used to describe any non-litigation dispute resolution process.  This 
may include negotiation, mediation, arbitration, expert determination and a range of 
combinations of different approaches.  Negotiation is practiced throughout the relationship of 
landlord and tenant and may be attempted at several stages of a dispute, from when it 
originally arises to final attempts at settlement pre-trial.  Kheel described negotiation as "the 
primary method of conflict resolution."164 
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Mediation involves a negotiation between the parties which is facilitated by a neutral third 
party.165  It aims to help the parties to come to a consensual agreement.  A successful 
mediation will result in an enforceable agreement but because of the consensual nature of the 
process, agreement is not guaranteed.  Although a contract may include a mediation clause, 
because of the consensual nature of the process, it cannot avoid the possibility of a dispute 
ending up in court. 
The flexibility provided by mediation allows the parties to tailor the process to fit their 
needs.166  If successful, it is generally quicker and cheaper than litigation.  The consensual 
nature of the process makes it particularly useful for maintaining good relationships between 
the parties, and the understanding which mediation seeks to achieve may be helpful in 
avoiding future disputes.  It also allows for more inventive solutions than would be available 
in court, especially considering the difficulties with mandatory injunctions discussed above. 
In contrast to mediation, arbitration does not result in an agreed settlement.  Rather, an 
independent arbitrator decides on the solution to a dispute, which is binding on the parties.  It 
is much more like litigation than mediation, with submissions made by both sides, but can be 
more flexible than litigation.  The parties must agree to the determination of a dispute by 
arbitration.  It may be provided for in the lease, or may be agreed between the parties after the 
dispute has arisen.  Arbitrations in England and Wales are governed by the Arbitration Act 
1996.  The decisions of an arbitrator are only appealable in the courts on narrow grounds.167 
In some cases, where a dispute resolves around the determination of a particular technical 
question, such as the appropriate level of rent, it may be appropriate to appoint an 
independent expert to adjudicate.  This is similar to arbitration but much more limited in 
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scope.  Many rent review and service charge clauses contain procedures for assessing an 
appropriate amount in the event of dispute, although this procedure is not commonly used in 
relation to other landlord-tenant disputes.  Expert determinations are not regulated and the 
terms of reference should be agreed by the parties before commencing.  The parties must also 
agree on how an independent expert might be appointed.  Depending on the terms of the 
adjudication, expert determination may give the adjudicator a greater degree of freedom in 
using their own knowledge in coming to a determination than an arbitrator would have.  
Section 19(1C) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1927168 allows the parties to specify in a lease 
or another agreement prior to an application for consent adjudication by an independent 
expert as  the means for determining the reasonableness of the landlords withholding of 
consent.  This may be useful to parties wishing to avoid costly and time consuming litigation 
regarding consents for alienation. 
In addition to the dispute resolution techniques described above, a number of hybrid 
techniques may be used, which seek to capture some of the benefits of different approaches.  
"Med-arb" and "arb-med" seek to achieve the benefits of a voluntary agreement between the 
parties for their ongoing relationship, while availing of a fall back position provided by an 
adjudication.  The procedures are flexible and should be designed to cater to the needs of the 
parties. 
6.5.3 Dispute resolution in the property context 
By their very nature, landlord and tenant disputes tend to have a number of characteristics 
which may pose dilemmas for the parties in trying to promote their individual interests, as is 
the case in litigation.  Such disputes are generally in the context of ongoing relationships; they 
are very often time sensitive; they involve very complex questions relating to commercial 
practice; and because of the foregoing, resolving them by litigation can be very expensive. 
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For those reasons, litigation often may not be the appropriate way to resolve landlord/tenant 
disputes. 
However, the parties themselves may see their relationship as more adversarial than 
cooperative.169  This points to a divergence between the approach advocated by the literature 
and commercial practice.  This zero sum approach to conflict between the parties may make 
litigation seem like a more attractive option than negotiation, especially if one party perceives 
that they will get a fairer hearing in court.170 
Although arbitration or expert determination clauses are quite common in relation to rent 
reviews, ADR has not seen widespread use beyond this in the commercial landlord/tenant 
context.  Bright notes that leases often do not contain adequate mechanisms for resolving 
landlord/tenant disputes.171   
One area which is a constant source of disputes - that of seeking consent from the landlord - 
often ranks low in terms of tenant satisfaction.172  A number of commentators have suggested 
the use of ADR as a way of cutting costs and speeding up the resolution of disputes relating to 
consent.173  Fisher and Ury note that the use of objective standards is necessary to get away 
from the traditional form of adversarial positional bargaining.174  Individuals will tend to point 
to examples which are most favourable to their position in negotiations as a result of self-
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serving bias,175 so it is important to have certainty in the criteria used.176  Objective criteria 
used in relation to a dispute concerning consent might include professional practice or the 
likely outcome of a case, should the dispute go to court (or to trial if litigation has begun).  As 
discussed in Chapter 4, the court's assessment of reasonableness is often heavily reliant on 
expert evidence, and decisions are generally consistent with best commercial practice.177  It 
appears that given the time-sensitive nature of such disputes and the need for expertise in 
determining the reasonableness of a refusal of consent in many cases, some form of 
alternative dispute resolution may create benefits for both landlords and tenants. 
6.6 Conclusion 
Many of the problems in the landlord-tenant relationship appear to stem from the fact that the 
legalistic nature of leases creates an adversarial relationship.  Neither giving tenants additional 
rights to pursue their own interests against one another, nor specific enforceable rights against 
landlords to manage a centre in accordance with some standard of best practice will address 
this issue, due to the complexities involved.  Both approaches encourage the parties to 
continue to engage adversarially; and not to do anything beyond what is required and insisting 
upon their own rights. 
Ensuring the long term prosperity of both landlords and tenants may require non-legalistic 
approaches, focusing on communication and cooperation between landlords and tenants.  As 
overseers of a portfolio of properties, landlords are well positioned to manage each property 
in the interests of all tenants, but they need the information and incentives to fulfil this role to 
best effect.  Drafters of leases seeking to ensure the long-term success of tenants and 
landlords in property portfolios might do well to look at the commercial literature reviewed in 
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Chapter 2, and focus on ensuring that effective mechanisms exist for cooperation between 
landlords and tenants, that tenants share enough information with landlords for landlords to 
manage their portfolios effectively in the interests of tenants, and that the interests of 
landlords and tenants are aligned through appropriate incentives. 
Given that some of the most important terms in a lease from the perspective of the ongoing 
management are drafted by lawyers, it can hardly be surprising that the relationship is later 
characterised by a legalistic, adversarial style.  In order to steer away from conflict, and 
ensure that both landlord and tenant can continue to benefit from the relationship as the 
commercial environment changes, the parties would be advised to focus on incentives rather 
than just rights.  An economically informed approach to drafting leases would help to ensure 
that the incentives of the parties are aligned, rather than trying to regulate their conduct 
through rules, which may cause conflict later in their relationship. 
Where disputes do arise, alternatives to litigation such as mediation, arbitration and expert 
determination may provide faster, more cost effective and more amicable solutions.  Lease 
drafters should consider including terms to encourage the uptake of ADR, in order to promote 
the long term success of both landlords and tenants. 
That is not to say that legal principles have no role in ensuring a healthy and mutually 
beneficial long-term landlord-tenant relationship.  The courts' evolving attitude to the ancient 
doctrine of non-derogation from grant is a recognition of the mutual dependence of landlords 
and tenants in portfolio settings.  The approach adopted in Chartered Trust and later in Petra 
Investments deftly balances the expectations of individual tenants and the need of landlords to 
adapt to changing commercial situations.  This provides some level of security for tenants 
while allowing landlords to realise the potential benefits for all parties arising out of flexible 
centralised control of a broad portfolio.  The position of judges, looking at the factual 
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circumstances of the dispute in question is far better suited to regulating the relationship by 
legal means than the drafters of a lease looking forward into an unknown future. 
Finally, it does not appear as though the application of competition law to land agreements 
will have any significant impact on the management of property portfolios.  Individual tenants 
may seek to rely on the Chapter I prohibition in seeking to escape restrictive covenants, but 
the difficulties currently present in relation to private enforcement of competition law are 
likely too extreme to be overcome by most private litigants.  This may change depending on 
how the Government approaches reforms of private enforcement. 
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7. Conclusion 
The centralised management of a group of commercial properties has the potential to yield 
significant benefits over diffuse control of the same properties.  Such benefits may include the 
internalising of externalities experienced between the properties, as well as economies of 
scale and scope.  Common ownership of the properties may provide an opportunity for their 
management to be coordinated. Portfolio landlords are therefore in an ideal position to capture 
many of these potential benefits, not only for the landlord, but for tenants within the portfolio, 
and for society as a whole. 
As seen in Chapter 2, active, business-led approaches to property management are more 
suited than traditional property-led management styles, to ensuring that the potential gains 
from agglomeration are realised.  By prioritising the needs of tenants' businesses, landlords 
stand to benefit from increasing rent potential resulting from higher tenant profitability.  
Broader society also benefits from the increases in productivity arising as a result of such co-
operation between landlords and tenants. 
Landlords who take such an approach have been supported and protected by judges and 
regulators.  The judicial approach to reasonableness is most lenient in regard to refusals of 
consent designed to prevent damage to neighbouring property and tenants, in pursuit of such a 
business-led approach.  Similarly, legislators have frequently expressed desires to protect 
portfolio landlords insofar as they wish to manage their portfolios for the benefit of all.  This 
has had a significant impact on policy making, mediating the general trend towards greater 
protections for tenants from unscrupulous landlords.  This can be seen in the "neighbouring 
property" exemption to fines provisions and the rejection of proposals to fully qualify all user 
covenants.  However, it appears in the latter instance that concerns of legislators are 
overstated, and that the full qualification of user covenants could be mandated without a 
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negative impact on business-led portfolio landlords, given the courts' approach to refusals of 
consent intended to protect the position of the portfolio, following a business-led approach. 
For a portfolio landlord to continue to realise the potential benefits of common management 
in the long run, he must adapt his management policies in response to changes in the external 
environment.  In order for a landlord to react flexibly to such changes, his powers to exercise 
control over properties in the portfolio must not be excessively restricted, or must change in 
response to market shifts.  Strict contractual governance of how the landlord should exercise 
his powers is likely to inhibit this. 
The courts' approach to reasonableness in the context of landlords' consents enables landlords 
to exercise flexible control over the duration of a lease.  Although many commentators have 
suggested a contractual approach to reasonableness, which would limit the landlord to 
considering interests protected in the lease, the courts have been more flexible, recognising 
the need for management priorities to change over time.  Reasonableness is used in contracts 
precisely because it allows a court to make a decision appropriate to the circumstances of the 
dispute.  The courts have determined reasonableness in the context of the relationship of 
landlord and tenant as it actually stood when consent was sought, not as the lease created it.  
This allows for the relationship to change dynamically on an ongoing basis in response to 
commercial challenges, without the parties having to constantly redraw their agreement. 
The courts have also shown an appreciation for the need for flexibility in defining the scope 
of a grant for the purposes of non-derogation from grant. 
Nevertheless, the need for flexibility should be taken into account by the parties when 
drafting their lease.  Tightly drafted terms may cause conflict between the parties as their 
relationship develops and the commercial context in which they operate evolves.  Rigid 
obligations may give parties powerful weapons with which to attack one another, but this may 
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only lead to conflict.  Giving tenants enforceable rights in the management of a portfolio, 
whether against the landlord or other tenants, may also undo some of the good that can be 
achieved by common management.  For these reasons, landlords should be careful to avoid 
giving tenants such rights unless necessary for a particular purpose.  Focusing on aligning the 
interests of landlord and tenant provides a way for the parties to ensure that each party will act 
in the interests of the other, while allowing for flexibility.  This may include the use of 
turnover leases.  Shifting the focus of landlord-tenant relationships from adversarial to 
cooperative may require significant changes in commercial practice, with increased emphasis 
on communication and information sharing between landlords and tenants.  Approaching the 
issue from a commercial, rather than a legal, perspective may, therefore, be more effective in 
achieving the aim of co-operation through alignment of interests.  The use of non-litigation 
dispute resolution procedures may help to refocus the landlord-tenant relationship to 
encourage co-operation. 
The wording of a lease will be critical in determining how the landlord may exercise control 
over dispositions, user or common areas in a development.  However, the broad factual matrix 
surrounding the negotiation of a lease may be just as important in delineating the control 
which a landlord may exercise.  The circumstances in which the lease was signed will affect 
the expectations of the parties entering into the lease, which frames their ongoing relationship.  
From a legal point of view, the expectations of tenants may also have consequences on the 
landlord's ability to exercise control over his tenants. The contractual approach to 
reasonableness, which marks the low water point of a landlord's ability to reasonably withhold 
consent, is heavily dependent on the expectations of the tenant at the time the lease was 
entered into.  The extent of the duties imposed on a landlord by the doctrine of non-
derogation from grant will also depend on what the parties expected the grant to be.  
Landlords might wish to reserve significant powers of control in order to ensure that they will 
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not be held to have been unreasonable in withholding consent to a change of user or 
assignment, but this may create an expectation that the powers will be used to protect a tenant.  
Drafting leases to describe the powers of control retained by landlords is therefore a subtle 
balancing exercise. 
Finally, it is not expected that the application of competition law to land agreements will 
impose any significant constraints on the way landlords manage their portfolios.  While the 
benefits to be had from common ownership and control are significant, the fact that such 
control is relatively localised means that property portfolios are still subject to competition 
from outside.  Even if an agreement may stifle competition, it is unlikely that the effects will 
be large enough for regulators to intervene.  Unless and until private enforcement of 
competition law is reformed to be a realistic option for tenants wishing to challenge 
agreements they see as anticompetitive, competition law is unlikely to trouble portfolio 
landlords.
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